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This dissertation is dedicated to all doctors and their families, who adhere to the 
highest ethical principles of answering the call of duty towards the ill, sick, infirm 
and injured, but who had to suffer litigation and disciplinary proceedings in an 
undignified, unfair, unreasonable and unjustified way.  It is trusted that this 
dissertation would bring some form of legal reasoning to bear upon the medico-
legal processes and the quality of the medical expert’s witness, opinion and 
testimony.  Thus it is trusted to contribute to maintaining the high standards of 
medical care and to emphasize that the wellbeing of the ill is still the supreme law. 
Salus Aegroti Suprema Lex
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PREFACE 
This writer as a doctor, surgeon and legally qualified person, has seen the abuse 
of medical expert witnessing in many spheres of legal medicine, court and 
disciplinary cases. Most of this writer’s colleagues agree and had found 
themselves embittered victims of hostile and in-appropriately wrongly interpreted 
medical expert witnessing. This has caused severe psychological trauma, loss of 
self-esteem and respect for the legal and the medical professions. 
As Justice has to be served with the inevitability of ever increasing litigation for 
professional negligence, proper guidelines and knowledge must be available.  
This dissertation is then such an attempt at improving the dire shortage of 
guidelines and knowledge to avoid the dilemmas and pitfalls of the Medical Expert 
Witness and contributing to improving medico-legal guidelines and knowledge.  
In this dissertation emphasis is placed on ethics and medico-legal knowledge as 
the mainstays for acceptable medical expert witnessing. This writer will therefore 
often and inevitably repeat arguments and statements but for the continuity of the 
broad message this is considered necessary. 
To keep a dissertation short and readable, the writer refers to third persons in an 
open discussion unfortunately in the male form. No intent to subject or insult 
women/feminism is meant with this word choice and apology is given if found 
offensive. Likewise the abbreviation of MEW is used for medical expert witness or 
witnesses and the plural form must kindly be deducted from the main sentence.  
The words opinion and/or testimony are preferably used instead of witnessing.  
It is sincerely hoped and trusted that the readers of this dissertation will find it a 
pleasure and most informative, as much as this writer excitedly discovered newly 
found knowledge and argumentation in the many books and articles read in the 
process of writing this dissertation. 
 
Dr GM Scharf.  MBChB(UP); MMed(Surg)(UP); FCS(SA); LLB (Unisa) 
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ABSTRACT 
THE MEDICO-LEGAL PITFALLS OF THE MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESS 
The fastest growing field of law is undoubtedly that of Medical Law with the civil 
and disciplinary cases flowing from it. Globalization, international communication, 
development and evolution of Law as well as Medicine, cause this worldwide 
rising medical litigation. 
Humanitarian rights, post-modern scepticism and even iconoclastic attitudes 
contribute to this phenomenon.  Medico-legal litigation and disciplinary complaints 
rise (in South Africa) up to 10 per cent per year. 
To assist the courts and legal profession, in medico-legal issues, helping the 
parties where the plaintiff has the burden of proof and the defendant for rebuttal, a 
medical expert witness must be used.   
The dilemmas and pitfalls arise, in that although knowledgeable medical experts 
could be used to guide the courts to the correct decision, the lack of a legal mind 
setting, court procedure and legal knowledge could affect the relevance, credibility 
and reliability, making the medical evidence of poor quality. 
The legal profession, deliberately, could “abuse” medical expert witnesses with 
demanding and coercion of results, which have unrealistic and unreasonable 
expectations. “Case building” occurs, especially in the adversarial systems of law, 
making the medical expert vulnerable under cross-examination, when it is shown 
that the witness has turned into a “hired gun” or is unfair. Thus, lacunae develop, 
making reasonable cases difficult and a quagmire of facts have to be evaluated for 
unreasonableness, credibility and appropriateness, compounded by the fact that 
seldom, cases are comparable. 
The danger is that the presiding officer could be misled and with limited medical 
knowledge and misplaced values, could reach the wrong findings. Several cases 
arguably show that this has led to wrongful outcomes and even unacceptable 
jurisprudence. 
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The desire to “win” a case, can make a medical witness lose credibility and 
reasonableness with loss of objectivity, realism and relevance.  With personality 
traits and subjectivity, the case becomes argumentative, obstinate and could even 
lead to lies. The miasmatic, hostile witness emerges, leading to embarrassing, 
unnecessary prolongation of court procedures. 
The medical expert witness should be well guided by the legal profession and well 
informed of the issues. Medical witnesses should have legal training and insight 
into the legal and court procedures. At the time of discovery of documents, via 
arbitration or mediation, medical experts should strive to reach consensus and 
then present their unified finding, helping the parties fairly and expediting the legal 
procedure and processes. 
Keywords: Medical Law, Medical Malpractice, Professional Negligence, Medical 
Expert Witness, Ethics, Medico-Legal Knowledge, Medico-Legal Training, 
Improvement of Medical Expert Witnessing 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION, DELIMITATION, PROBLEM STATEMENTS AND 
HYPOTHESES 
 
“Knowledge without justice should be called cunning, not wisdom,…and if prompted by greed and 
not the common good, warrants the description ‘brazen’, not ‘courageous’”.1 
 
1.1 Background to the dilemma of the Medical Expert Witness 
Law and Medicine, being of the oldest professions, influence one another, within 
an established relationship of law, health and ethics.2 Medical law, being a 
comparatively young discipline, has developed over the past 20 years 
academically into a distinct legal subject field.3 It is formed and cast out of a 
melting pot of laws, including those of tort or delict, criminal law, civil procedure, 
the law of contracts, constitutional law and family law.4  
Medical law acknowledges inter alia autonomy, consent, truth, confidentiality, 
privacy, the person and his or her dignity, as well as the respect for justice. With 
emerging human rights forming a foundation, medical law encompasses a 
coherent approach to medico-legal problems in the health sector.5 It is of value to 
have medical law as an acknowledged field, so that when medical negligence is 
for instance suspected, justice should be applied in the correct context, as not to 
be irrational or unfair. Here the role of the knowledgeable medical expert witness 
(MEW) must be acknowledged to ensure that justice is done.6 It is also perceived 
that as scientific health knowledge and interventions are advancing, so too health 
                                                          
1  Habinek Cicero – On Living and Dying Well 129. 
2  Geston Medical Law Review 11, as a foreword in honouring Prof Margaret Brazier, retiring 
as Professor in Medical Law at the University of Manchester, where she had established the 
field of Medical Law 25 years ago. 
3  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law 1. 
4  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law  3. 
5  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law 4. Medical Law, including a Right to Autonomy, to Dignity 
and to Life is founded in Humanitarian Law, enshrined in the Human Rights Acts of 1998, 
based on the guidelines of the ECHR (European Charter of Human Rights). 
6  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Law preface. 
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law and common law will develop, with patients becoming more aware of their 
rights, to impose regulations and constraints.7  
1.1.1 Defining the medical expert witness 
The MEW can be defined, as anyone (by implication in medicine - a medical 
practitioner) with special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a 
particular field or discipline, that permit him or her to testify to an opinion that will 
aid a judge in resolving a question that is beyond the understanding or 
competence of lay persons.8 With this MEW knowledge available to a court, it will 
help the court to understand the issues of a case and reach sound and just 
decisions.9 In South Africa the definition and value of a medical witness had been 
referred to in various cases for instance Van Wyk v Lewis (1924), Mohammed v 
Shaik (1978) and Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic and Another 
(2001).10 
1.1.2 The Duties of the medical expert witness 
It is the expected role of the expert not to be concerned as such with the law as 
he/she does not argue matters of the law, but argues technical matters and 
medical expertise. In the case of S v Huma and Another,11 it was stated that an 
expert witness is not to further the cause of a particular party, but to assist the 
court to come to a proper decision and finding on technical and scientific matters. 
This assistance to court does not revolve around the “opinion”, but indeed the 
witnesses’ competency whilst also considering knowledge, experience, and 
expertise.12 
  
                                                          
7  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 3. Examples would be organ 
transplantations, experimental protocols for cancer treatment, minimal invasive operations 
etc. 
8  Knoetze 2008 De Rebus 26. In the USA, a jury must be helped by a medical expert witness 
to reach a correct finding. Hookman Medical Law and Ethics 219. 
9  Grobler 2007 SAGR 11. 
10  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438; Mohammed v Shaik 1978 (4) SA 523 (N) para 528G; 
Michael and Another v Linksfield and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 1189G. 
11  S v Huma and Another 1995 (2) SACR 407 (WLD) para 409d-e. In this case mainly involving 
ballistic expert witnesses it was mentioned that especially in pro deo cases, that if necessary 
medical and psychiatric expert witnesses for the defendants must be appointed in the 
interest of justice (para 409f). 
12  Knoetze 2008 De Rebus 26. 
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1.2 Purpose and problem statement 
1.2.1 General background and the rise of medico-legal litigation  
The purpose of this dissertation is to state the problems around and encountered 
by the MEW and the quality of the MEW, so as to help all parties and the court to 
achieve fair and reasonable judgements, especially in cases of medical 
negligence litigation. The main problem seems to be the lack of MEW’s insights 
into medico-legal aspects, like the “duty of care”, “notion of proximity”, the criteria 
of “remoteness of damage”, the concept of legal “causation” and the constituting 
elements of negligence.   
The MEW must know that medical mishaps have multivariate causes and there is 
always a question of causal complexity, which often cannot be satisfactorily 
addressed. The MEW must be aware of a tendency to seek sufficient evidence, 
opinion and a human factor for attribution of blame, feeding a desire to punish. 
The lay mentality, causing a pitfall for the MEW is then, if something “went wrong”, 
somebody must be blamed. It is argued, that by exposing “medical accidents” and 
“blaming the doctor”, the purpose should be to lower the incidence of 
inadequacies in a system, altering the specific circumstances so that it could 
produce better medical results.13  
MEWs must know that once blame is levelled at a doctor, it is rarely a simple 
matter as allegations are often misplaced. Lessons (for the medical doctors) are 
then not learned from a tragedy, simply because all focus is on the blame. An 
opportunity for constructive intervention, in improving medical care and prevention 
of adverse events, is then lost. Medico-legally, there should be sufficient 
understanding of causes of iatrogenic harm and a sophisticated appreciation of 
how things go wrong.14 Best practice must be seen in juxtaposition of realism with 
medicine’s pressing needs and limited resources. Lawyers and medical doctors, 
                                                          
13  Merry and McCall Smith Ethics, Medicine and the Law 8. 
14  Merry and McCall Smith Ethics, Medicine and the Law 8. 
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especially expert witnesses, are “normally blind about their own blindness 
(implying lack of knowledge)”.15 
Professional people are generally overconfident in their opinions, impressions and 
judgements. Exaggeration could then take place.16 The dilemma and pitfall arises  
where a MEW, will support a bogus claim, the challenge being that it is then 
difficult to defend against such a claim.17  
Another dilemma occurs in that medical practitioners with seniority and 
professional standing are requested by various legal representatives to write 
reports, give opinions for possible litigation and then to give “expert” evidence on 
the care of patients, with whom they have had no clinical knowledge other than an 
unknown doctor’s notes, statements and records of management. Often their 
views, albeit not well considered and often judgementally prejudiced are then used 
as crucial to the final decisions.18 The MEW should be aware of the pitfall that it is 
difficult to single out any cause for the increase of medical negligence actions.19 
The most common explanations would be that more medical accidents are 
occurring due to increased pressure on hospitals and doctors, to falling standards 
of professional conduct and due to the ever increasing complexity of therapeutic 
and diagnostic methods.   
According to the Medical Protection Society,20 the increase in medical litigation in 
South Africa rose more than 30 per cent over the last four years whilst the rise in 
the claim costs was over 132 per cent. Out of court settlements and the potential 
incurred, but not reported cases, have probably also doubled.21 In the Gauteng 
province the medical malpractice/negligence litigation claims against the provincial 
hospitals are presently far over R 573million.22 The recent amendments of the 
                                                          
15  Daniel Kahneman (Nobel Prize winner, psychologist and economist), referring to 
economists, applicable to all professions. This writer then quotes Donald Rumsfield, former 
US Secretary for Defense “we do not know, what we do not know”. Kahneman 2011 Time 5 
December 56. 
16  Kahneman 2011 Time 5 Dec 56. 
17  Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 450. 
18  Redelingshuys et al 2006 SADJ 136. 
19  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 191. 
20  The Medical Protection Society is a member driven medical indemnity insurance scheme in 
the United Kingdom, South Africa and several other commonwealth countries.  
21  Howarth 2012 SA Medical Chronicle 1. 
22  Howarth 2012 SA Medical Chronicle 1. 
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Road Accident Fund (RAF) Act,23 as well as the implication of contingency fees 
are contributory, in that as the RAF claims and income decrease for the legal 
practitioner, many are now willing and available to do medico-legal work.24 To 
illustrate the dilemma of rising medical law incidences, is that in the United States 
of America, 10 per cent of annual healthcare expenditures go for liability and 
defensive medicine and that malpractice litigation costs rise 7.5 per cent annually, 
of which 50 per cent alone go for legal fees and administration.25 This increase of 
medico-legal litigation creates a rising need for guidelines, standards, training and 
accreditation of witnesses.26   
The concern is raised whether a medical malpractice litigation storm is brewing. 
The dramatic rise in litigation and its impact on the medical fraternity is indeed 
considered to be a looming disaster.27  Data shows that South Africa is following 
the United States and global trend of increased medical negligence cases. 
Presently the discipline of obstetrics and gynaecology is most affected, followed 
by neuro and spinal surgery, trauma, orthopaedic surgery, plastic-reconstructive 
surgery, bariatric surgery and fertility procedures.28  
Runaway negligence pay-outs are fuelling this phenomenon and “cherry picking” 
occurs of potential cases on a contingency basis, encouraging the hunt for 
medical malpractice/ negligence cases. This then promotes defensive medicine.29 
It seems not so much that the doctors are more negligent, as it is that the patients 
are more demanding of their “rights”.30 
                                                          
23  Law Society of South Africa and Others v Minister for Transport and Another 2010 CCT 
38/10. 
24  Pepper and Slabbert 2011 4 SAJBL 29. 
25  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 4. 
26  Grobler The South African Gastroenterology Review 11. 
27  Howarth 2012 SA Medical Chronicle 1. 
28  Pepper and Slabbert 2011 4 SAJBL 29. 
29  Bateman 2005 SAMJ 376. Defensive medicine is where a doctor, afraid of litigation, over 
services a patient to eliminate a risk of misdiagnosis as well as ordering many more and 
unnecessary tests to make sure and the over treating a patient as to (falsely) consider 
himself at low risk for litigation.  
30  Bateman 2005 SAMJ 376. 
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An adverse event occurs in at least 10 per cent of all medical treatment cases. 31 
Of these cases, 20 per cent have severe consequences. About 50 per cent of 
these were preventable and fewer still are really due to negligence. The doctor-
patient communication and attitude before and after the event have an influence. 
With an adverse event occurrence, the doctor must attend to the clinical and 
psychological need of the patient and the family, to minimize the “blame and 
shame” rebound reaction. Lessons must be learnt in order to improve patient 
safety.32 Doctors, lawyers, lay patients and their families must remember also that 
an expression of regret is not an admission of liability.33  
The question is whether defensive medicine, practiced by litigation wary doctors, 
actually prevents professional liability suits. The main effect it seems, at the 
increased cost for all, is that physicians protect themselves, inter alia by ordering 
superfluous tests. Thus defensive medicine transforms the malpractice crises into 
a vicious circle. This enhances risk, which without medical scientific rationale 
results in the potential litigation increase.34 
This can result for instance in higher malpractice insurance premiums. “Negative” 
defensive medicine ensues, which is characterised by avoidance, shying away 
from difficult cases with potentially poor results. Doctors for instance, won’t see 
emergencies, do no new procedures or prescriptions, avoid obstetrics and 
orthopaedics, and choose early retirement.35 Experienced staff are then lost.  
1.2.2 The effects of litigation on doctors   
Although it is not the focus of the research of this dissertation, cognisance should 
be taken of the effect of litigation on a medical practitioner. MEWs should be 
aware of this, so that they could conduct themselves in a manner as an aid to the 
court and not act as a "hired gun" for the plaintiff or the defence.  
                                                          
31  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 6. An adverse event is described as any 
event in medical practice where the treatment, against expectations, had to be adjusted to 
meet a changing scenario and where a patient suffers permanent damage. 
32  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 6. 
33  Writer’s emphasis. An expression of regret has been found to be a common factor amongst 
lay people that it demonstrates possible blame against or guilt by the attending doctor.  
34  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 6. 
35  Howarth 2013 Sept Medical Chronicle 11.  
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Physicians indicate that their primary anxiety about litigation is the traumatic 
experience of being sued for malpractice, which is often interpreted personally as 
embarrassing and an affront against their professionalism, resulting in 
psychological trauma. Doctors then experience a sense that they have already 
“lost” the case. The legal process is intimidating, seen against the background that 
physicians, in good faith, practice medicine competently and ethically.36  
 The constant state of vigilance exhausts doctors, rendering them dysfunctional, 
causing physical illness and even suicides due to the Malpractice Stress 
Syndrome, a variant of the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.37 Schooled in the 
pursuit of excellence, a summons fuels anger, frustration, isolation and difficulty to 
distinguish between bona fide and negligent errors, deviations from professional 
standards and blameless misfortune for a doctor.38 Pressures from liability 
insurance carriers to settle a case for financial reasons are upsetting and 
exacerbate the situation.39  
Although advised not to take it personally, the emotional toll is extreme as 
malpractice claims are experienced as a personal “assault”. Legal terms like 
negligent, reckless, careless, unskilled, unfaithful, and unprofessional are difficult 
to keep in perspective. The confusing and lengthy legal processes count 
emotionally. A successful defence and trial could be a pyrrhic victory. Cases 
become “character assassinations” and any physician’s practice can be faulted, 
“after the fact”, by a MEW. Pressures from liability insurance carriers, to settle a 
case for financial reasons, are upsetting and exacerbate the situation.40  
A worrisome effect which seems to be occurring more often is that 
reimbursements and compensation pay-outs are based on personal economics, 
sympathy or whim and not on legal fault and harm caused. To accomplished 
fairness to patients and physicians and to be treated justly, could be the end effect 
to strive for, facilitated by a knowledgeable MEW.41  
                                                          
36  Marshall and Kapp Our Hands are Tied 1. 
37  Marshall and Kapp Our Hands are Tied 13. 
38  Marshall and Kapp Our Hands are Tied 14. 
39  Hookman Medical Law and Ethics 2. 
40  Hookman Medical Law and Ethics 2. 
41  Marshall and Kapp Our Hands are Tied 28. 
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1.2.3  The relevance of the Medical Expert Witness  
It must be accepted that there are medico-legal issues that simply cannot be fairly 
decided upon without expert guidance, as a presiding officer probably has little or 
no medical knowledge. As in other professional fields like engineering, chemistry 
and accounting, medical expert opinion is well received. There is a practical test, 
namely that the opinion of a skilled witness is admissible, when it could help the 
court appreciably in reaching a fair, reasonable, just and justifiable finding.42  
This statement is supported by previous judgments. In the case S v Melrose43 the 
court found the viva voce evidence of medical practitioners relevant. In medical 
cases, it is important that the witness should not express an opinion on 
hypothetical facts, which would have no bearing on a specific case, or which 
cannot be reconciled with the other evidence and facts of a case.44 However, an 
overreaction is found in the case of Mohamed v Shaik.45 In this case it was 
considered necessary to decide whether an expert had the necessary 
qualifications and experience to express reliable opinions. Paradoxically, it was 
held that a qualified medical practitioner, with the MBChB degree46 and four years 
of experience was not an adequately qualified authoritative figure, under doubtful 
circumstances and facts, to discuss a (specialist) pathologist’s report. 
Formal qualifications are not always so essential and thus especially when highly 
qualified academic professors are called upon, they are in fact “expert medical 
witnesses” instead of the reasonable and fair “medical expert witness”.47 Here the 
practical experience and expertise should be more decisive to accept a 
professional person as a MEW. Obviously, greater credibility and weight must be 
given to evidence on what had actually happened than to the opinion of an expert 
                                                          
42  Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 93. 
43  S v Melrose 1985 1 SA 720 (Z) para 724I. 
44  Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 96. 
45  Mohamed v Shaik 1978 4 SA 523(N) para 528G. 
46  Medicus Baccalaureus; Chirurgus Baccalaureus degree as the accepted medical degree at 
most universities with health and medical faculties. 
47  An “Expert Medical Witness” would in this writer’s opinion be a highly qualified professional 
(i.e. a professor) with a niche interest and expertise that would emphasise and discuss 
exceptional medical knowledge (i.e. a rare syndrome), whereas “Medical Expert Witness” 
the emphasis would be on the reasonable professional’s standard of skills and knowledge 
and opinion on an acceptable course of action to be used in medical negligence and 
malpractice litigation. 
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witness who attempts to reconstruct events on the basis of experience and 
scientific training. Caution must be exercised in accepting expert witness opinion 
as evidence when it is in conflict with the probabilities which arise.48  
There is also a perpetual dilemma of hearsay evidence. An expert witness may 
not, as a rule, base his or her opinion on statements made by a person not called 
as a witness. This could be a problem with quoting journal articles, as many of 
these articles (even in prestigious journals) are proven to be false and 
fraudulent.49 However, experts may refer to textbooks and be allowed to do so 
provided conditions are met as set out in Menday v Protea Assurance Co Ltd.50 It 
must be shown that the expert witness, by his own training and knowledge, can 
confirm the correctness of statements in a textbook. The textbook must also be 
reliable as it must have been written by a person with an acceptable reputation 
and experience. This rule seems to be disregarded, in especially the preliminary 
legal consultations, when a legal representative uses an expert witness to 
encourage a settlement. The court however, can rely upon publications referred to 
and adopted by a credible and trustworthy expert witness.51 
1.3 Choice of legal systems 
The systems with which the South African legal system would be compared would 
be mainly adversarial systems which would be comparable with the South African 
system. The choice is then mainly English Law and then also from various 
Commonwealth countries like Australia and Canada, from which many lessons 
could be learnt. As most literature advising the MEW originates in the USA some 
reference to cases in the USA need to be made as well. 
1.4 Research methodology 
The research is based on a need of personal experience that as a medically and 
legally qualified MEW, large gaping lacunae were noted in the medical negligence 
and expert witness roles in medical litigation. It was surmised that many MEWs 
                                                          
48  Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 99. 
49  Ruiz M “Credibility of Science Journals under Scrutiny” http://wwwguardian/v.com/2013/10/ 
credibility-of-science- journals-under-scrutiny. (Date of use: 20 October 2013).  
50  Menday v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1976 1 SA 565 (E) para 569D. 
51  Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 101. 
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are ill prepared and often incorrect as far as procedure and ethics were 
concerned. Extensive literature studies were done with the available literature and 
personal communication. The medico-legal dilemma and pitfalls of the medical 
expert witness was presented at the 19th World Congress on Medical Law.52 
The concept of the unfair, unreasonable and “hired gun” MEW and the problems 
caused by their testimonies were well received and it was acknowledged that this 
must be prevented by giving MEWs some form of legal training. Over 60 high 
court cases and personal MEW experience also forms the foundation of this study. 
The referencing and bibliography is based on the academic guidelines as given by 
the College of Law, University of South Africa.   
1.4.1 Point of departure and assumptions 
The point of departure for this research is that the need for qualified and ethical 
medico-legal witnesses is high. This is especially so in South Africa where medical 
negligence and litigation cases are rising. The average MEW has no or very 
limited specific knowledge of legal thinking, reasoning as well as of the legal 
system. The knowledge and practice of medico-legal ethics is arguably the corner 
stone for effective medical expert witnessing to help a court reach a finding 
ensuring justice. The legal representatives and the so-called medical legal expert, 
as an assumption, must therefore be aware of the pitfall and dilemma regarding 
the ethics, credibility and relevance of the expert witness. These pitfalls are 
exacerbated by mainly irrelevant or wrongly interpreted facts and the building of 
cases by “trawling”’ “fishing” or when the MEW becomes a case of the “hired gun”. 
This could lead to an unsatisfactory finding and outcome of a case. Contributing 
factors to this phenomenon would be and is a conflict of goals between the legal 
and medical fraternity as well as the adversarial court procedures.  
1.4.2 Court rules 
The following court rules need to be taken note of and continuously kept in mind. 
These should then serve as the legally sanctioned mandate for the role of the 
                                                          
52  Scharf The Medico-Legal Dilemmas and Pitfalls of the Medical Expert Witness 
www.2012wcml.com (Maceio, Brazil – August 2012) 
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MEW. Rule 24(9) of the rules of the Magistrate’s Courts and rule 36(9) of the rules 
of the Supreme Court (virtually the same) provide as follow: 
No person shall, save with the leave of the court or the consent of all 
the parties to the suit, be entitled to call as a witness any person to give 
evidence as an expert upon any matter upon which the evidence of 
expert witnesses may be received, unless he shall  
(a) not less than 15 days before the hearing, have delivered notice 
of his intentions to do so; and 
(b) not less than ten days before the trial, have delivered a 
summary of such expert’s opinion and his reasons therefore. 
The above rules are confined to civil cases. In criminal cases prior disclosure may 
be demanded – and should generally be granted on constitutional grounds. In 
both civil and criminal cases there are certain statutory provisions which permit 
expert evidence by way of affidavit or certificate. These provisions do not however, 
preclude the calling of the witness in person.53  
1.4.3  Acts relevant to medical expert witnessing  
It must be accepted that virtually every medico-legal case is indeed a variant of 
the sui generis rule, as every case is under the circumstances one of its kind and 
peculiar in the approach. Medical expert witnesses and legal advisors must be 
aware of this fact and thus use the applicable laws to facilitate litigation and 
argumentation processes. The Constitution is the most important fundamental act 
in the present Post-Apartheid South Africa and all the human rights that are 
enshrined in it form the basis on which all subsequent acts as well as the common 
law must adhere and be subjected to. Insight into the Constitution and the relevant 
Acts must therefore be obtained by a MEW. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, has in it the Bill of 
Rights54 guidelines that must be used in medical malpractice litigation and which 
                                                          
53  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 212, Civil Procedure Evidence Act 25 of 1965 s 22. 
54  Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 to be referred to as the 
“Constitution of the Republic of South Africa”. 
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would be applicable to all parties. The following sections are highlighted as 
important to take note of, namely:  
• Section 9: refers to equality and subsection (1) states that everyone is equal 
before the law, and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
• Section 10: refers to human dignity where everyone has inherent dignity and 
the right to have their dignity respected and protected. 
• Section 11: everyone has the right to life. 
• Section 12: freedom and security of the person especially subsection (2) 
where everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which 
includes the right- 
(a) To make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) To security and control over their body; and 
(c) Not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their 
informed consent.55 
• Section 14: everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to 
have the privacy of their communications infringed.  
• Section 27: health care, food and water and social security including that 
everyone have the right to have access to health care services, including 
reproductive care and very important that no one may be refused emergency 
treatment. Thus with possible medical litigation it is expected that if a facility, 
or any medical practitioner, could and can be able to help a person in an 
emergency, it will be expected to do so.  
• Section 28: concerning rights of children. Subsection (2) states 
unambiguously that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in 
every matter concerning the child. The court is the ultimate supreme 
guardian of all children (applicable to those younger than 18). It should be 
taken note of that legal procedures and action could be taken against 
parents who refuse lifesaving treatment to their children.  
                                                          
55  This subsection is therefore important to bear in mind when evaluating informed permission, 
consent as well as therapeutic privilege aspects in medico-legal litigation.  
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• Section 32: access to information. A patient and also thus a doctor have the 
right to have access to information on request, especially what would be 
needed to exercise a right. 
• Section 33: just administrative action. Here everyone under subsection (1) 
has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.56   
• Section 39: interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Here it should be noted under 
subsection (1) that a court, tribunal or forum, when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; must consider 
international law: and may consider foreign law.57 
With this Constitution in place, the developing and maturation of medical law in 
South Africa, must use proper and applicable foreign law cases, especially when 
research and study shows tremendous scientific legal development of medical 
jurisprudence in other countries. The role of international law cannot be ignored 
and the development of International Law and especially following the mandate of 
United Nations Charter on Human Rights (UNCHR)58 over the last sixty years, 
dealt the death knell for medical paternalism, inappropriate applications of 
therapeutic privilege, the “wall of silence” and the “veil of secrecy”! However, the 
same rights enshrined into the Constitution must also at all costs be used to 
defend a medical practitioner in fairness, equality and reasonableness.59 
The Constitution is considered to have mainly a vertical effect, interpreted as the 
State versus the individual, but it also implies so-called horizontal application 
between private and/or juristic persons, enhancing the three principles of law 
namely constitutional supremacy, justiciable application and entrenchment. All 
laws and litigation must be subjected to constitutional scrutiny and the Constitution 
                                                          
56  This is most applicable in disciplinary hearings against doctors in Health Professions Council 
of South Africa (HPCSA) cases, which has a status of a high court. The burden of proof in 
these cases are “on the balance of probabilities” and not “beyond reasonable doubt”. The 
MEW must be very aware of this pitfall of possible unreasonableness as virtually every 
doctor and his legal team admit to dissatisfaction with HPCSA procedures. 
57  Writer’s italics to emphasise that in the development of Medical Law in South Africa, also 
especially pertaining to medical expert witnessing, many lessons and findings need to be 
taken from international and foreign law. 
58  United Nations Charter on Human Rights at https://www.un.org/rights/50/declaration (Date of 
use: 11 April 2013).  
59  Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 7. 
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must be applied to all legal proceedings, directly or indirectly.60 This is then the 
foundation of modern South African Medical Law, where first and foremost the 
constitutional obligations must be fulfilled.  
The following acts61 are also most important for the MEW to be considered in the 
appropriate aspects of medical litigation: 
• The Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005. Note must be taken 
of the implications and limitations (capping) of claims and the narrative test 
allowed where a medical expert witness could argue for appropriate special 
and general damages.62  
• The National Health Act 61 of 2003. This act provides the foundational 
structure of the national, provincial and district health care systems, including 
forming relationships between public and private care regulating the 
minimum acceptable standards. It provides for the statutory Health 
Professions Council, academic complexes and human resources regulations. 
Criticism has been levelled at a Draft Amendment for the establishment of 
the Office of Health Standards Compliance, where there is no clarity of the 
role of an appointed Ombudsman in relation to the HPCSA and the Council 
of Medical Schemes.63 
• The Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998. It could be envisaged that future 
“third party” financers would become more embroiled into medical litigation 
for instance the failure to provide for the payment of cancer medication, 
honouring patient agreements and exercising member rights. MEWs will be 
needed to determine fairness of paying for the prescribed minimal benefits.  
• Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997.  
• Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993. 
• Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 
of 2000. To note that this act prohibits unfair denial of access to healthcare 
services.  
                                                          
60  Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 32. 
61  SAPPF publication 2011 Healthcare in South Africa 170. 
62  Slabbert and Edeling 2012 PER 267.  
63  Kahn 2011 Business Day January 26. 
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• Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. Here it must be noted 
that information could be accessed that is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights. This then has an impact to access medical records 
and a patient’s medical history. 
• The Children’s Act 38 of 2005. The most important aspect here is that the 
age of majority has been reduced from 21 to 18 years, which is now the age 
of consent for medical procedures, and even to twelve years for the use of 
contraceptives.64  
• The National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
• The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. This act promotes social and 
economic welfare of consumers by promoting fair business practices.65    
1.5  Overview of chapters 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters, which will be so set up in an effort 
to flow into one another to reach arguments after problem statements, which could 
be used in a summary and conclusions. The chapters are the following: 
• Chapter one: this is an introductory chapter where the problems encountered 
by the MEW, the legal teams and the courts will be set out. The problems are 
elucidated which would be more addressed in detail in other chapters.  
• Chapter two: in this chapter applicable historical aspects are discussed.  
Strategically the vision is that when it is known where aspects of litigation 
have come from, the future adaptation for the dynamic evolution of legal 
aspects in medical law will be better formulated and understood. Emphasis is 
also placed on ethics and certain philosophies influencing a MEW. 
• Chapter three: medical negligence in litigation is defined and several 
applicable definitions of concepts given.   
• Chapter four: in this chapter the many dilemmas and pitfalls of the medical 
expert witnesses are defined and by way of literature studies, advised how to 
avoid these dilemmas and pitfalls. In so doing better focus could be obtained 
                                                          
64  The Children’s Act 38 of 2005, S 129 (2)(a)(b) and S129 (3)(a)(b)(c) 
65  Pepper and Slabbert 2011 4 SAJBL 29. 
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in expert testimonies and opinions, which again could ensure that the courts 
are helped by applying sound principles furthering the cause of justice.  
• Chapter five: this chapter entails aspects of other commonwealth and other 
legal systems which the South African legal system should take note of, 
especially under the Constitution section 39, that international law must be 
considered and that foreign law may be used.66 Traditionally English Law has 
a very vast experience of medical law as well as the legal systems of 
Canada and Australia. Many dynamic changes regarding the norms, ethics 
and qualifications of a MEW in the USA system were noted which could be of 
use here in South Africa. 
• Chapter six: Here the emphasis on the present medico-legal expert 
witnessing and its dilemmas in South Africa. On comparison it is the opinion 
of this writer that the South African system is fair, reasonable and just, but 
that the true quality of a MEW, by way of case reports, shows that it could be 
substandard. This could lead to wrong court findings. Norms and values as 
well as ethics need to be more refined and matured into a MEW and that 
there should be some form of training as well as a “code of conduct”. 
• Chapter seven: is the concluding chapter with a summary and conclusions.  
1.6 Hypothesis  
As law develops with the course of time, especially with the number of medico-
legal cases increasing, there would be a need for knowledgeable and qualified 
medical expert witnesses and that the quality of medical expert witnessing should 
increase. This would have the effect that medical litigation would on the advice of 
a MEW become more streamlined, facilitating the conclusion of meritorious cases 
in settlements outside the courts. Furthermore the litigation processes will be more 
fair and reasonable and the courts, plaintiffs and defendants helped in an ethical 
and professional environment.  
                                                          
66  The Constitution, section 39: interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Here it should be noted 
under subsection (1) that a court, tribunal or forum, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, must 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; must consider international law: and may consider foreign law. 
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MEWs should have to undergo some training in the “principles of medical law” as 
well as ethics.67 Round table discussions at the time of discovery of documents 
and the reaching of MEW consensus under the supervision of the various legal 
teams would prevent unnecessary long, psychologically traumatic appearances in 
court and being subjected to cross examination and other adversarial systems of 
court procedures.68  
The medico-legal profession as well as the various professional bodies of Law and 
Medicine should then endeavour, with the help of concerned societies and 
academic institutions, to educate, train and advise the legal profession as well as 
the MEW. It will be most necessary that a “Code of Conduct” be established.69  
1.7 Value contribution 
Through an overview of the causal and contributing aspects of medico-legal 
litigation, the knowledge gained will be used and valuable to educate and train 
lawyers as well as medical personnel in matters to improve medical expert 
testimonies. This will be to the immense help of courts but hopefully litigating 
parties would be able to settle cases out of court, saving money and time. In this 
dissertation aspects will be highlighted which could enhance the quality and fair, 
reasonable and justifiable testimonies, which will not cause any insult, humiliation 
or disgrace to any party. Thus the main value contribution of this dissertation could 
be to enhance the legally acceptable standard of the MEW and the opinion and 
testimony which could be used to every party’s advantage.  
1.8 Motivation  
A lot of problems are encountered with the MEW in various litigation cases. Close 
scrutiny of these problems show that many MEW's, do not understand their role 
and have very little insight into exactly what a legal team needs, due to a lack of 
legal knowledge. Many witnesses are false, hide facts, do not attend to the real 
material problems and often seem to have an unethical attitude and even start to 
                                                          
67  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 270. 
68  Theophilopoulos C et al Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure 267. 
69  Meintjes-Van der Walt 2000 The South African Law Journal 790. 
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do the argumentative adversarial role of the advocate, causing confusion and 
complicating the issues.  
The writer has interviewed (informally) over 200 doctors and surgeons about their 
experiences in various Health Professions Council of South Africa cases or high 
court cases and it is astounding how the majority feel that the various medical 
witnesses were extremely unfair as well as unreasonably hostile and acted as 
“hired guns”.  
At the same time it was noted that the legal profession browbeats the medical 
profession with legal terms, threats and imposing knowledge which fill the medical 
profession with submission and fear. By knowing some aspects of law, this 
intimidating role of the legal profession could be neutralised. 
In attending over 102 high court case as a Medical Expert Witness and with 
obtaining a legal degree, it became obvious that the MEW could be a very 
valuable team member and could give insights, not thought of by legal persons, 
which could win a case or at least not pursue a case that would have no chance of 
being won.   
For the benefit of all parties in the field of medical litigation it could be motivated, 
albeit more out of an altruistic and ethical point of view, that there must be medical 
doctors, who endeavour to learn more aspects of the law of medical litigation, thus 
avoiding the dilemmas and pitfalls of a MEW, which could nobly and honourably 
benefit all fair and reasonable parties. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEDICAL EXPERT 
WITNESS 
“Quod ego praetermitto et facile patior sileri” – [If] I make no mention of this, [I will] readily allow it 
to be passed over in silence.1 
2.1 Introduction  
The earliest records of medical negligence litigation are found in for instance, the 
Code of Hammurabi (circa 1 750 BCE) which provided penalties for “medical 
negligence”, by amputating a physician’s hand when having had caused a death.2 
The Greeks in 500 BC made medicine more scientific, where close observations 
and astute conclusions had led to acceptable good diagnoses and treatment for 
the time.3 The Hippocratic Oath was formed and would set ethical standards which 
are still adhered to today by most doctors (who often see the Oath as a prohibitive 
factor in not (unnecessarily) testifying against fellow doctors), taking the Oath or 
similar undertaking at graduation.4  The Romans frowned upon the medical 
profession, by employing Greek doctors (albeit as slaves), to do this “undignified” 
medical work. Medical malpractice was however already then divided into 
“intentional”, “negligent” and “ignorant”.5 The concept of culpa was introduced, 
denoting the absence of intention, but the presence of negligence through a 
commissio or an omissio.6 The concept of imperitia culpae adnumerator was 
introduced following the description of negligence by Gaius. 7  
The notion of causation, since Roman times, is pivotal to law as in medicine. 
However it was being understood that causation could be due to other origins of a 
                                                          
1  Haynes Ancient Guide to Modern Life 52. The writer quotes Cicero, admitting to an historical 
murder he knows about. 
2  Johns http://www.comonlaw.com/Hammurabi.html (Date used: 28 August 2012). Referring 
to “paragraph” 218. “If a surgeon has operated with the bronze lancet on a patrician…,and 
has caused his death,… his hands shall be cut off. For a slave…he shall render a slave for a 
slave.   
3  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 609. 
4  An example would be that many doctors would not want to testify against another doctor, 
especially for a considered reasonable error of judgement. 
5  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 57. 
6  Hiemstra and Gonin Trilingual Legal Dictionary 165. Commissio in delictual offence meaning 
to commit, and omissio emphasizes an offence due to failure to act. 
7  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 613. Imperitia 
culpae adnumerator meaning here that the lack of or want of skill is reckoned as a fault.  
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phenomenon or the consequential effects between two events, one which is 
claimed to have brought the other.8 Likewise, legal causation developed from the 
Roman Law of Delict, namely the Lex Aquilia (286 BCE).   
In due course a chain of causation had developed (especially now in present time 
medico-legal practice), because it is really seldom if ever that one single action or 
omission is the sole cause of damage.9 The notion of fault was the determining 
criterion of liability. Fault would be attributed to someone who negligently 
performed services under a contract or for a fee.10  
If patients died in the Roman-Greek times, medical culpability was considered, 
and if negligence was present action could be undertaken.11 Fault, meant in terms 
of a defendant’s actions against foreseeable risk of harm, was always determined 
first and then causation was established between the culpable conduct and the 
alleged harm.12  
Medical negligence cases after the Roman-Greek periods are obviously, as part of 
the dark ages, rare. If a physician caused a death, he would be at the mercy of the 
deceased’s family. In early Roman-Dutch law the imperitia culpa adnumerator rule 
survived. However, it was considered that it could be wrong to hold a physician 
liable for a death, as the fact that a patient died is not in itself any indication of 
medical negligence. On the continent, Europe came under the Constitutio 
Criminalis Carolina of Emperor Charles V, influenced by the humanistic school of 
Roman Law in 1530.13 This unified the legal systems of Europe, giving courts the 
chance to examine a case on its own accord, finding judgement based on facts 
and opening the way of the expert witness. Abandonment as cause of liability 
emerged and the payment of compensation for bodily injuries came to the fore.14  
                                                          
8  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 58. 
9  This is still very true in present time and astute lawyers and advocates must continuously 
bear this in mind when planning a defence or representing a plaintiff. The role of the medical 
expert witness here is most critical. 
10  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 76. 
11  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 77. 
12  Even now in modern times the defendant’s lawyer while accepting a client’s fault, can deny 
liability on the grounds of causation. 
13  Constitutio Criminalis Carolina http://www.latein-agina.de/explorer/hexen1/carolina.htm 
(Date of use: 12 March 2012). Emperor Charles V was the emperor of the Holy Roman 
Empire in the 1500’s, also being the King of Burgundy, the Germanic states and Spain. 
14  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 617. 
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In early English Law the tort of negligence was introduced, with the first reported 
case in 1374, under the reign of Henry IV in England.15 Note was taken of where 
people were injured by unintentional harmful conduct. The concept of “legal duty 
of care” entered the common law in England. Thus, due to the lack of care, 
diligence and foresight, as well as skill and honesty, patients could suffer 
damage.16 Although the causal link was not yet conceived, damage had to be 
demonstrated.17   
2.2  Roots of legal medicine development 
The roots of legal medicine could be traced to sixteenth century Italy and the later 
eighteenth century in Britain, then also being developed in Germany, France and 
the United States. The French term Médecine légale appeared for the first time in 
the late eighteenth century.18 In due course the term “medical jurisprudence” was 
introduced into America, following the lead from Britain.  
2.2.1 The development of legal medicine in Britain 
In 1788 Dr. Samuel Farr published the Elements of Medical Jurisprudence. Since 
then the systematic study and teaching of forensic medicine took place. In 1789 
Dr. Andrew Duncan19 emphasised that the term Medical Jurisprudence should 
also encompass “medical police” and “juridical” medicine. 
Professional malpractice in England became rooted in the publication of Sir 
William Blackrose’s (1723-1780) writing “Commenting on the Laws of England”. 
Here the term mala praxis has been used for the first time under humanistic 
expressions. In 1917 it was stated that mere mental pain and anguish are too 
vague for legal address where no injury is done to a person, property, health or 
reputation. This would have to be medico-legally challenged over the next several 
decades up to the present time where for instance post-traumatic stress syndrome 
is acknowledged. 20 
                                                          
15  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 617. 
16  Mendelson The Interfaces of Medicine and Law 8. 
17  Mendelson The Interfaces of Medicine and Law 10. 
18  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 14. 
19  University of Edinburgh, Scotland. 
20  Mendelson The Interfaces of Medicine and Law 31. 
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In due course the question of the “reasonable man” and the want of due care 
according to the circumstances arose.21 The notion of “duty of care” has been part 
of common law for a long time. Its practical effect is the restriction of freedom of 
conduct. Thus a doctor must not create actionable risks to the protected interests 
of a plaintiff, which fall in the ambit of the duty. However, there is no general test 
which would determine the existence or otherwise of the duty to care. The 
boundaries are vague and often there was no prior relationship between a plaintiff 
and the defendant. The decisions of remoteness of damage and the reasonable 
care to avoid damage, as well as the “egg-shell skull” type of cases complicate 
this insight.  The concept of the measure of reasonableness was stated by the 
Chief Justice Tindal in the High Court of England 1838 that a reasonable care and 
skill must be determined of the person who has entered a learned profession.22 
Judge Atkin formulated the so-called Atkinian formula of, a person from whom an 
action had sprung forth, who could reasonably have foreseen the result, should 
then be directly affected. The duty of care is then closely related to this concept. 
Medical scientific truth forms another element to be considered. Thus such dicta 
must be considered in the light of contemporaneous knowledge.23 
The concept of a physician giving an opinion on the defendant’s demeanour and 
facts produced in evidence in a court goes back to 1760.24 Even then a warning 
was made that over eagerness may cause extravagant statements and injury to 
the scientific standards of proof. Nowadays it is accepted, with the contribution of 
more scientific psychological and psychiatric standards, that with most illnesses 
and afflictions, that it is not possible to isolate emotional from physical factors. 
Here the Atkinian principle comes to the fore again in what is reasonably 
foreseeable. Thus “close” proximity in emotional shock translates into “causal” 
proximity. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has become defined since the 
1960’s.25 Although it could lead to over and misuse, the PTSD studies made the 
                                                          
21  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 19. 
22  Meagher, Marr and Meagher Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 192. 
23  Meagher, Marr and Meagher Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 193.  
24  Mendelson The Interfaces of Medicine and the Law 156. 
25  Defined as a prolonged state of anxiety and psychological arousal following emotional 
trauma episodes, together with concomitant emotional disturbances. Proven with EEG, CT, 
MRI, PET scans (positron emission scans) and is typical found with intrusive thoughts, 
nightmares, flashbacks. 
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claim for emotional shock more scientific. The “once and for all rule” might not 
cover this phenomenon in later stages.26  
Once culpa had been established, there will be an acceptable duty in English law 
to compensate. The law of torts proceeded on the assumption that the duty to 
compensate was based on a moral duty to provide reparation for the 
consequences of faulty conduct (that was foreseeable and preventable). In the 
legal history it is interesting to note that there were so-called compurgators or 
“oath swearers”,27 where formalistic procedures were followed. Although they did 
not testify, a set form of oath was made, provided they had personal knowledge of 
the case, in defence of the doctor or defendant. Initially, other witnesses were 
considered inferior to compurgators. However, echoes of compurgation are still 
present in modern law, and no much more that in the field of the MEW, in 
defending a respectable colleague.28  
Since the 1990’s it has become evident in Britain that MEWs could be lying or be 
giving false information. To counter this phenomenon Royal Court rulings have 
been given, strengthened as well as by General Medical Council findings, that a 
MEW can be held liable for negligence where false or misleading opinions and 
evidence was given.29  
2.2.2 The development of legal medicine in the United States of America 
The concept of medical jurisprudence was transferred into America by one Dr. 
James Stringham, who had studied for his medical degree at Edinburgh, 
elaborating upon the definition as “that science which applies the principles and 
practices of the different branches of medicine to the elucidation of doubtful 
questions in courts of justice”.30  
The first Medico-Legal Society was formed in 1867 in New York. This society 
emphasised that no physician or surgeon could be a satisfactory expert witness, 
                                                          
26  Mendelson The Interfaces of Medicine and the Law 36. 
27  Present in the Law of Ancient India and in English Law before King Edward I. 
28  Murphy Murphy on Evidence 401. 
29  Levine v Wiss 478A, 2ed 397 (NJ 1984), also General Medical Council v Meadow (2006) 
EWCA Civ 1390. 
30  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 15. 
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without knowledge of the law. Eventually the American College of Legal Medicine 
was formed, by a group of doctors qualified in the law.31   
The first USA malpractice case was in 1794, where a surgeon was fined for the 
death of a woman due to a result of surgery “that was unskilful, ignorant, cruel, 
contrary to all known rules and principles”. This was seen as breach of contract. 
Benjamin Rush, a signatory of the Declaration of Independence, called for lectures 
that would bring medicine and legal professions closer together.32   
In 1892 the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) lashed out at the 
disgrace of medical experts who were hired for theories and opinions. It was 
apparent that winning a case became paramount, resulting in jumbled cases with 
confused collections of half-truths and facts that are open to question.33 It was 
also stated that concern about the credibility of a medical expert testimony in 
malpractice litigation is nothing new. It stated: 
…disgraceful exhibition of medical experts who are hired… paid for theories and 
opinions… led then to conflict enthused with the idea that truth is the great object. 
In reality both sides care nothing for the truth, winning the case is paramount. The 
expert witness is seductively drawn up to make statements, then driven to retract or 
qualify them, even pressed to perjury and then this expert ends up to a jumbled 
confused mass of half-truths and facts open to discussion. 34 
In 1942 Dr. Alan Moritz described legal medicine as “the application of medical 
knowledge to the needs of justice”. Although meant to be interpreted broadly, the 
term was more applicable to forensic law or pathology. Later, in 1975, the Harvard 
professor of legal medicine defined it as “the specialty areas of medicine 
concerned with relations with substantive law and with legal institutions, including 
clinical medical areas, such as treatment of offenders and trauma medicine related 
to law, would be included herein”.35 
                                                          
31  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 15. This prestigious organisation is still 
devoted today to address problems at the interface of the law and medicine. 
32  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 11. 
33  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 13. 
34  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 292. 
35  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 21, quoting the American College of 
Medicine and the Law (ACML) - In 1877 the Harvard University established a separate 
professorship in legal medicine. 
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Since 1972 the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics evolved, presently 
set as basic curriculum goals that medical students must:36 
• Have the ability to identify the legal moral aspects of medical practice.  
• Understand and have the ability to obtain a valid informed consent or accept 
a refusal. 
• How to act where a patient is incompetent to consent or refuse treatment,  
• How to proceed if a patient refuses treatment. 
• Legally morally justification to withhold information from a patient. 
• When it is justified to breach confidentiality. 
• Knowledge of the legally moral aspects of care of terminally ill patients with a 
poor prognosis. 
2.2.3 The South African scenario 
It could be argued that the South African scenario arises out of the Roman-Dutch 
teachings of the common law, thus having also a great influence in the eventual 
development of medical law in South Africa.37 The Dutch concepts for fault were 
repetitions of the Roman law. The imperitia rule was also carried over.38 The 
Roman-Dutch law sanctioned physicians most harshly for medical negligence, 
originating from the Constitituo Criminalis Carolina of 1532.39 Apart from medical 
negligence the Roman-Dutch law emphasised that a physician has a “duty to care” 
for a patient and must undertake to complete the treatment and not abandon the 
patient. Roman-Dutch Law also influenced legal and moral convictions regarding 
the liability of physicians.40 
In Southern Africa the first medico-legal case was noted in 1877 where it was 
mentioned that a medical practitioner, like any professional man, is called upon to 
bring to bear a reasonable amount of skill and care in any case.41 This was 
                                                          
36  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 21.  
37  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 616. 
38  Imperitia culpae adnumerator – Loosely translated that the lack of skill will be held against 
the physician.  
39  Constitutio Criminalis Carolina http://www.latein-agina.de/explorer/hexen1/carolina.htm 
(Date of use: 12 March 2012). 
40  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 617. 
41  Lee v Schonnberg (1877) 7 Buch 136 – de Villers CJ.  
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followed by the Kovalsky v Krige case where permanent damage followed a 
circumcision and it was stated: 
A surgeon… undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable and competent degree of skill to 
his case.42 
Since 1994, the Constitution plays a decisive role. The term of “professional 
negligence” is preferably used as opposed to “medical malpractice”, the latter 
being a very broad term.43 The essential legal elements of a medical negligence, 
namely (1) an act, which was performed with (2) negligence, which (3) had caused 
harm or injury, at which (4) there is fault and a (5) provable nexus between cause 
and the harm, remained basically unchanged. Yet, technological development 
altered these standards of the levels of these elements dramatically, like 
complications of X-ray examinations, anaesthetics and organ transplantations to 
mention but a few.44  
With these paradigm shifts, the nature of the doctor-patient relationship and 
understanding of professional negligence, changed. Paternalism gave way to 
patient autonomy, brought about by constitutional and human rights 
considerations. Consumerism, impersonality and financial constraints emerged 
adding other dimensions to this complicated doctor-patient relationship formula.  
To establish professional negligence, a test for medical negligence has evolved. 
The test or criteria to be answered is basically that of a medical professional, 
having failed to foresee the possibility of harm (physical or mental) occurring to a 
patient in circumstances, where a reasonable person (diligens paterfamilias)45 in 
the professional’s position, would have foreseen the possibility of harm occurring 
and would have taken steps to avoid or prevent it, is then negligent!  
This basic test revolves around foreseeability and preventability. Although 
fundamentally objective, it has elements of subjectivity when the negligence is 
assessed. The standard of negligence is graded according to the case of a 
                                                          
42  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical  619. Kovalsky v 
Krige (1910), the plaintiff lost his case. 
43  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical 599. 
44  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical 602. 
45  Figuratively from Latin as the “reasonable man”, who would be prudent, diligent, careful and 
circumspect, just like a caring head of a family. 
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medical practitioner, where the standard would be of a reasonable medical 
practitioner under the same circumstances. It is stressed that it is not the standard 
of an exceptionally able doctor, but that expected of an ordinary or average doctor 
and his levels of knowledge, skill, ability, experience and diligence.46 By studying 
the historical aspects of the MEW mainly by the English (and by implication also 
the Commonwealth laws), the legal systems of the USA and then the reciprocated 
and developing medico-legal law in South Africa, it is interesting to note how 
mature refined legal reasoning had been promoted in its development. This in 
itself is the proof why a legal representative and a medico-legal expert witness 
should have insight to this historical development, to understand better the 
argumentation revolving around medico-legal cases. Understanding the historical 
background, would give enough reason to evaluate and appreciate the value of 
the philosophy and ethics involved in preventing the pitfalls of a medical expert 
witness as discussed in the next chapter.  
2.3 The role of ethics and selected applicable philosophies in the 
development of the present day medical expert witness  
“To certain people, even educated ones, the whole business of philosophising is 
distasteful. Others have no objection, as long as it’s conducted informally, but don’t 
think too much effort should be devoted to it.”47 
The knowledge a MEW should have about ethics, amplified by a “code of ethics”, 
would help to lessen the overwhelming burden of medico-legal litigation and also 
enhance the satisfactory outcome to all parties concerned.48  As lessons are learnt 
from history it could be argued that a “Code of Ethics / Conduct” for MEWs must 
be endorsed by the medico-legal community and ethical guidelines should be 
contained in this “Code”, as lessons learnt from the historical development.49 
  
                                                          
46  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438. This case is quite well referred to and quoted from after 
having been referred to in English, Canadian and Australian legal literature and court cases. 
47  Cicero (circa 45 BCE) On Living and Dying Well – Habinek 1 
48  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 3. 
49  Meintjes-Van Der Walt 2003 Child Abuse Research SA 42 
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Jean-Martin Charcot stated that everyone is aware of the common human need to 
tell lies, whether for no reason at all or to create an impression to accrue pity.50 
Physicians and MEWs for instance, reciprocally distrust patients especially when 
no lesions or injuries could physically be demonstrated, believing it an act for 
“compensation neurosis”.51 
The psychology of “moral panic” threatens fundamental values and fuels the need 
for punishment which should be reserved for those whose actions reveal morally 
relevant wrongdoing. The philosopher Jean Hampton (1990) reasoned that 
accusing, condemning and avenging are part of our daily life, but it is poorly 
understood. The term mens rea,52 referring to the state of mind to be culpable, 
creates a refined system, to distinguish between being blameworthy or blameless. 
However, as often experienced, there is a continuing tension between 
subjectivism and objectivism. Society’s practice of “blaming” creates a danger of 
losing moral values. MEWs can falter, for instance becoming “hired guns” when 
losing the values of ethics. This opens the full complexity of faults of human 
behaviour of all concerned parties.53  
Insights into the fields of psychology and accident causation theories are often 
ignored by the medico-legal team. It must be realised that there is a belief by the 
patient and the family, in individual accountability and then they become and 
develop into an autistic,54 self-centred, self-interest responsive person in 
scapegoating. They then have an inability to accept the inevitability of human 
loss.55 Fallibility is, alas, a condition of human existence. Doctors, like ordinary 
people of all walks in life, will at times err through ignorance or misadventure, but 
these errors in medicine can be fatal.  
                                                          
50  Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893), world renowned “father” of neurology, but also developed 
psychology and worked with hypnosis on hysteria. Worked at the famous Salpetriere 
Hospital, Paris, France for 33 years. http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Marin_Charcot 
(Date of use: 28 January 2013).  
51  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 5. 
52  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 5. “Guilty mind doctrine”. 
53  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 8. 
54  The term used here with the litigious patient and family having impaired social interaction 
and communication and having restrictive self centered persistent behaviour, refusing to 
listen and consider the doctor’s side of events.  
55  Durand “Responsibility” www.durand.org.za/tuis/medies/responsibility (Date of Use: 31 July 
2012).  
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2.3.1 Doctors as culprits, victims and witnesses  
From a medico-legal point of view, a MEW when asked to give an opinion or even 
a testimony is confronted by many ethical questions. The doctors have to do an 
evaluation whether their colleagues must be seen as culprits or victims and 
whether they should be prepared to testify for a particular party in medical 
litigation. It is an encountered problem that doctors are not willing to testify against 
colleagues – the so-called “conspiracy of silence”.56 Most reasonable doctors feel 
that any doctor can make a mistake or an error of judgement and when it comes to 
negligence, no intent was meant. All doctors know that the practice of good 
medicine is not easy, often complicated by difficult unreasonable patients. 
Biological sciences can also have a large degree of unpredictability. A question 
that begs to be asked is whether the doctor is a culprit or a victim of the 
circumstances of a particular case. Furthermore the witness doctor is placed 
under stress as the classical Hippocratic Oath has an undertaking which could be 
interpreted to keep silent, when encountering a situation that could reflect 
adversely on a colleague.57 The reasons could also be fear of losing hospital 
privileges, that malpractice insurance could be cancelled and fears of vulnerability 
in future litigation against a particular doctor that would want to act as a MEW 
against a fellow medical doctor or specialist.  This creates a dilemma for the 
“professional witness”. The consequences of any litigation against a doctor where 
a MEW has stated or defined negligence are patient-family anger, self-
centeredness and “autism changes” in the litigious patient or family.58 The 
defendant doctor, inadvertently but understandably, invariably reacts with hostility, 
can become inattentive and abruptness can follow, challenging his own ethical 
principles and a vicious circle could develop.59 
                                                          
56  Bateman 2005 South African Medical Journal 378. 
57  The original Hippocratic Oath, although not pledged as such any more, is usually still taken 
note of and the appropriate sentence is here which could enforce silence is “all that may 
come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession or in daily commerce with men, 
which ought not to be spread aboard, I will keep secret and never reveal” (own emphasis). 
58  With “autism changes” is meant that patients and their family become extremely self 
centered, with loss of contact to reality, inappropriate reactions to the situation and showing 
most unreasonable and unrealistic expectations.  
59  Durand “Responsibility” www.durand.org.za/tuis/medies/responsibility (Date of use: 28 
January 2013).  
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However, the “suit prone” physician (as a “culprit”), often has faulty working habits, 
personality faults and weak communication skills. This person often cannot admit 
his limitations, dismisses complaints and fails to defuse an upset patient.  He fails 
to realise that patients can react with hostility and anger, especially if ill, fearing 
malignancies in uncomfortable, painful and embarrassing circumstances, resulting 
in loss of trust and faith. The doctor lacks empathy, failing to understand that this 
is a form of communication, by ways of actively experiencing the feelings and 
thoughts of patients. This then loads the scenario against the doctor and these 
weaknesses should be taken note of by an ethical medical witness so as to fairly 
evaluate a case in which he deems it appropriate to testify, because this type of 
doctor must be brought back to order, even by using extreme measures like the 
law and medical litigation.60 
The effect of a summons initiates a period of disequilibrium in a doctor’s life. With 
unfair litigation this is an extremely heavy emotional burden for a doctor to carry. 
There is invariably shock, disbelief, shame, anxiety, anger, depression and 
physical symptoms. Self-blame could be excessive, lasting up to two years. This 
could, uncontrolled and under stress, cause that the defendant doctor will likely 
accept unwarranted guilt. Thus, a MEW must take care, also from an ethics and 
philosophical point of view, not to pressure the defendant doctor to assume 
unwarranted blame, adding to a phenomenon where a good doctor otherwise 
could become guilt ridden, more dysfunctional and contributing to miscarriage of 
justice.61 
Using a holistic approach, it must be borne in mind that psychologically, a doctor 
has residual feelings following medical litigation for up to two years. Furthermore 
angry patients undergo emotional maturity regression under stress and vent their 
anger with a malpractice suit, often unnecessarily complicating the issue. Once 
litigation has started, an apology will probably not stop it, and this long course of 
stress for especially an innocent doctor to bear must be prevented by means of a 
MEW using a well-considered ethical approach.62  
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61  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 179.  
62  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 179. 
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As most professional organisations and societies have codes of ethics and 
professional rules, more attention should be given to ethical and professional 
aspirations and obligations. It must be prevented that the MEW, “as a victim”, will 
be abused or forced to act unfairly without any integrity, by unreasonable, 
emotional and probably “compensation greedy” patients and their lawyers.63  
2.3.2 The philosophical role of autonomy and confidentiality 
For many centuries doctors were in a comfort zone of paternalism, domineering 
patients into treatment regimens which the doctor thought was right and 
appropriate. With the emergence of human rights and the post-modern era were 
patients, as independent responsible persons, would want to decide on their own 
terms which treatment and its implications they would consider, the concept of 
patient personal autonomy emerged. This encompasses to be able to rule oneself, 
and not be under the control and interference of others. Limitations to inadequate 
understanding and information to make a meaningful personal choice are thus 
rejected in this concept.64 Four types of autonomy applicable to the medical 
professional - patient relationship can be described. This is important to know, as 
any litigation could actually be enhanced by how this interaction develops namely,  
• A paternalist relationship65  
• A relationship of mutuality.66   
• A consumerist relationship.67  
• A relationship of default, which basically amounts to no sensible relationship 
having been established.68   
Above emphasises that an efficient and ethical doctor-patient relationship should 
be a fiduciary relationship. This is defined in terms that it arises when the 
beneficiary (patient) entrusts the fiduciary (doctor) with power which may affect the 
                                                          
63  Meintjes-Van der Walt 2003 Child Abuse Research SA 42. Meintjies-Van der Walt 
emphasises that not enough attention is given to the ethical aspirations and obligations of 
professionals involved with expert evkidence. 
64  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics 99. 
65  The physician controls the relationship and decides for the patient. 
66  The doctor and the patient are equal partners engaged in a sharing of information designed 
to produce the best treatment for the patient. 
67  The patient is the active dominant party, demanding treatment from a doctor who must meet 
the requests of the patient. 
68  Here neither party takes a leading role. This encounter leads to a non-productive result. 
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beneficiary’s interests and to the patient’s exclusive benefit. However, the reality is 
that the medical professional has the power of knowledge and thus the authority in 
relationships. This must then always be considered when evaluating the ethical 
angle as a MEW of a doctor-patient relationship. An advantage is that it would 
then also improve communication between the doctor and the patient.69 
A dialogue could then follow, abolishing the fear, lack of control and feelings of 
abandonment, which patients could experience, enhancing the concept that a 
patient has autonomy and in confidence, can make informed choices of treatment 
with an empathy sensitive and sympathetic doctor. The patient’s integrity is thus 
protected. This then forms an important concept of consent. Patients’ rights could 
be neglected if too little attention is given to autonomy. However doctors must 
guard against ending up submitting to a patient’s arguments, when the patients 
have no understanding of medicine or the issues for instance, giving the confused 
and frightened “no” to ideal or appropriate treatment or surgery. The argument 
which courts will have to settle in medico-legal cases is the question of whether a 
doctor, ethically speaking, was indeed acting in the best interests of the patient, so 
that proper and informed consent could have been given by a patient!70 
More and more cases, especially at disciplinary hearings arise where issues of 
transgression of confidentiality are encountered. Every such case must be decided 
on its own merits, as confidentiality is very important. This should ethically be 
taken very seriously, especially with computerisation nowadays which could cause 
loss of privacy. Insurance companies also seek forever more and more 
information about patients, infringing on the autonomy of a patient. Some medical 
commentators have described patient confidentiality as a “decrepit concept”, 
because often in reality it does not actually and realistically exist, infringing also on 
the autonomy of a patient.71  Thus reaffirmation of the importance of confidentiality 
                                                          
69  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 179. 
70  Herring Medical Law and Ethics 206. The rights in Medical Law, including a Right to 
Autonomy, to Dignity and to Life is founded in Humanitarian Law, enshrined in the Human 
Rights Acts of 1998, based on the guidelines of the ECHR (European Charter of Human 
Rights). 
71  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 948. 
  
33 
 
could ethically be seen as one way of restoring patient-doctor trust and show 
respect for the patient’s autonomy.72  
2.3.3 The effects of legal dictates on the ethics of a medical expert witness  
Legal dictates (for instance avoiding litigation by the practice of defensive 
medicine and “over servicing”) often act in opposition not only to cost containment, 
but also to good clinical judgement and also the accepted principles of medical 
ethics.73  
In the 4th century BC, Hippocrates, had the concept of primum non nocere - 
“above all, do no harm”.74 Questions from an ethical aspect must be posed by 
every MEW of what is right, what is justice and what it means to act correctly, by 
which way all parties could benefit. Every MEW must be evaluated in each witness 
session as to his level of practice regarding ethics and the basic philosophies, 
setting the standard in how a particular MEW would and could assist the court. In 
recent times, following transplant surgery and the changing relations between all 
in healthcare, important ethical questions are raised. Patient confidentiality and 
justifying being a MEW are examples of these changes.75 
 Every MEW should, prior to being an expert witness, undergo self-examination, 
whenever ethics and morality are involved, thus ensuring that there is an ethical 
and moral base, for  instance studying case reports and having group discussions. 
Flowing from this, ethical concepts in medicine and law, what is good, bad, right 
and wrong will be better defined. Ethics, could force the evaluation in situations 
about what ought to be done and whether the right thing is being done in a 
particular medico-legal case.76   
Morality refers to actual human practices enforced by values and legal practice. 
Thus morality is what people factually do, whereas ethics is what they think, 
                                                          
72  Herring Medical Law and Ethics 255. 
73  Marshall and Kapp Our Hands are Tied 1. This leads to “deprofessionalisation” of medicine, 
forfeiting medical judgement for legal protection. (Doctors are often reminded by their 
defence lawyers, that one cannot use an excuse of too expensive costs, when having 
thought about special tests and examinations). 
74  Both as philosopher and physician, in the oath, written by him or one of his students. This 
principle is more known in the Latin phrase instead of the original Greek. 
75  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 9 
76  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 9. 
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reflectively and systematically, they should do. Here the two main pillars 
(Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology) of medico-legal philosophy should also be 
understood by the MEW.77  
2.4 Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology 
It is most important that any MEW must understand the two most accepted 
philosophical theories so as to formulate and justify the basis of rendering an 
opinion and testifying, thus assisting the court with his medical knowledge (either 
for or against the plaintiff or the defendant).78 It will be noted that it is perhaps 
more acceptable to have and use both theories as a background so that the one 
theory’s strong points could compensate for the other’s weak points.  
2.4.1 Utilitarianism refers to an ethics theory that forms a subgroup of 
consequentialism. This is a moral approach theorising that the consequences of 
actions are exclusively taken, as the only concern in terms of which the moral 
status (“rightness” versus “wrongness”) of the actions is the way in which it is 
decided. The specific consequentialist theory, based on the argument that the 
relative amount of happiness or pain, that is brought about by actions is the most 
important indicator of moral worth.79 The following three claims to utilitarianism are 
formulated, and must be considered by a MEW who intends to give expert 
testimony in court, thus justifying his action: 
• Actions are to be judged right or wrong solely by the virtue of their 
consequences; nothing else matters. 
• In assessing consequences, what matters is the amount of “happiness” or 
“unhappiness” that is created; everything else is irrelevant. 
• Each person’s “happiness” counts the same. Thus, right actions are those 
that produce the greatest balance of “happiness”, with each person’s 
“happiness” equally important.80  
In medico-legal issues all parties should have an intuitive sense that the 
consequences of the actions of lawyers, doctors and especially MEWs, count in a 
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78  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 20. 
79  This is known as utilitarianism. 
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moral sense. If doctors as a MEW harm another person by their slanted or faulty, 
unfair and unreasonable opinion or testimony, it is wrong. The quality of a good 
MEW is that no unfair or unjustifiable “harm” should occur against the party 
against whom he or she testifies.  
This makes the utilitarianism quite radical, weighing up one party’s right to 
“happiness” with another party’s right not to have unfair and unjustifiable 
“unhappiness”. The greatest balance of “happiness” over “unhappiness” (fairness 
and reasonableness) is sought. A MEW could have to answer whether it is right, 
for instance, to lie or manipulate the truth, to bring about the most 
happiness/satisfaction for the most people involved, relying on the adversarial 
system and the other party’s legal team to let the law arrive at the correct finding, 
by means of a “check and balance” mechanism.81 Thus, this balance of bringing 
greater “happiness” over “unhappiness” can be at odds with the demands of 
justice, especially if the MEW is weak, ill prepared, has no strong integrity and 
lacks ethical values and insight. In countering this phenomenon MEWs must not 
be placed in an unbearable position, in that they cannot act with integrity. The 
MEW must be placed in a position to give a balanced opinion.82  
2.4.2 Kantian Deontology is the second significant and influential moral theory, 
with close association with the modern world. The term “Kantian” comes from the  
German-Lithuanian philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). This philosophy 
emphasises the role of strict behaviour to rules in conferring moral status on any 
action. Deeds have inherent moral worth. Acts would be wrong, regardless of 
justification, by having no possible advantageous consequences. It is by being 
human, that insight is developed in good moral characteristics like honesty, 
integrity and altruism. By being rational, right and wrong can be distinguished.83  
Kant’s concept of morality comes from the capacity to reason and for freedom to 
act autonomously. Here autonomy means to act according to a “law” that an 
individual imposes on himself. For Kant, the right motive is to always do one’s 
                                                          
81  Presuming that all parties have excellent advocates who through their training, knowledge 
and skill would ensure inbuilt automatic safety factors like checks, balances and counter 
checks to ensure truth and accuracy. 
82  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 23 
83  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 25. 
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duty. It is a “duty” to do the right thing to fulfil the inalienable sense of duty. This is 
a categorical imperative or unconditional demand, a role of “good will” in 
morality.84  
This emphasises that acts are based on rationality and that moral action is based 
on freedom which in turn is based on autonomy, which then invites unconditional 
respect. It is important that Kant meant it to be respect also for all individuals. This 
imperative forbids “abusing” anybody (like a MEW) as a “means” to something 
else.85  
Kantianism also explains the role which moral rules play in life. The sense of duty 
springs from the morally obliged respect for all autonomous human persons. In 
Kantianism acts are not from self-interest or for optimal consequences, but only for 
the sake of duty.86 Obviously there will be inflexibility, but it should be tempered by 
a concept of greater value or duty. There is thus a duty to prevent harm to people 
and respect autonomy and confidentiality, which every MEW should bear in mind, 
rather than being a virtuous person and not for instance a “hired gun”.87 This then 
leads to the ethical concepts of virtue ethics and principlism. 
2.5 Virtue ethics and Principlism  
2.5.1 Virtue Ethics: this is the oldest form of ethics in the Western Tradition.88 It 
is also called character ethics, as it is focused on the character traits of people.89 
The fundamental point of a virtue approach is that moral status is conferred on 
acts, not because of the characteristics of the act90 or its consequences,91 but for 
the character traits of the actor. What makes an act right or wrong, is the character 
of the actor, since it is the virtuousness of the character that confers a moral status 
on what is done. To act right is to act with virtue. By dealing with good people, 
                                                          
84  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 26. 
85  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 27. 
86  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 27. 
87  This could be used as a counter argument against doctors for not accepting MEW requests, 
for instance when it is considered that harm due to fault of a callous doctor had occurred to a 
patient.  
88  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 29. 
89  Aristotle is the most prominent philosopher associated with this. It was rekindled in the 20th 
century. 
90  Concept from deontology. 
91  Concept from utilitarianism. 
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there will be a guarantee of righteous deeds, producing goodness and preventing 
harm. Virtue is a character trait that is “good for a person to have”.92  
There must be good intentions and motives with which people embark on moral 
action.  Although virtue ethics have excellent qualities, it cannot actually stand on 
its own. Apart from care, virtues that are important to support one another are 
compassion, trustworthiness, integrity and conscientiousness. It would be useful if 
a MEW, would evaluate the actions of a doctor under these headings to reach a 
sense of fairness of his professional view in the medical-legal process.93  
2.5.2 Principlism. This theory refers to the approach to moral argumentation 
developed by Beauchamp and Childress, worldwide acknowledged experts in 
biomedical ethics.94 The basic idea is that moral problems, in accepting and 
evaluating a case, must apply one or more of the four basic moral principles.95 
These principles are (a) autonomy, (b) non-maleficence, (c) beneficence and 
(d) justice.96 The approach is to use these as “basic” beginnings of addressing an 
ethical, moral and medico-legal problem.97  
By using the four principles as a basic point of departure, consensus could be 
achieved. All other theories, alone, could not always be applied in medico-ethical 
situations, but they can fit into one or more of the basic four principles. This 
creates a form of common morality and it is pluralistic, as two or more principles 
form the basis of a normative statement.98  
In every situation the principles must be individually weighed. Thus each case 
must be analysed for principle application.99  
The emphasis is more on a process than a final product. The downside of 
principlism is that intuition (which could be wrong) plays a bigger role, but it is 
balanced out eventually with the consensus achieved by the built-in common 
                                                          
92  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 30. 
93  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics 38. 
94  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 37. 
95  Beauchamp and Childress Principle of Biomedical Ethics 12.  
96  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 39. 
97  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics, Human Rights and Health Law 14 
98  Kennedy and Grub Medical Law 23. 
99  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 39. 
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morality. Principlism, as a point of departure is very popular, as people could 
identify with it, because of simplicity and versatility.100 
Principlism should be used by all medical lawyers and MEW's as a background to 
each case as follows namely by the principles of: 
• Respect for Autonomy – respect is related to individual autonomous choice 
and decision making by patients. This principle takes into consideration self-
determination and is the basis of informed consent and respecting 
confidentiality in healthcare practice.101  
• Non-maleficence. This revolves around avoiding or doing as little harm as 
possible. False or distorted testimony against a doctor or for the 
interpretation of a patient’s case, fall under this heading! 
• Beneficence – this principle means doing good for others and promoting 
their interests and well-being.102 In healthcare practice this principle expects 
practitioners to act in the best interests of their patients and to promote their 
welfare.  
• Justice. In healthcare it refers to distributive justice and the fair allocation of 
scarce healthcare resources. The principle of justice also considers whether 
the individual is properly treated and whether society’s benefits and burdens 
are distributed fairly.  
Criticism against this system is that to use above as a single system providing a 
framework for dealing with all moral problems, is that it does not actually provide a 
unique solution to every moral problem.103  
By using principlism, the outdated doctrine of paternalism is then being eliminated. 
Paternalism however can still remain a comfort zone for many doctors. It could be 
argued that often patients trust a doctor to make the right decision for them, but at 
least then it must be at the informed will and consent of the patient.104  
                                                          
100  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 39. 
101  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics, Human Rights and Health Law 14. Respect for 
autonomy of the MEW should therefore also be borne in mind. 
102  It differs from benevolence which is “wishing good “for others. 
103  Gert, Culver and Clouser Bioethics: A Systemic Approach 26.  
104  Kennedy and Grub Medical Law 25. 
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Paternalism in medico-legal law is ethically juxtaposed to informed consent. It 
could be argued that doctors are victims of legal paternalism by lawyers 
encouraging pleas of guilty of malpractice charges, to prevent costly prolonged 
litigation. Medical and legal practitioners must also not make themselves guilty of 
paternalism.105  
Current ethical approaches tend to value a patient’s autonomy and rights of 
choice. The move from paternalism to patient centred decision-making is at the 
heart of many recent cases like Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479.106  
2.6 The post-modern era’s effects on medical ethics  
In the post-modern era,107 it must be accepted that doctor/patient relationships are 
also much affected by economic interests. Traditional subjects, processes and 
(Western) ideologies are abandoned, promoting diversity and discourse. Moral 
insights can thus be gained through a diversity of perspectives. A form of 
pragmatism has thus developed, born out of frustration with the old orders and 
dominance of power. There is a danger in post-modernism, in that the study of 
other philosophies is neglected. It stands to reason that doctors and patients will 
view one another differently when one is a State patient, treated free, compared to 
being treated on a private commercial basis. Although a consumerist philosophy 
applies, it does not or should not really have any impact on the altruistic ethical 
care of a patient.108 However it could lead to costly over-servicing, unnecessary 
referral and over-investigation, especially in facilities owned by doctors. Money’s 
corrupting role is difficult to avoid and this could lead to doctor/patient conflict. 
Patients inevitably see themselves as victims who could only fight back with 
litigation, and this pathway is fuelled by the patient’s ignorance of medical matters. 
The public should be educated in the broader picture of medicine and its costs. 
However, these polarised opposing attitudes between doctor and litigious patients 
                                                          
105  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics, Human Rights and Health Law 15. 
106  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 4. Here the doctor did not 
warn the patient about a rare eye immunological reaction which could cause the loss of sight 
in the healthy eye, as he considered “paternalistically” that the patient need not, as well as 
would not have wanted to know. 
107  In this writer’s view since from the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 1948-1953 
or from 1945 onwards. 
108  The exception here is probably cosmetic and plastic surgery. 
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can be reconciled, where a knowledgeable, qualified MEW could play a role based 
on respect and trust, fulfilling a main function of medical witness jurisprudence!109  
Human rights are always at the centre of any potential litigation where justice, 
information, access to health services, dignity and privacy are at the forefront. 
There is a continuous need for policy makers, judges and legislators to seek a 
balance between individual rights and the community’s interests.110 Because 
advances in technology and knowledge cause dilemmas which could be 
ubiquitous, health law has a very strong international global aspect.111 Admittedly 
it is difficult to define ethics, in the post-modern era.112 Ethics is defined as a study 
and practice relating to morals and addressing moral questions. Although most 
people will maintain that there is a difference between ethics and morals, both 
concepts can refer to character, behaviour patterns, custom, legal sanction and 
the distinction between right and wrong. 113  
Ethics seek principles of overriding importance, of universal application, 
concerning human well-being, with a rational approach to morality and should be 
prescriptive.114 Thus by putting ethics of medicine first and foremost in the practice 
not only of medicine but also in the practice of medical litigation, the MEW would 
then by maintaining this standard with integrity, give honest, fair and reasonable 
medico-legal opinions and testimony that would help a court and all parties 
involved to reach a fair and justifiable outcome. This type of practice of medicine 
and medical law, especially in post-modern times, could be a tool for improving the 
practice of health care and thus the role of ethics here as a positive factor, should 
be acknowledged.115  
In practice, many doctors express their concern that many so-called MEW’s do 
however lie. This is to sound extremely authoritative and knowledgeable to create 
                                                          
109  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 17. 
110  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA765 (CC) . 
111  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 4. Comment: Thus focus 
must be maintained on the health law development in other countries, especially for South 
African purposes, from other common law jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Australia , Canada and the Netherlands. 
112  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 17.  
113  The words “Ethics” and “Morals” originated respectively from Greek ethikos and Latin 
morales. 
114  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 18. 
115  Montgomery 2012 Journal of Med Law Review 8. 
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the impression that they are better and more superior to the defendant doctor. 
This is a rising phenomenon and is now addressed as a new and rising aspect 
and threat of medico-legal practice.116  
2.7 The ethical dilemmas of a medical expert witness.  
Considering all the factors contributing to finding a MEW as fit, proper and 
competent, the most important are the reliability, being capable of clearly 
explaining and presenting the facts, and being knowledgeable.117  
From a plaintiff’s point of view a dilemma is that a MEW must evaluate issues like 
malingering, vindictiveness, behaviour akin to childlike regression and autism, 
histrionic behaviour, hysterics and the so-called “compensation neurosis” which is 
motivated by the lure of pecuniary damages.118 
The ways in which the standard of care is assessed are themselves subjected to 
limitations creating further dilemmas, as “expert” evidence may be a poor indicator 
of what should reasonably be expected in a particular case. Legal and disciplinary 
procedures should be properly founded on firm moral and scientific grounds. 
There should also be a conviction that patients will be better served if the real 
causes of harm are properly identified and appropriately acted upon, thus 
eliminating unrealistic and unreasonable expectations.119 
Quite minor cases may present a dilemma in that it has consequences completely 
out of proportion to their moral culpability. On the other hand, a major departure 
from the required standard could even result in a criminal case, but many fall into 
the civil /common law jurisdictions.120 The pitfall could occur that a tendency has 
evolved to blame the last identifiable element in the chain of causation and the 
person “holding the smoking gun” is then mostly blamed. It is a mistake to 
concentrate on a single discrete act, without paying adequate attention to the 
overall performance of the individual in the context of the entire event. By not 
                                                          
116 Durand “The Mechanism of the Lie – Mendaciology” www.durand.org.za/ 
tuis/medies/mendaciology (Date of use: 12 February 2012) 
117  Knoetze (2008) De Rebus 28. 
118  Durand “Responsibility” http:www.durand.org.za/tuis/medies/responsibility (Date of use : 3 
July 2012). 
119  Murphy Murphy on Evidence 51. 
120  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 11.  
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doing so, the pendulum can swing unfairly against the defendant. It is most 
important that the cause of a problem be properly identified, as it could then from a 
medical point of view act as a lesson to prevent a recurrence. At the same time 
there must be caution against and no deliberate choice, to falsify evidence by any 
party, which would be a criminal act.121    
There must be resistance to the temptation to and it must be factually accepted, 
that there is no rational justification for judging culpability of an act by the severity 
of its unintended consequence. Likewise legal action against a doctor would focus 
on an isolated failure and discount many successes.122  It is therefore also 
important that the myth should be dispelled that in medical expert witnessing, 
especially in the adversarial system, that autonomy, certainty and real objective 
scientific knowledge actually and really fully exist.123  
2.8 The phenomenon of lies as a threat to medico-legal ethics  
Mendaciology is a new field to ethical study involving the mechanism and effects 
of the lie.124 The MEW to avoid embarrassment, to enhance his own image and to 
control a threatening situation (like losing his status as an expert), could lie 
deliberately, trusting that the lies and false information would not come out in the 
cross examination.  This is a prevalent issue as nearly 60 per cent of doctors have 
personally seen and experienced a MEW in court whom they believed to have 
been inaccurate or who have based their witnessing on questionable science.125  
Another factor which could fuel mendaciology is that by being “famous”, that it 
could be addictive. Thus to maintain this “famous” status, false testimony could be 
conjured up by doctors who have some form of a character defect, to impress and 
gain accreditation, thriving on the attention.126 
                                                          
121  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 14. Chain of causation: legally and 
during evaluation and analysis of the events it is realized that seldom if ever, just like in an 
aircraft crash, that one single person or incident precipitated an adverse event or harm and 
injury due to negligence in a patient. There are usually many small but leading incidences 
and events eventually culminating into the sum of a catastrophe. This must be evaluated. 
122  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 15. 
123  Meintjes-Van Der Walt 2000 The South African Law Journal 790. 
124  Mendacium definition: Latin for “lie”, also “mendacious” adjective in English for “untruthful”.  
125  Publication of the Centre for Survey Research and Analysis, University of Virginia, October 
2006. On commission of the American Tort Reform Association. 
126  Youngson and Schott Medical Blunders 233. The case is described of a certain Dr. William 
McBride, who triumphed by discovering the Thalidomide (anti-nausea pill in pregnancy) 
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The fine art of these lies is when there is truth in the semantics of the spoken text 
being essentially true, but in context of the situation and the circumstances, it is 
false. This type of lie is picked up by a knowledgeable person, who recognizes this 
deviation and knows the right answer. Medical professionals can control this form 
of lie, masquerading self-confidence and honesty as well as sincerity, knowing 
well that the truth is being misrepresented and so could lose or win a case. 
In the same sense a witness could “lie” by withholding the truth. This is well known 
in criminal law as misrepresentation by omission. The expectation is not met that 
the liar, as a MEW, could take steps to remedy the misrepresentation, but does 
not do it. The paradox and dilemma could however arise, by applying Kantian 
deontology,127 that focus on what is forbidden to say where obligations to tell the 
whole truth, could create many contradictions.128  
Most doctors have become aware of this phenomenon in especially HPCSA 
cases, where the MEW of the disciplinary council is an assertive professor with a 
niche interest and no reasonable experience in the private or clinical practice. 
However, if Beauchamp and Childress’ principles, especially that of non-
maleficence, are used by these witnesses, these scenarios could be avoided, 
enhancing moral reasoning and reaching proper moral decisions.129 It is thus 
obvious, that the solution to proper, fair, reasonable and justifiable medical 
jurisprudence must be a commitment to adhere and follow the philosophy of 
mainly the above mentioned as ethical and moral behaviour. 130   
2.9 Conclusion 
It is unacceptable that doctors should have to work in a legal vacuum, in which 
they are fearful that they could face civil, disciplinary or criminal action following 
risks that they take with every patient. Doctors know that an astute lawyer and a 
                                                                                                                                                                               
disaster in 1961 and who received many accolades (i.a. Commander of the British Empire) 
for this, found that several other drugs also had similar effects, but when confronted no 
evidence could be provided. After millions of Pounds were spent on litigation, McBride 
admitted publishing false data. Dr. McBride was found guilty of scientific fraud and erased 
from the General Medical Council (UK) medical register.  
127  Davis A Companion to Ethics 205. 
128 Durand “The Mechanism of the Lie – Mendaciology” www.durand.org.za/ 
tuis/medies/mendaciology (Date of use: 12 February 2012) 
129  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics 399. 
130  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 193. 
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naïve or hostile unethical MEW, could conjure up a case, even when only a bona 
fide error of judgement had been made.131 
For this reason, for proper judicial process, clear and general rules and 
qualifications must be in place, even by means of a statutory process. A check 
and balance mechanism must be built in. After necessary proof had been given of 
malicious or careless testimony by a MEW, the MEW could also be charged for 
“malpractice” or criminally for perjury.132  
There must be a commitment to only appoint an experienced and qualified MEW, 
by whom the professions and the public could be adequately represented. The 
dilemma is that once rules have been formulated, they eventually acquire a narrow 
meaning which allows no room for manoeuvring and then these rules could 
become more restrictive than originally intended.133  
The legal profession is drawn into this complex situation, leading to distress, 
emotions and even judicial hostility. This could influence the proper judicial 
processes, unless these situations are defused by knowledgeable expert 
witnesses.  
The long term effect, now that damages claims are colossal, is that experienced 
practitioners are refusing patients for fear of being accused of negligence. Young 
doctors are deterred to enter the high risk disciplines of the profession because of 
the risks involved. The dilemma here is the classic problem of doing justice to all 
parties.134  This is all amplified by the legio dilemmas a MEW must know of and 
consider when trying to give an opinion about a medical negligence claim that 
should be fair, reasonable, justified and justifiable, with ethical considerations of 
beneficence and non-maleficence to be obligatory.135 
 
                                                          
131  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 15. 
132  Freckelton I (2007) Expert Witness Immunity and the regulation of experts: General Medical 
Council v. Meadow Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 185. 
133  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 150. 
134  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 16. Quoting the statement of Lord 
Denning in the case Whitehouse v Jordan (1980) 1 All ER 650. 
135  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics 371. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DEFINING AND UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN LITIGATION 
“We must not take what is unknown as known and rashly assent to it. Anyone who wants to avoid 
this mistake, as all should, will devote time and effort to careful observation”1 
3.1 Introduction 
For meeting the requirements for patient care, a doctor is understood to bring forth 
a fair, reasonable and competent degree of skill.2 This has been shown as one of 
the most basic requirements for the doctor-patient relationship to develop (chapter 
one). The historical oversight showed that this tradition from a medico-legal point 
of view has been well established and is amplified in the practice of medical-legal 
ethics in ensuring that a doctor adheres to his side of this relationship (chapter 
two).  
The causes of litigation revolve around the breakdown of this relationship due to 
perceived judgements of error, or real and factual medical negligence or 
malpractice. It is therefore important to define and understand the concept of 
medical negligence and to conceptualise this factually, so that potential litigation or 
defence could follow if necessary. Definitions and concepts must be clarified so 
that no room for error is given that under a misunderstanding, a wrongful path will 
be taken causing real cases to be dismissed or findings made which are 
erroneous.3 The MEW and the legal team must therefore define and understand 
medical negligence, as set out in this chapter.4  
3.2 Definitions in medical litigation  
As much confusion exists amongst physicians around the various definitions 
widely used in medical litigation some clarification is needed.  
                                                          
1  Habinek Cicero- On Living and Dying Well 115. 
2  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 143. 
3  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Law 19. It is stated here: 
“For Law is beautiful – it has a certain elegance of logic, a certain rightness of reason, which 
when correctly understood and applied, is no less entrancing than the constructs of higher 
mathematics – this is certainly also true of medical laws”.  
4  Grobler 2007 The South African Gastroenterology Review 11 refers to MEWs that are held 
in low esteem. This is mainly due to their lack of defining and understanding negligence as 
well as their lack of ethics. Terms of “jukebox experts”, “hired guns” and “plaintiff’s whores” 
are used. 
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3.2.1 Medical malpractice: Where professional negligence resulting from 
improper discharge of professional duties or failure to meet the standard of care of 
a professional, resulting in harm to another. The legal standard of care for 
malpractice requires (a) a physician-patient relationship that establishes the duty 
of care, (b) an adverse outcome with actual injury or harm, (c) negligence by the 
provider (often interpreted as failure to provide the standard of care) and (d) direct 
causality between negligence and outcome.5  The term are often loosely used and 
interrelated with medical negligence, confusing many medical practitioners. 
Medical malpractice is used were medical negligence has taken place. Factual as 
well as legal causes have to be considered.6 Negligence refers to a blameworthy 
unlawful conduct in the context of how a reasonable doctor would have acted. The 
issue of criminal medical negligence then comes to the fore where foreseeability 
and preventability would be measured normatively by the “reasonable doctor in 
the same circumstances”, and found to have been extremely unacceptably and 
even deliberately below standard (creating a sense of horror and abhorrence as 
well as disbelief by the reasonable professional person).7  
3.2.2 Adverse incident: an adverse incident occurring in medical practice is 
mainly unexpected due to rareness but if argued, could have been foreseen as a 
possibility. This incident has a potential of permanently harming the patient and 
the doctor must take appropriate action. This leads to the adverse advent 
described as any event in medical practice where the treatment, against 
expectations, had to be adjusted to meet a changing scenario and where a patient 
suffers permanent damage. The dilemma is whether a reasonable careful diligent 
doctor would have foreseen such an event and have taken appropriate steps to 
prevent it. If the adverse incident is considered an accident, the dilemma arises 
that the event was not preventable and would be interpreted medico-legally as 
exculpatory, mitigating, unintentional and unforeseeable. Thus the definition and 
the meaning of such a broad definition must be placed in boundaries by the MEW 
and legal teams!8   
                                                          
5  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 283. 
6  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 283 . 
7  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 846. 
8  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 27. 
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3.2.3 Medical misadventure, mishap or error: is considered as a personal 
injury arising from medical error or medical mishap. Medical mishap is defined as 
an adverse consequence of treatment by (or at the direction of) a registered health 
professional, given if: 
(a) The likelihood of the adverse consequence of treatment is rare; and 
(b) The adverse consequences of the treatment are severe.  
With some caveats, “rare” is defined as something that would not occur in more 
than one per cent of cases.9 The severe is dealt with “arbitrarily”. Medical error is 
also here defined as the failure of a registered health professional to observe the 
standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circumstances.10 The 
short definition of a medical error could be drawn through to civil negligence. 
However, the definition fails to recognise the nature of human error and its 
distinction from a violation, or to recognise a body of science underpinning this 
concept.11  
3.2.4 “Act of God” (vis major) is often used loosely and should be defined as a 
direct, sudden and irresistible action or the operation of uncontrollable natural 
forces, which could not humanly have been foreseen or prevented. When many of 
these cases are closely scrutinised, often tell-tale signs are picked up like 
uncorrected electrolyte imbalances, which could have caused sudden heart 
arrest.12 
3.2.5 A medical accident is an unplanned, unexpected and undesired event, 
usually with an adverse outcome. An adverse outcome, following an error, must 
be construed to be an accident as “no one plans, expects or desires an error”.13  
  
                                                          
9  Strauss. Paper delivered at the Surgical Controversies Symposium, regarding Informed 
Consent 2006. 
10  The New Zealand Accident, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act (1992) definitions. 
11  The New Zealand Accident, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act (1992) definitions 
12  Green http://www.expertlaw.com/library/malpractice/medical_error.html 9. (Date of use: 12 
July 2011 ).  
13  Green http://www.expertlaw.com/library/malpractice/medical_error.html 3. (Date of use: 12 
July 2011). 
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3.3   The “medical negligent act” 
As a negligent act is the basis of medical malpractice litigation and the leading 
element of a delict, the elements of a delict, must be evaluated, to avoid dilemmas 
especially at cross examination. These elements are conduct, which was wrongful, 
at which there is fault that caused injury or harm, and that there is a causal 
connection or nexus with the harm or injury (own emphasis). Thus a delict is an 
act, that wrongfully and in a culpable way, caused harm to another, and that there 
is fault as well as a connection between the causation and the harm. All elements 
must be present before a plaintiff could, via a delictual action, pursue liability.14  
The most common causes of action, of which a MEW must be well acquainted 
with, are:15 
• Negligence. 
• Breach of contract, meaning the guaranteeing a specific result.16  
• Divulgence of confidential information. 
• Insufficient informed consent. A claim is possible even at a low risk of one to 
two per cent because failure to have warned could have deprived the 
claimant of a choice.17 
• Failure to prevent foreseeable injuries.  
3.3.1 Determining the cause – to prevent cause “confusion” 
Legally it is important to establish and confirm the cause generally and specifically 
of an incident of professional medical negligence. Confusion exists and pitfalls 
develop so that lay people and doctors confuse factual causes with juristic and 
                                                          
14  Neethling, Potgieter, Visser Law of Delict 4. 
15  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 280. Hookman uses “Black’s Law 
Dictionary’s” definition of negligence. 
16  Plastic and reconstructive surgery cases especially, as well as sterilization operations that 
have failed.  
17  Cameron and Gumbel Clinical Negligence – A Practitioner’s Handbook 12. 
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judicial causes.18 Legally speaking, the proximate cause seems to be a good 
approach and the MEW should be knowledgeable about it.19 
The principle for the proximate cause is explained as the closest related cause or 
sequence of causes that produces the undesirable or catastrophic event. Note 
should be taken by not choosing exaggerated descriptive words like “catastrophic 
or disastrous”, as a court’s opinion could be unfairly influenced! It also must be 
emphasised that a medical complication is not the same or synonymous as 
medical negligence.20 
The MEW should understand that a plaintiff’s attorney has to, pending the 
circumstances of the litigation, demonstrate that: 
• The physician departed from commonly accepted standards.21  
• The physician failed to keep abreast with changes in medical practice. 
• The physician employed a new, unproved and unacceptable method of 
treatment. 
• The physician did not take proper precaution against risks. 
• The physician did not perform to the standards expected of a reasonably 
competent and “prudent” specialist. 
In short, to obtain compensation the patient must show that the doctor was at fault 
causing an injury. Thus to find that a doctor is at fault, the judges must rely on the 
opinion and views of a doctor as a MEW.  The accepted view of the medical 
profession will seldom be challenged by a judge. As both sides can call their own 
MEW, a clash of eminent medical opinion could however unfortunately occur, also 
in the adversarial court procedures.22 
  
                                                          
18  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 175. This revolves around the conditio sine 
qua non or the question of “but for…”? 
19  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 190. Also known as the flexible approach with 
emphasis on the direct consequences of an act and reasonably foreseeability. 
20  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 295. 
21  Although not necessarily the majority’s use of standard, but at least should have followed 
respected minority’s standards. 
22  Kennedy and Grub Medical Law 397. 
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3.3.2 Assessing the plaintiff’s “harm” or “damage” 
The medical profession as a whole is most prone, unlike other professions, to 
make irreversible mistakes, often committed as an error done in an unguarded 
moment.23 It could also be problematic to prove harm, as a doctor can only 
undertake to do his best and can never guarantee a cure. The patient will only 
have a legal remedy if it can be shown that “but for” the doctor’s carelessness or 
lack of skill, it had caused the patient injury, that would otherwise not have been 
suffered. The plaintiff must prove that had the doctor acted acceptably and 
properly, the harm would have been avoided. To maintain an action in negligence, 
the plaintiff must establish that the doctor owed (a) a duty to care, (b) that the 
duty was breached, (c) that harm was suffered due to the breach (own 
emphasis).24 The MEW must understand this to assist the legal teams. 
Furthermore the plaintiff’s attorney must prove, with considered MEW advice, that: 
• The physician had a duty to care for the plaintiff. 
• The physician failed this duty. 
• This failure resulted in damage. 
• The damage must be measured for monetary compensation. 
However, the plaintiff must first establish the appropriate medical standard of care 
(by using a MEW), so the court can determine whether the defendant’s conduct 
was a deviation which then constitutes negligence.25 
The most common complaints against doctors are: 
• Deserting patients. 
• Devaluing patient and family views. 
• Poor communication, failing to understand patient and family prejudice. This 
is the most important contributing factor.26 
                                                          
23  Kennedy and Grub Medical Law 398. 
24  Kennedy and Grub Medical Law 398. 
25  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 80. 
26  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 110.  
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The decision to litigate is precipitated by perceived lack of caring and collaboration 
in the delivery of health care: 
• Perceived unavailability. 
• Discounting patient and family concerns. 
• Poor delivery of information. 
• Lack of understanding the patient and family perspective. 
Communication failures contribute to many medico-legal mishaps. Unfortunately 
these communication failures can be very complex. It has been shown that 
positive communication increased patient perception of physician competence and 
decreased malpractice claim intensions up to 50 per cent.27  
Although effective communication shows a doctor as caring, diagnostic errors that 
harm patients, result in multiple communication break-downs.28 It is important 
though to take note of patients contributing to errors, like not providing complete 
and appropriate clinical history information. Interpersonal relationships can 
complicate effective empathy and sympathetic communications.29   
An informed patient is an understanding patient.30 In the diagnosis and treatment, 
the elements needed to be covered are the options, benefits of treatment, possible 
harm, the seriousness of this harm, probabilities, factors influencing outcome and 
difficulty in avoiding harmful incidents. By informing the patient, the important 
medical ethic of autonomy, is fostered. If this could not be achieved, it would be 
wise to refer the patient. Lawyers, but also plaintiffs, don’t realise that the 
complete elimination of risk is simply not possible. What would be considered a 
tolerable risk is dependent on values, beliefs and scientific information. Risk 
management will continue to be a balancing act of competing priorities and needs. 
                                                          
27  Howarth 2012 SA Medical Chronicle 1. 
28  The prevalent aspects most consistent in prevention of litigation are compassion, 
communication, competence and proper charting according to most authors.  
29  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 81. 
30  A typical case law example would be the case of Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
Here a patient was not warned that her breast areola could become devoid of blood supply 
causing necrosis, following a subcutaneous mastectomy.  
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By being flexible and by using good judgements are the key factors to make 
appropriate risk decisions.31  
Most common reasons for patient dissatisfaction are: 
• Failure to diagnose, inordinate delay and failure to consult other doctors. If 
doctors negligently fail to diagnose and treat an illness, it will have to be 
shown, apart from the disease worsening, that had it been treated earlier it 
would have prevented worsening, at least for the interim period.32  
• Negligent prescriptions and invasive procedures. 
• Failure to obtain and document informed consent: 
o Must contain expected outcome, potential risks and reasonable 
alternatives. 
o The principle decisions in what the doctor advised and which the patient 
chose.33 
Good clinical notes should contain the patient’s subjective complaints, the 
objective clinical findings, the appraisal/diagnosis and plan, as well as the options, 
the opinions and the agreement. Records were considered the sole property of the 
doctor, prior to the present (RSA) Constitution.34 With the new Constitution this 
has changed, reminding doctors to have good quality notes, realising that it could 
be read by a judge in court! The procedure of discovery would also allow the other 
party to inspect the records. Records should not be given to other parties without 
obtaining own legal guidance, especially when it seems that the records are 
wanted by parties contemplating litigation.35 Refusal to give records after obtaining 
legal guidance would however only arouse excessive suspicion and paranoia.36  
  
                                                          
31  Choctow Avoiding Medical Malpractice 27.  
32  Cameron and Gumbel Clinical Negligence – A Practitioner’s Handbook 27. 
33  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 175. Stating in documentation that the 
“patient understands and agrees”. 
34  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 32 Access to Information and s 33 
Right to Just Administrative Action would apply. 
35  For purposes of building a case by “fishing” or “trawling” expeditions. 
36  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 291.  
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3.4 The delictual concept of causation 
The defendant’s lawyer, while accepting fault, can deny liability on the grounds of 
causation. This is because legal liability will be attributed only to the defendant if it 
could be shown on a balance of probabilities, that the action or omission caused 
or materially attributed to a risk of injury.37 The decision of liability is reached on 
the basis of legal policy considerations rather than seemingly logical extrapolation 
of facts.38  
The shift is from factual causation39 to legal (judicial) causation.40 Modern law has 
also now incorporated foreseeability of risk of harm, as against foreseeability of 
harm, making it inchoate.41 Factual causation, following inductive reasoning and 
established by the condition sine qua non test, could thus become superfluous. 
Judicial causation has then to be established as well and this could be a pitfall for 
a MEW to understand. A foundational case in South African medical law is Silver v 
Premier Gauteng.42 Here the patient developed bedsores and claimed from the 
Premier, but the factual causation could not be satisfied, and thus a judicial 
causation could also not be established.43   
It is important for legal credibility, for achieving justice, that following a careful 
analysis, it must be shown how a defendant’s conduct is causatively linked to the 
plaintiff’s harm. The task of courts is to determine whether some harm has indeed 
been caused by a particular wrongful act. The classical example here, bordering 
perhaps from the viewpoint of the MEW on a travesty of justice, is the Rogers v 
                                                          
37  Khoury Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability 22. 
38  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 81. 
39  Neethling Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 177. Determined on the basis of the evidence 
and probabilities, whether there is a causal link between an action and the damage. The 
obvious method is to establish whether one fact followed from another expressed in terms of 
the conditio sine qua non “test”. 
40  Neethling Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 187. Legal causation must be determined by 
criteria after factual causation has been established. There are many opinions and theories 
are formed. The favourite is the so-called “flexible approach”, which considers policies, 
reasonableness, fairness and justice. Others are “adequate causation”, “direct conse-
quences” criteria,” theory of fault” and “reasonable foreseeability” criteria.  
41  Here meaning that this concept is not fully developed, confused and incoherent. The Main 
question to be asked here was whether the risk and also its cause was reasonably 
foreseeable.  
42  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (W) para 570 E.  
43 ` Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 828. Silver v 
Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (W) para 570 H. 
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Whitaker case of Australia.44 In this case it was considered that a complication 
which only occurs in a one in fourteen thousand chance should have been 
mentioned in the process of informed consent, as it was, though remotely, still 
foreseeable. It should have been foreseen that it was material to the patient (own 
emphasis) to have been warned. A South African case is Castell v De Greef, in 
which similar arguments had been produced, in that a practitioner had to incur 
liability for negligent failure to warn of (foreseeable) material risks.45  
The concept of harm and thus also injury must also be understood in this context. 
Harm as a term has both a normative and a non-normative use. To harm someone 
need not imply a violation. In medico-legal terms harm is construed in the sense of 
thwarting, “defeating” or negatively influencing somebody’s interests. Acts of 
harming is then considered a prima facie wrong. The concept of harm should 
however be interpreted narrowly as a wide conception would include discomfort, 
humiliation, offense and annoyance or setbacks of reputation and privacy. Harm in 
this context should be limited to physical and mental harm including pain, 
disability, suffering and death.46 
The concept of causation is a vague area for a MEW. To define and identify it, the 
elements of a delict must be evaluated by the legal team with the medical witness 
giving input on what would be reasonable and a proper standard of care under the 
circumstances. If the MEW cannot understand the concepts of factual and judicial 
causation, the MEW’s opinion and testimony could be misunderstood and would 
be of a questionable standard making the MEW very vulnerable under cross 
examination. Causation, responsibility and legal liability must be evaluated 
together.47  
Causation must then be seen as a tool for inquiring into the relation between one 
event and another. It must be borne in mind that doctors cannot predict an 
                                                          
44  Here the Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 High Court case and (1993) 67 ALJR 47 
Appeal Court case of Australia found that the risk of sympathetic ophthalmia (loss of sight in 
the healthy eye, through the action of antibodies, formed from the diseased eye) that may 
occur in 1: 14 000, rarely performed procedures was foreseeable! This is an extremely 
unreasonable, if not unfair finding against a doctor (Doctor Rogers). (Writer’s italics and 
opinion). 
45  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) para 408I. The defence of volenti non fit iniuria was 
rejected (para 409A). 
46  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics 152 
47  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 4. 
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outcome, as patients could react differently to various treatments. Medical 
judgements, being dependent on many interlinking factors in medicine, therefore 
differ from other “predictable” exact sciences like mathematics and physics.48  
3.4.1 The role of a novus actus interveniens in medical litigation. 
Novus actus interveniens is also described as nova causa interveniens, which is 
interpreted as a new cause that is intervening and also a later additional 
occurrence (complicating a medico-legal issue). However it must be very well 
interpreted, and the role of the MEW here is to help establish novus actus 
interveniens from the normal or expected course that develops in the progressive 
evolving clinical situation of a specific condition, i.e. as complications of the 
specific condition.49  
Its occurrence is then vested in the break or interference of the continuation of a 
chain of events, flowing from a cause and another intervening, unrelated 
occurrence. This is an often hidden major pitfall of which a MEW must be aware 
of, exacerbated by the withholding of important and material facts by a plaintiff or a 
legal team.50   
3.4.2 Remoteness of damage  
Three conditions must be met, before a person who caused harm, could be held 
liable for it, these being the following:51  
• The person must have had knowledge that by taking an action (or by 
omission), which caused harm, they could be held liable. 
• The sanction must be proportional to the conduct. 
                                                          
48  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 5. 
49  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 323. 
50  Another example is a case (Van Der Merwe v Workman’s Compensation Fund,2008 
Gauteng North, unreported) of where a person who fell down a set of stairs (the fall being 
caused by broken floor tiles) fracturing his neck, developed bowel distension due to the 
turning of the large bowel on itself (volvulus). The patient had to undergo a permanent 
colostomy. This is a well-known and acknowledged complication of quadriplegia but the 
Workmen’s Compensation Fund refused to pay for this, viewing it as a novus actus 
interveniens. This writer had to sternly advise the court that it was not fair and a settlement 
was reached, compensating the patient appropriately. Had the medical witness no insight 
into this concept, the patient would probably have been legally bereft of fair payment and 
compensation.  
51  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 10. 
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• The connection between the action or conduct and harm must be proved.52  
By satisfying these legal criteria in civil procedures, liability could be excluded for 
harm that was unforeseen, even if it was caused by wrongful conduct.53 Here the 
“umbrella term” of “remoteness of damage” applies, where secondary damage or 
harm sets in by later intervention and not directly flowing forth from the original 
injuries or harm. When proving that the damage caused was due to an unlawful 
conduct, lawyers and the MEW could misunderstand one another. Here the onus 
of proof will lie with the victim, and although legal minds would argue for a 
standard of proof, most medical doctors act on probabilities that often fall short of 
the standard of proof required by a court.54  
Biological processes, like Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are difficult to 
prove, especially in the context of “remoteness of damage”. This could be 
circumvented if a court puts the onus of proof on the defendant to rather prove 
why a certain trauma or harm could not have caused PTSD, for example following 
a bullet wound injury. By insisting either way on the proof of a causal connection, 
the law will be aligned with the values that prevail in society, creating dilemmas 
and pitfalls for the MEW. Courts must emphasise, that lawyers as well as MEW, 
must at the inquiry stage (when a prima facie case exists), properly evaluate 
historical involvement and relevance, to determine liability for harm or remoteness 
of damage.55  
3.4.3 A failure to warn  
A dilemma could occur if the test for causation is taken to the level of a “failure to 
warn”. Whether a plaintiff was not warned and even if warned would not have 
been subjected to medication, to a point where if the patient still went on with the 
recommended treatment which caused harm, the plaintiff must show as the 
reasonable person, sharing reasonable beliefs, fears, desires and expectations, 
that the plaintiff would then not have agreed to the medical procedure. The 
question that arises is whether the plaintiff’s harm should be held to be within the 
                                                          
52  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 186. It is emphasized that in South African Law 
of Delict, a causal nexus can only exist between actual events.  
53  Like burn wounds obtained in theater, because the patient was not properly “earthed”. 
54  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 12. 
55  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 859. 
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appropriate scope of liability. This could also be valuable for a defence 
argument.56 
Perplexing questions arise regarding which factors should be considered relevant, 
in terms of responsibility, especially with intervening events occurring.57 Chappel v 
Hart is an important case quoted to evaluate “medical causation”58 within a failure 
to warn context. In this case a throat ailment was operated upon which caused 
damage to the nerve leading to the vocal cords. This is a common complication for 
neck operations and this risk, as part of obtaining informed consent, should be 
explained. The patient was not warned and although the surgery was professional, 
the vocal cord nerve was damaged. The patient claimed, had she been warned, 
she would have gone elsewhere for surgery. However, because the defendant did 
not foresee damage and as the patient needed the operation, there was no 
reasonable way to establish whether other doctors, would have had no greater risk 
of injuring the nerves. Failure to have warned did not expose the plaintiff to any 
greater risk, than what she would have faced elsewhere, but the patient’s 
autonomy was neglected. Had the plaintiff asked about this risk, different 
reasoning would apply. It was argued by the defence that had she gone 
elsewhere, she would not have had this injury. This was impossible to prove. In 
this case the plaintiff was compensated. The neglect of or ignoring foreseeability, 
is thus a contributing focal point in causation and the incidence of materially 
relevant, possible complications should be well explained in layman’s terms to a 
patient. However, severe misunderstandings by any average patient could still 
occur.59     
The notion of causation is pivotal to medical law, but paradoxically often does not 
meet the accepted legal standard. The two faceted legal notion of causation may 
be the reason as causation could medically be due to other origins of a 
phenomenon or the consequential effects between two events, one which is 
                                                          
56  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 26. 
57  Examples could be inter alia medication given causing an allergy which kills an orthopaedic 
patient, or due to negligent treatment, gangrene sets in and a limb is amputated. 
58  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232.  
59  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 860. 
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claimed to have brought the other.60 It is seldom if ever that one single action or 
omission is the sole cause of damage, especially in medico-legal practice.61  
The MEW must understand the shift from factual causation to legal causation.  
The legal system places a greater apportionment upon responsibility, whereas in 
medical settings generalisations are made.62 In the various medical disciplines, 
perceptions about the causation may differ. MEW's may display a degree of being 
unsure, especially when having to give explanations for the causation. Intrinsic 
subjectivity of the MEW can then subsequently cloud the issue.63 
Judges should only bring closure to the question determining medical causation, 
when the different MEW's agree to an acceptable extent, as exemplified in the 
South African case of Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Ltd and 
Another.64  If the experts still have disagreement, closure is considered, if there 
would be no further significant implications.65 Emphasis is placed on substantial 
and significant harm or damage, thus to exclude “de minimus non curat lex” cases, 
as opposed to cases where medical negligence had materially contributed to 
cause damage.66   
Use of “common sense” must be tempered by a personal sense of wisdom and 
reasonableness by a MEW in his opinions and testimony, when causation is 
evaluated. This must also remain normative as liability must be determined on the 
broad grounds of moral responsibility for the damage which has occurred. 
Presently in order for the MEW to avoid pitfalls and gaps in his testimony as far as 
causation is involved, he needs to be advised that ultimate questions must be 
                                                          
60  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 175. The two notions being 1. Factual 
causation (conditio sine qua non) and 2.Legal causation.  
61  To quote a favoured quotation by advocates in medico legal hearings or trials : “just like an 
aircraft accident seldom happens “suddenly” due to one cause, so does a chain of events 
and omissions add up to an eventual medical adverse event and a case of medical 
malpractice negligence”. 
62  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 83. 
63  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 85. 
64  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 
1200C. Here the judge emphasized he will not be misled by council eliciting expert opinions 
but will listen to believable (sic) opinions of various experts to determine whether the 
conduct of the respondents were reasonable. Para 1198I. 
65  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 89. 
66  Khoury Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability 25. “De minimus non curat lex” meaning 
figuratively that the law will not concern itself with trifle minimal frivolous cases.  
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answered like, “was there a breach”, “did it affect the plaintiff” and “did it indeed 
cause the damage claimed”. Here objectivity will then penetrate and solve 
uncertainty regarding culpability and compensation, making the focus for the MEW 
and the legal teams at least a bit clearer. This will help a court then to reach a fair, 
reasonable and justifiable decision. 67  
3.4.4 Loss of chance and hypothetical future scenario’s  
The loss of chance concept has internationally (especially in the USA) now also 
become a popular lateral way for litigation against medical malpractice. Especially 
inter alia, doctors’ prognosis statements could be used with the necessary 
caution.68 It is seldom easy, but provided it is well thought out with the aid of a 
knowledgeable MEW, this could provide a fair avenue for just compensation, 
where a harmed patient might have received no compensation at all. In the RSA 
this doctrine at the time of writing had not really yet been used (and thus not 
reported) although it had been mentioned in Oldwage v Louwrens.69  Several 
cases in the RSA had the potential for this doctrine (for instance the loss or 
misinterpretation of histology, leading to non-curative action) and thus the MEW, 
although it could be a difficult concept, must have some understanding of it. This 
doctrine has been described in the Supreme Court of Canada and defined as – 
“…the plaintiffs may be compensated where their only loss is the loss of a chance 
of a favourable opportunity, or of a chance of avoiding a detrimental event”.70  
The “Loss of Chance” concept for harm prevention is poorly understood. To 
illustrate, a case needs to be discussed.  
Hotson v East Berks Area Health Authority (1987) AC 75071 
In this case, a child who fell out of a tree developed necrosis of the 
injured hip. This hip was not immobilized and it was claimed that he 
was treated negligently, thus necrosis followed, even if accepted that 
75% of children with this type of injury would develop this 
                                                          
67  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 151. 
68  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 833. 
69  Oldwage v Louwrens (2004) 1 SA 532 (C) para 562C. 
70  Athey v Leonati (1996) 3 SCR 474. 
71  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 25. 
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complication. If this is taken as the view statistically and allowing for 
probability, this child could not claim for harm, but if a claim is made 
for a “loss of chance” then a 25 % claim for damages could be made. 
Thus the concept of “loss of chance” came as a developed remedy, 
were the court adopts a “competing fiction” asking: “was the defendant 
party’s fault, part of the sequence of this case’s history by which the 
plaintiff lost a chance of avoiding complications with its resultant 
harm?” The court must choose which rules are appropriate where 
there are evidentiary lacunae in a case. However in this case the 
plaintiff’s case was not entertained (arguably unfairly and 
unreasonably) on the principle of the “all or nothing” approach by the 
House of Lords.  
The theory is put in practical terms as a patient presenting for treatment with 
symptoms of cancer, but the practitioner negligently fails to recognize these 
symptoms and then does no tests to confirm this cancer. The correct diagnosis is 
then made after several months when the patient has advanced cancer. In 
retrospect using the size of the growth and spread, it could be deducted that the 
earlier consultation should have been so to have made the diagnosis provided a 
proper examination and tests had been done. It then could have been presumed 
that had the earlier diagnosis been made, the cancer would have been detected 
and treated. It could then be argued that the patient would for instance, have had 
a better survival for five to ten years. Now, after the lapse of time, the patient’s life 
expectancy would be a couple of months.72  
Assuming there had been a contract between the patient and the doctor, the 
patient would probably be entitled to nominal damages for breach of implied terms 
requiring the exercise of reasonable care and skill. There could also be 
compensation for pain suffered, until the diagnosis was made, as well as for loss 
of earnings. The question is whether loss of chance of survival could be claimed 
for, as on probability any such cancer patient would have died naturally on the 
balance of probabilities, unless this could also be proportionally compensated. 
Loss of chance should be compensated appropriately, even if the chances are 
                                                          
72  De Raedt Q “Loss of a Chance in Medical Malpractice” http://www.2012wcml.com 145 (Date 
of use: 19 August 2012). 
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less than even (proportionally) for a predictable course of the disease. It should be 
recognised as such rather than as an “all-or-nothing” proposition.73  Alternatively, 
as it is not to be a drastic change of the traditional views in the RSA, defendants 
could still be held accountable for the proportion of damages that they are liable 
for.74  
Another pitfall that could develop under loss of chance is the distinction between 
past facts and future hypothetical facts. In the court’s assessment of damages it 
could hinge on what will be and what would have been, contrasted by determining 
what was.  Hypothetical events on what might or might not have occurred have 
since been applied almost daily, where a plaintiff is suffering from an underlying 
natural condition that might have affected the plaintiff, if an injury or a missed 
diagnosis had not occurred.75   
This raises questions in relation to causation, since any causal questions would 
involve the hypothetical scenario of what would have happened had the defendant 
not been negligent. The acceptable course would be that proof on the balance of 
probabilities would be required in the relation to causation. Evidential onus placed 
on the defendant, can show what would have been the effects of an underlying 
condition, if the plaintiff had no injuries. The ultimate onus still rests on the plaintiff, 
to prove that the defendant caused the harm for which damages are sought. Thus 
the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that a defendant’s 
negligence contributed materially to the present symptoms. Alternatively, it might 
be easier to convince a court and “prove” that there is now a loss of survival 
chances, bypassing the proof of causality to an extent.76  Pending the evidential 
proof and the defendant’s case, a court could reduce the plaintiff’s claim 
appropriately, bearing contingencies and imponderables in mind.77   
So-called open and closed cases must also be touched on briefly. The open cases 
is where a plaintiff has been exposed to a risk, which may or may not occur and is 
confronted with the dilemma of “the once and for all rule” of assessment of 
                                                          
73  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 154. 
74  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 839. 
75  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 166. Scenario’s that come to 
mind are obesity, heart and lung conditions. 
76  De Raedt http//www.2012wcml.com 145 (Date of use: 19 August 2012). 
77  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 168 
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damages. If the patient waits for the risk occurrence, the limitation period may 
have passed. If the plaintiff sues before the risk occurrence, damages may be 
awarded only on the chance basis. The plaintiff will probably be 
undercompensated if the risk does eventuate. Here provisional damages should 
be compensated and rules be developed in the so-called chance and “forecast” 
cases. If the risk realizes or occurs at a later stage another court appearance 
could be scheduled.78  
“Closed” cases are linked to the discovery of the fact of negligence and there are 
no reasons for waiting or expecting the eventuation of a risk. At trial, the facts will 
already have been evident. All personal injury litigation has the inevitable 
uncertainty of what would have happened and what will happen.79    
It is important to establish at the time of harm or death, whether a disease or 
condition contributing to it, was present. Weaknesses will be present to help define 
whether these factors fall in the remoteness of cause, but should be mentioned to 
show that consideration was given to these factors in evaluating the case for a 
loss of chance. The court could then have the final say.80  
Other dilemmas contributing to negligence in loss of chance case that must be 
taken note of could be: 
• The absence of a good and comprehensive history of an incident that caused 
harm or death. It might be unreliable and not accessible, creating unique 
challenges. 
• The absences of a thorough examination, where the patient may have been 
abusive, threatening, uncooperative, agitated, confused or have intellectual 
disabilities. 
• Unreasonable and unrealistic expectations.  
• Review of cases may assist and must be considered where possible to 
observe delayed appearances or the permanent evolution of injuries.  
                                                          
78  This has been introduced in England in 1985 by Rules of Court and Supreme Court Act 
1981 s 32A, following recommendations by the Law Commission.  
79  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 176. 
80  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 305. 
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• Medical practitioners have limited medico-legal knowledge which creates 
problems. Factually incorrect information is then given. No appreciation is 
given on how much weight would be placed on an opinion by a court, which 
may influence a charge or a verdict.  
• Impartiality is a critical component to the provisions of medico-legal services. 
Immense pressure could be brought on a defendant medical practitioner to 
resolve an issue, compromising fairness.  
• Objectivity must be maintained, as its absence could lead to inappropriate 
expectations and observations.81  
In the Rogers v Whitaker case, 82 where a complication ensued following loss of 
sight, which was stated to be a “one in 14 000” risk of occurring, the lesson is that 
it was found that a doctor has a duty, even if it is onerous, to warn a patient of a 
material risk inherent in the proposed treatment – a risk is considered material if in 
the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable patient, if warned of the 
risk, would be likely to attach significance to it, or if the practitioner is aware that 
the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to 
it. This is however subject to therapeutic privilege.83 In South African case law a 
similar case is found, namely Verhoef v Meyer84 of an ophthalmologist of whom 
the patient claimed did not give adequate informed consent, in that both her eyes 
had to be operated for retinal detachment instead of only the right eye. The case 
was dismissed against the doctor, even on appeal, as the doctor could 
professionally defend himself against the charges. Comparing the two cases, it 
does seem that the South African Law would be more tolerant to the action of a 
doctor when he acts in the true interest of the patient.85  
It must also be accepted that all surgery and medical treatment involves risk which 
could precipitate loss of chance and other litigation. Routine hospital admissions 
can for instance carry risks of infection. Material risks might really be remote but a 
                                                          
81  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 310  
82  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 
83  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 984. 
84  Verhoef v Meyer 1976 AD, (T) unreported.  
85  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 35. 
64 
 
doctor must consider what a reasonable person would think, considering the 
specific patient’s anxiety and concerns.86 
3.5 The possible role of imputed knowledge in negligence 
The level of imputed knowledge, which a reasonable patient should have, can and 
should be a defence against medical negligence claims. Just like in the law of 
enterprises and commerce, if a person goes into a contractual relationship, he 
must make sure of the facts and have some additional knowledge. By using the 
principle of caveat emptor,87 the reasonable and knowledgeable patient must by 
study, asking questions and reading up, gain extra background knowledge and 
information, especially of the facts, effects and complications of medical 
procedures.  
However, there will be many unresolved issues and as long as those could be 
covered by the imputed knowledge concept, it would be significantly useful. The 
rest of the complications, which have an under 1/100 chance of occurring, should 
be viewed if not materially important to a specific patient, as unlikely or a remote 
possibility.88  
A balance has to be maintained between the impacts of advice regarding 
significant risks, versus the patient’s fear. It is very important for a doctor to 
mention at the outset, what would happen if no treatment is given and then to 
mention various courses of action with the advantages and disadvantages. The 
patient’s own wishes and quality of life must be taken into account. Prospects of 
success and likely outcomes are also important. A point will be reached which will 
define that the doctor has done what is reasonable, albeit not easy to obtain or 
recognise in practice, regarding informing the patient appropriately accepted as 
the optimal treatment regimen decided upon, as well as the possible adverse 
                                                          
86  Smith and Maddern The Surgical Litigation Crises 36. 
87  Caveat Emptor – from Latin literally meaning “buyer beware”, or in medical case in these 
modern times “patient beware”. 
88  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 36. Here examples could also be to warn a singer or 
telephonist that after a thyroid operation the voice could be hoarse, or an athlete, that he 
would not be able to train for six weeks, 
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effects that could occur. It must be realized that the complete elimination and 
discussion of most risks, are simply not possible!89 
Should the information given, had led to other opinions or the consulting of 
another surgeon, it does not imply that there would have been any reduction of 
risk but that note should be taken that the patient is a “statistically significant risk 
case”.90 This risk should be explicitly addressed in these cases. It is important to 
consider absolute as well as relative changes in outcome. Then secondly, the 
severity and permanence of injury must be taken into account. Finally the 
particular concerns and circumstances of the patient involved must be 
considered.91  
Imputed knowledge should lead to the issue that statistical errors are important in 
the confusing ways of expressing probabilities. One such idea is if data falls 
outside of the 95 per cent confidence limit, it is “unworthy” to be considered. The 
legal team must then also understand MEW reasoning. Reasoning is a process of 
moving through a chain of arguments from premises to a conclusion. This should 
be a cognitive process. Scientific cognitive findings suggest that humans, 
irrespective of training, can be “blind”.92  
Although probabilistic information is processed and acted upon, intuitive 
responses to it are flawed. Naivety could set in, causing errors even for trained 
professionals. Wrong answers “that seem right” are produced, even consciously 
avoiding other answers that could be “more” right.93 
Problematic information could become over simplified. Risk evaluation is biased in 
terms of where the risks are great, and is avoided as much as possible to preserve 
“false” gains. Statements are often only put in the positive, where negatively 
framed ones could lead easier to legal responses at a later stage. The feeling of 
reasonableness becomes very subjective and is linked to the events and the 
plausibility of the narrative. Thus the events are fitted into a likely ‘’story’’. This 
                                                          
89  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 172. 
90  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 392. Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 
CLR 232 John Doyle (Chief Judge, Southern Australia). 
91  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 396. 
92  Kahneman Thinking, Fast and Slow 8.  
93  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 410. 
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then becomes a powerful force on how these events will be judged and could 
manipulate a court’s opinion.94  
These factors must be mentioned and openly examined in a court so that the 
influence on decision making could be tempered. Plaintiffs and defendants can 
become most upset if the “reasonable expected result” is disrupted.  Intuition, on 
which many untrained people rely, has a probability of more than 50 per cent of 
being wrong.95 A MEW presenting reasoned statistical information, must use a 
simple framework and endeavour to ensure that the evidence is comprehensible, 
credible and of use to a court.96  
3.6 The meaning of proof in medical negligence 
The meaning of proof revolves around the key word “certainty”. Proof might not 
incriminate a person absolutely, but must also be thought of as an instrument to 
exonerate a person absolutely. Words like “proved absolutely” must be used with 
utmost caution. The proof of medical negligence represents the formal law of 
procedure and evidence. A MEW should have insight in how this fits into a legal 
case so as to avoid pitfalls where wrongly interpreted facts could lead to weak or 
even false evidence.97 The presumption of innocence until proven guilty should be 
remembered at all times. Care must be taken that elaboration of facts should not 
take place. A statement must preferably be made so clear, that confusing 
repetition would be avoided. A MEW should be well prepared or read from 
carefully constructed notes, as spontaneous lectures and presentations are 
unlikely to be understood. Jargon should be avoided. The MEW should practice 
expected cross examination so that the information would be advisory, accurate 
and understandable.98   
A dilemma in the proof of causation is that as it is often described as a matter of 
common sense, it is too simplistic and unhelpful when proper legal advice needs 
to be given, where there are issues where causation must be proved. It beguiles a 
                                                          
94  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 10. 
95  Kahneman Thinking, Fast and Slow 234.  
96  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 411. 
97  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Law 854. 
98  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 405. 
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MEW as to whether a breach of duty has or will cause an adverse outcome. 99 
“Wisdom” and “intuition” in a sense of mysticism are used often by decision 
makers using difficult factors in making connections, establishing the influences, 
determining the aetiologies and assessing causalities.100  
The “common sense test” has a danger that proof of causation could be difficult 
and unpredictable.101 Consistency and correctness could have variable results. 
Proof is however fundamental for any resolution in all forms of litigation, even 
when it is afflicted by many theoretical and practical conundrums, also influenced 
by the complex rules of shifting burdens of proof, as well as conceptually objective 
and subjective tests, that could be used. Decision makers, though they value 
expert objective opinions, are still too often confronted by opinions that are 
complex, conflicting and demanding, but are also partisan and subjectively based. 
Causation evidence demands high quality reasoning of expert witnesses but the 
opinions must be tested by effective cross-examination. “Observations”, 
“generalisations” and “explanations” must be clearly distinguished to weed out 
conceptual difficulties and inconsistencies. Here the South African case of Michael 
and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic and Another could be used as an example.102 
To prevent such scenario’s in future, the aim in the long term must be to have 
clearer tests and for greater synchronicity between medical and legal criteria for 
proof of causation. 103  
Obviously, in the criminal law, the need to establish the guilt of the accused, such 
as causing a victim’s injuries, must be beyond reasonable doubt. Essential, 
primary, crucial facts are difficult to distinguish from non-essential, secondary, 
background facts. In the civil law, the proof lies in the balance of preponderance of 
probabilities, thus causation must be established to that level, except where the 
                                                          
99  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 429. 
100  Kahneman Thinking, Fast and Slow 235. 
101  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 190. The “common sense test” (preferred term 
used in Australian Law)is where a judicial officer uses all the tools to relate the given 
evidence to the causation which would include the flexible approach, the adequate theory 
and direct consequences approach but where it must be acceptable, believable and logical. 
The MEW must therefore help to connect the evidence to logical reasoning to help the court 
to accept the presented evidence.  
102  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 
1189G.  
103  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 431. 
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allegations are so serious that it could become a criminal charge or have serious 
consequences for a defendant. Future implications of adverse events are always a 
matter of chance and are less certain objects of knowledge. There is also then 
more speculation and experts, like actuaries and epidemiologists, could be 
needed to interpret circumstantial evidence and facts to conduce toward 
suspected causes and its outcome.104  
The line between an expert witness opinion and conjecture can be grey. Burdens 
of proof can also shift as where failure of standard of care has been proven and 
the injury followed shortly thereafter, as well as res ipsa loquitur cases. Often proof 
is arrived through circumstantial evidence or by expert evidence expressed in 
terms of possibility and probability. This could allow for unacceptable case building 
and must be guarded against.105 
Evidence and the opinion by a MEW in the same field of the defendant, obviously 
carry much more weight. The legal proceedings as far as proof and influencing the 
opinion is concerned, is mostly additionally complicated by the plaintiff’s claim that 
he would never have undergone a procedure had he been properly advised of 
risks, often with obvious hindsight knowledge and even with conscious self-
interest.106  
It must be noted that the most disagreement and difficulty in giving appropriate 
weight or credibility to evidence, are related to the interpretations of observations, 
generalizations and explanations. The MEW must be most cautious of these terms 
and their interpretations, as well as deductions and conclusions flowing form it.107 
Causation can be scientifically regarded as explanatory if it is possible that an 
precipitating action can show up in the consequent injury and damages.108  
                                                          
104  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 432.  
105  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 861. These 
authors emphasize the fact, quoting Innes CJ in Van Wyk v Lewis. “The testimony of 
experienced members of the (medical) profession is of the greatest value in questions of this 
kind. But the decision of what is reasonable under the circumstances is for the Court; it will 
pay high regard to the views of the profession, but it is not bound to adopt them.” This writer 
would want to add and emphasize that this is the main reason why by explaining the medical 
facts and evidence it must be made as logical as possible for the Court to accept.  
106  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 434. Here especially psychiatric 
patients and cosmetic procedures patients who are dissatisfied with the results of treatment. 
107  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 435. 
108  To be seen as an ex post facto prediction of the consequences of an act. 
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Circumstantial evidence, with proof being needed at trial, does not itself bear 
directly upon an issue, i.e. the causation of a death could be quite influenced by 
other background circumstances, leading to “legal fallacies”.109 The real issue is 
the degree of probative value to this form of evidence. In the famous Australian 
case of Chamberlain v The Queen,110 where the parents were accused of 
murdering their baby, whose body was never found, serves as an example. The 
theory by the defence was that a dingo wild dog carried off and killed the baby. 
There were no eye witnesses and only circumstantial evidence was evaluated, 
heavily supported by wrong, inappropriate assumptions and deductions in the 
absence of scientific evidence.111  
Expert evidence of the possibility of causation can create the danger that 
assumptions and reasoning about probabilities become too mathematical,112 
which must be tempered with the contention that some judgements of probability 
can be justified by non-mathematical criteria.113 Presiding officers could become 
overwhelmed by statistics, creating a pitfall that other important evidence, could be 
held at a lower level or become marginalized.114  
Another problem for a medical witness is the distinguishing of what could have 
occurred naturally or would not have occurred, “but for” exposure to a 
substance.115 Flowing from this the phenomenon of “association fallacy” is created 
                                                          
109  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 3. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc applies as a 
legal fallacy, “after this; therefor in consequence of this”. 
110  Chamberlain v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 521. 
111  Writer’s italics to emphasize that this was an absolutely unallowable finding and sentence on 
the balance of probabilities and even beyond all reasonable doubt. Surely a trauma surgeon 
as a MEW could have prevented the jail term of 8 years which Mrs Chamberlain had to do. 
In 2012 the Australian Supreme Court formally apologized to a freed Mrs Chamberlain. 
112  Referred to the Pascalian model where mathematical proof is given, named after 
mathematician Pascal. 
113  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 437, refers to the Baconian 
model where for example in the identification of a guilty or not guilty rapist via DNA testing, 
counts more than a witness/victim’s (did she consent to sexual intercourse?) testimony. 
114  Chances that an HIV person could knowingly, heterosexually, infect another unknowingly 
person during sex is 1:200, but should this person become infected the consequences are 
dire. The question that could be asked is whether the connection between the intercourse 
and infection is too remote, and could it have been foreseen by the perpetrator. 
115  In re Agent Orange product liability litigation. This argument seems to have been settled in 
Re Agent Orange Liability findings, where Vietnamese citizens and USA veterans of the 
Vietnam war (1966-1973), could not prove that these substances, used as a defoliant and 
herbicide in the Vietnam War, caused diseases like lymphoma. The normal incidence of 
these lymphomas where not found to be significantly increased and as far as skin lesions 
were concerned, no biopsies had been done to prove the link to Agent Orange. Although 
admittedly this contained “dioxin”, a toxic substance that could cause skin afflictions and 
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– the confusion of “association with a cause”.116 Thus, to prevent the wrong 
assumptions and findings there must be an algorithm or formulae to use: 
(a) A statistical association, the stronger (in magnitude) the more likely, and 
(b) Temporality, meaning a cause must precede its effect. The closer the 
temporality, the stronger it should count in weight.  
(c) There must be a cause and effect relationship between exposure, harm or 
disease that should be biologically plausible and consistent with other 
information. 
(d) Dose-response effect where causation is likely if greater amounts of a 
(putative) cause are associated with increasing harm. 
(e) Consistency – similar findings elsewhere would support causation. 
(f) Analogy – substantiation of relationships, increases likelihood of causation.  
(g) Experimental evidence, i.e. removal of a cause results in decrease of harm 
or injury.  
(h) Specificity – single putative cause supports causation.  
These criteria must be rigorously scrutinised. Meta-analysis enabling the 
combination of several similar studies enhances the value and weight of the 
overall conclusions. These criteria could be most important in cases for claims for 
damages following acts precipitating medical complications. 
It is important that the MEW must help and guide a legal team to establish 
whether a nexus is found at an observational, generalisation or a real explanatory 
level, the last being the desired level.117 In Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness, the 
Australian High Court emphasized that the common law test of the balance of the 
preponderance of probabilities, is not satisfied by evidence that only establishes a 
                                                                                                                                                                               
possibly tumours, this substance also occurs naturally, thus it would be most difficult to 
prove a link and nexus, between exposure and tumours. Harvard University, Faculty of Law 
publication www.law.harvard.edu/publications/evidenceiii/cases/agent.htm (Date accessed 
18 August 2012). 
116  Kahneman Thinking, Fast and Slow 222. 
117  Examples would be claims against where asbestos caused cancer, brain damage followed 
pertussis inoculation, which emphasize that the “observational level” did not meet the 
“explanatory level” for proof of causation. Strokes following contraceptive medication 
(Vadera v Shaw (1998) 45 BMLR 162, Lexis-Nexis p13) – which claims were found not to be 
true and at that time there was no relationship proven between the pill and strokes, thus data 
was at a “generalization level” and not at an “explanatory level”. 
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possibility of a nexus.118 This still seems a major issue in court testimonies in the 
SA where expert witnesses confuse “possibilities” with “probabilities”.119  
Proving causation of injuries is fundamental to success for plaintiffs in personal 
injury litigation, not only in that there had been a failure to adhere to a proper 
standard of care by the defendant, but indeed whether the failure had caused the 
injuries.120  
The claimed impact of non-provision of information (during the informed consent 
stage) can be used by a plaintiff to strengthen a case, but interestingly in the USA 
and Canada, the test is objective, focusing on what a reasonable or prudent 
patient would have done in the circumstances of the plaintiff. What the individual 
plaintiff would have done is of little relevance, while in England the test is 
subjective i.e. what would the reasonable person have done in the plaintiff’s 
position. The danger created here is that the plaintiff could be viewed as an 
untrustworthy witness, because of having hindsight into an artificial situation. The 
emphasis should therefore be on whether a particular plaintiff, had the plaintiff 
known the (adverse and harmful) outcome was possible, would still have 
undergone the procedure. Objective facts could however support a plaintiff’s 
claim, as well as the court’s assessment of the patient’s character and personality.      
The so-called Briginshaw standard test121 could be used, being that “the 
seriousness of an allegation made, must be weighed up against;  
(a) the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, and/or 
(b) the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding” and  
(c) “the petitioner must satisfy the court that his story is true”.122 
                                                          
118  Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) NSWCA 347 
119  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 
1190B. 
120  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 457. Examples here would be 
the Chappel v Hart case supra and also Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority 1988 AC 
1074 – here too much oxygen for a premature baby was given, resulting in retro-lental 
(behind the lens of the eye) fibrosis causing blindness, where discharge of the burden of 
proof could not be attained – it was wrongly based on an observational level, but not on the 
explanatory level in the threefold typology. 
121  Especially with advance directives ie living will or refusal for treatment, 
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This could then support the common law notion in civil matters generally that “he 
who alleges must (prove) carry the burden of proof”.123   
3.7  Conclusion to Chapter Three 
It is most important for a MEW and the legal teams to reach consensus on 
defining and understanding negligence in medical litigation. Every case should 
quite rightly be viewed as a sui generis case and thus in every case a medical 
witness should be called to assist the legal profession and the court, establishing 
whether there was negligence or to verify negligence. To help in this endeavour 
concepts must be taken note of getting the facts right even using the criminal law’s 
principles if need be. To evaluate the burden of proof the res ipsa loquitor concept 
must be understood and realised that it could not stand alone and must be 
supported by logical arguments. The RIL is a form of circumstantial evidence but 
must be based on logical reasoning where certain facts may be inferred from other 
acts, thus forming a premise that a harmful result speaks of negligence.124 
With negligence evaluation the “center of gravity”, so to speak, revolves around 
the true causation of an alleged incident. Care must be taken by a MEW to really 
establish whether an occurrence which could be construed as negligence really 
did materially contribute to a patient’s harm and injury. The potential problems 
must be avoided by evaluating the factual cause against the judicial cause. 
Complicating concepts must be taken note of like the nova actus/causa 
interveniens phenomenon, to realize that some evolving concepts have nothing to 
do with the original cause. Likewise, this begs consideration in the concept of 
“remoteness of damage”, when assessing a case and effects flowing forth from it.  
Foreseeability (by the doctor) of any harm or injury would play a pivotal role in 
confirming negligence and must be agreed upon by a medical witness. Recently 
the “loss of chance” has come to the fore and could be a valuable tool to get 
compensation, where statistically the compensation would have been denied. This 
concept is at times very difficult to understand, but a MEW can play a major role 
                                                                                                                                                                               
122  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 42. Briginshaw v Briginshaw 
(1938) 60 CLR 336. Originally a divorce case where adultery was alleged but could not be 
proven. The test has been used freely since in Australian court cases. 
123  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 855. 
124  Van Den Heever and Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitor and Medical Negligence 5. 
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here in providing most likely clinical courses of a particular patient. For the 
defence of a doctor, especially where there could be a lack of proper informed 
consent, the concept of imputed (or general) knowledge could also be advised, but 
society as such would expect that the doctor should have taken more care, with 
arguments carefully advanced, if any information, would not have been important 
to a specific patient under the circumstances. 
Finally it must be borne in mind that the line between an expert witness’s 
testimony and conjecture (thus manufacturing evidence and building a case) can 
be grey.125 Thus negligence must be proven and such contributing facts must be 
made known to the MEW, as to give proper and acceptable logical testimony. To 
enable this to occur, the requirements needed and the expected qualities of a 
MEW must be evaluated, at least by the contracting legal team, to ensure the 
avoidance of abovementioned pitfalls. This leads then to a critical stance on the 
requirements and expected qualities of the medical expert witness. 
 
                                                          
125  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 8. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DILEMMAS AND PITFALLS FOR THE MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESS 
“Wer einmal lügt dem glaubt Mann nicht, auch wenn er die Wahrheit spricht.”1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Knowledge of due legal processes is the best antidote for encountering the fear of 
litigation. By understanding Medical Law, a MEW should then meet certain 
requirements and then also have valuable expected qualities. This is achieved 
amongst other factors, by understanding the ethics involved, the formation of 
thinking patterns and by having some knowledge of the history of how Medical 
Law has evolved.  
By understanding and defining the concept of medical negligence, the MEW could 
be a very valuable member of a legal team. Medical Law is built up mainly by the 
field of contract law and the field of tort/delictual law. There is mostly a negligence 
aspect involved with a breach of trust, emphasising the fiduciary role and 
confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship. The requirements for a MEW 
towards a plaintiff or defendant must be the same as the relationship of the doctor 
and a patient, which is then naturally one in which trust and confidence must be 
placed in the doctor as a MEW.2  
This trust must be founded in the medico-legal knowledge which the MEW could 
be expected to have. An effective, credible and reasonable MEW should therefore 
also meet exacting requirements in that he or she should have qualifications and 
insight into medical-legal procedure protocols and have acceptable qualities of 
fairness, objectivity and reasonableness with exemplary medical practice 
standards and a fair reputation.  
Many concepts will be discussed in this chapter, of which insight and knowledge is 
paramount to help define a path for the MEW and the legal team to follow 
                                                          
1  Coetzee LC Medical Therapeutic Privilege (LLM Dissertation University of South Africa 
2001) German proverb: “He who has lied once, will never be believed, even so when he 
speaks the truth!” Quote used in LLM thesis of Dr L Coetzee.  
2  Judge Hodgkins in the Canadian case of Kenny v Lockwood (1932) OR 141.  
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enforcing fairness, reasonableness and equitability as well as justice. This could 
perhaps only be achieved by the MEW with further studies and an interest in 
Medical Law.3  
4.2 When is a doctor an expert and the appointment of an appropriate 
medical expert witness  
The term “expert” should not be interpreted as a person with above average and 
exceptional knowledge, but rather a competent and knowledgeable person who 
can aid the court and the presiding judicial officer, with professional insight into the 
medical science, so that proper, fair and equitable findings and deductions as well 
as conclusions could be made.4 Medico-legal knowledge is a dire necessity, 
because with proper analysis of a case, correct guidance could be given. As it is 
commonplace for a MEW to be used by either the plaintiff or the defendant, some 
unknowledgeable and unethical experts could in due course, transgress 
boundaries of acceptable medico-legal practice and undermine a court with 
unacceptable and falsely interpreted testimony to possibly reach an unfair 
decision.5 The common duties of an expert witness, as set out in the case National 
Justice Compania Naviera S.A. v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd could be set out 
as: 
• Expert evidence should be the independent product of the expert who was 
not influenced by the exigencies of litigation. 
• The expert witness should provide independent assistance to assist a court. 
The opinion must be objective and unbiased. The role of an advocate must 
not be assumed.  
• Facts and assumptions upon which the opinion and testimony is based 
should be stated. All material facts, even those causing detractions of the 
opinion, must be considered.  
                                                          
3  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 19. 
4  Knoetze ‘n Regsvergelykende Studie van Deskundige Getuienis in Straf- en Siviele Verhore 
54. 
5  General Medical Council v Meadow (2006) EWCA Civ 1390. In this case it was shown that 
the testimony of a Professor in Paediatrics was false due to the ignorant interpretation of 
statistics, which let a Court to unfairly sentence a woman to a jail term ( For “murdering” her 
two infants boys, who as was shown later died of an inherited metabolic disease which was 
incompatible with life after infancy. Although released after two years, the mother, a solicitor, 
committed suicide) http://www.bailie/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006 (Date of use: 30 March 
2012). 
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• The expert witness must state clearly if a particular issue falls outside his 
expertise. 
• If insufficient data was available it must be emphasised that the opinion is 
provisional. If the truth could not be ascertained without some qualification, it 
must also be stated.6  
It is highlighted in this case that it is the function of the court to base its inferences 
and conclusions on all the facts placed before it. The opinion of an expert witness 
is admissible only due to their special skill and knowledge. These expert witnesses 
are thus better qualified to help draw inferences than the judicial officer.7  
However, the expert’s witnessing will be irrelevant and unallowable when intruding 
on the legal or general merits of a case or the interpretation of a statute.8 The 
principle is that an expert witness’s opinion should be acceptable if it could 
appreciably help the court and only the court shall finally determine whether a 
question demands an expert’s evidence.9 The qualification to be an expert 
witness, as well as the value and acceptance of the form and probative value of 
the evidence will also be the prerogative of the court to decide upon.10 The MEW 
especially should be well aware to bear in mind the principles and rules for the 
admissibility of his expert opinion.11  
It could also be stated that a MEW should also possess an acute insight into 
ethics and morals of being an expert witness, respecting the Bill of Rights 
regarding the dignity of a patient and doctor, respecting their privacy and also their 
rights of fair administrative actions and access to the legal system. This broader 
and extended definition of the expert witness must be respected especially in the 
medical litigation field.12  
                                                          
6  Nondwana http://www.legalcity.net/Index.cfm (Date of use: 26 January 2012). The case 
National Justice Compania Naviera S.A. v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd 1993 (2) Lloyds 
Reports 68-81 sets out these duties. 
7  Zeffert and Paine The South African Law of Evidence 321.  
8  Zeffert and Paine The South African Law of Evidence 322. 
9  Zeffert and Paine The South African Law of Evidence 323. Referring also to the case of 
Michael and Another v Linksfield Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another para1189G, where four expert 
witnesses were allowed to testify, all with differing opinions! 
10  Zeffert and Paine The South African Law of Evidence 326. 
11  Zeffert and Paizes Essential Evidence 103. 
12  Swanepoel M http://www.puk.ac.za/opencms/expert/pul/html/2009volume12no4 (Date of 
use: 25 February 2014). Prof M Swanepoel, of the Department of Jurisprudence, Unisa 
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The concept of expertise must be understood in that it is formed in a novice 
witness, with acquired knowledge and skill, bearing in mind that even a top expert 
can be proven wrong. The inevitability of human error is not only due to human 
weakness, but rather an inevitable concomitant summation of our cognitive ability 
and development. Even though a medical practitioner in clinical practice can have 
a relentless dedication to achievement, the medical profession is the foremost 
culprit in perpetuating the myth of professional infallibility.13 
The effect is that the courts take the lead from these “expert” doctors themselves 
and then would treat any kind of failure in medical practice as unacceptable, 
creating a dilemma in medico-legal practice, resulting in wrongful findings.14  
A legal team must make an effort to select a fit and appropriately qualified, 
knowledgeable and experienced MEW. The ideal MEW must be appropriately 
qualified, must be selected on eminence in the appropriate field and should have 
some research and academic status. A paradox could be that a junior person in 
the same department could be a more realistic and acceptable MEW, as he will 
think more laterally than a senior colleague with fixed ideas and values, creating 
pitfalls and dilemmas for a legal team by having wrongly selected a MEW who is 
very rigid and inconvincible in his opinions. A MEW must have the ability to 
communicate and think appropriately under pressure. The MEW must have 
adequate knowledge to potentially counter an opposing expert’s “outstanding” 
superior specialist knowledge. Following the Canadian case of Arland v Taylor,15 it 
was found that judges could discount certain experts. Guidelines have been spelt 
out and emphasised, that medico-legal and court expertise be developed as a rule 
and skill-based behaviour must be taught. Therefore the expert must ideally 
possess a substantial medico-legal and procedural knowledge base. The MEW 
should ideally also be a teacher, preferably have contributed to textbooks, 
published articles in journals, have personal experience and interact well with 
colleagues.16 
                                                                                                                                                                               
emphasises this extended definition of a MEW in the LLD thesis, Law, Psychiatry and 
Psychology: A selection of Constitutional, Medico-Legal and Liability Issues.  
13  Herring Medical Law and Ethics 38. In the form of “Medical Expert Witness”. 
14  Herring Medical Law and Ethics 38. 
15  Arland v Taylor (1955) OR 131 (CA) 142. 
16  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 185. 
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The voir dire17 principle must be upheld by a medico-legal panel to establish an 
individual’s fitness to act as an expert witness. It could be argued that a MEW 
should also be a fit and proper person for this role (own emphasis) and meet the 
requirements to be capable and qualified to be a MEW. The MEW must have 
acceptable concepts of integrity, defined as having such high levels of 
professionalism, that the client’s interest is put first, within reasonable and realistic 
professional boundaries. Cognitive illusions are pitfalls that must be guarded 
against, which could be anchoring, framing, hindsight bids, dominating heuristics 
and egocentric biases.18  
The expert witness must assist the court and therefore the opinion of such an 
expert is admissible if the expert is better qualified than the judicial officer. The 
parameters cannot be defined with certainty mainly due to the expanding fields of 
medico-legal knowledge. Furthermore categories of expert evidence like evidence 
of opinion, technical expert evidence, evidence of fact and the admissible hearsay 
can also include those persons considered an “expert”, emphasising the 
importance of an expert’s knowledge, rather than his qualifications.19  It could be 
argued that as a paid witness, an expert might be tempted to become a 
professional witness with perfected courtroom performances.20    
A biased MEW can sway a court’s finding, by choice of words, manner of 
explanation and body language. Most medical cases would stand or fall on the 
quality of the available expert evidence. The MEW should bear in mind that the 
courts will have the final say about the reasonableness or even “negligence” of a 
medical witness, as well as to determine which opinions have a logical reasoning 
as foundation. The court can still find a defendant guilty, despite good professional 
support if the opinion will not withstand logical analysis. By having the intent on 
being objective, independent, uninfluenced and unbiased, the MEW would create 
a good and credible impression. The MEW should also qualify his opinions, if 
                                                          
17  Voir dire – from French and Latin meaning, figuratively to “speak the truth” and literally, to 
“see to speak”. In common law countries this is a principle whereby a board of panellists or a 
presiding officer, could determine whether a witness (or juror in the USA) is biased or would 
not deal with the issues fairly, for instance having knowledge of the facts or having 
acquaintance with a party. (dictionary.law.com) (Date of use: 12 June 2012). 
18  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 302. Heuristics, meaning here to find 
solutions by trial and error or by loosely defined rules. 
19  Meintjes –Van der Walt 2000 The South African Law Journal 773. 
20  Meintjes –Van der Walt 2000 The South African Law Journal 775. 
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there is a possibility that insufficient data had been given or that there could be an 
element of truth lacking.21  
The MEW must remember that a judge can and will see through dishonesty and 
insincerity. Thus the conduct of the MEW is very important and must be 
professional, courteous, sincere, honest and human. The MEW must 
conscientiously avoid being garrulous, impolite, pompous, arrogant, sarcastic, 
cynical or overconfident. The demeanour should be that of a calm teacher. The 
MEW must bear in mind that he is being consulted as a consultant expert. The 
MEW must be impartial and thus unable to perceive any promise of personal 
advantage from espousing either side of a controversy.22  
The MEW must be knowledgeable and trained in the skill to appear before a court.  
The MEW must have full qualifications in the area where his opinion is given. 
Credibility amongst peers must be present by inter alia peer reviewed research or 
publishing in journals, on-going education and by academic activities.23 If the 
expert opinion cannot be logically supported, it can fail the test of “the benchmark 
by reference to which (the defendant’s) conduct fails to be assessed”.24  
The medical witness selected must know or be informed of pitfalls like that 
technical terms are to be avoided and that language, intelligible to laymen, should 
be used. The MEW may consult notes to refresh memory and may refer to 
medical treatises. Books as such, are not admissible as authoritative. It could be 
misinterpreted, just like journal articles.25 Questions directed to elicit an opinion 
                                                          
21  Carter 2011 MPS Africa Case Book 7.  
22  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 305. Judges also follow a precedent and 
doctors should bear this in mind. A guide is to stick to “common sense” as the Latin phrases 
could emphasize – ab honesto virium bonum nihil deterret – nothing deters good people. 
Experto credite – accepted believe / assumption that an expert is speaking from experience. 
23  Lecture “A Lawyer’s Perspective” given by Adv. Emiel van Vuuren at Medical Malpractice 
Litigation Seminar, University of Pretoria 29 September 2012. 
24  Referring to the case of Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Limited and 
Another 2001(3) SA 1188 para 1190E.  
25  HPCSA v Van Almenkerk (2006) (Not reported) – here a general practitioner who practiced 
as a plastic surgeon doing liposuctions quoted articles that in the USA cosmetic surgeons do 
the procedures in their rooms, thus he could quite safely do it in his rooms, here in the RSA. 
This disciplinary case was about a patient that died following this procedure. However it was 
pointed out by an expert witness that in the USA, the cosmetic surgeons usually have their 
consulting rooms in clinics and thus have theatre and resuscitative equipment and cannot be 
compared to his (sub-standard) facilities. Van Almenkerk was found guilty and suspended 
from practicing plastic and cosmetic surgery. www.legalbrief.co.za/articles.php (Date of use 
13 October 2013). 
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from a defendant are proper when a doctor’s conduct is in issue. If no personal 
knowledge of facts is in dispute, an opinion may be given on a hypothetical 
question. If a selected doctor as a MEW is called to testify, the lawyer and 
advocate must: 
• Research the subject to understand the discussions with a doctor. 
• Remember that experience, knowledge and skill, weigh more than 
qualifications. 
• Get the MEW to testify in a narrow field rather than generally. 
• Know that the doctor cannot be a partisan, but must make concessions. 
• Insist on clear communication. 
• Be in possession of medical reports and conclusions as documented. 
• Stress the importance of MEW’s ability to support an opinion. 
• Prevent contradictions. 
• State the MEW’s qualifications (and possibly curriculum vitae) at the start. 
A MEW actually expresses more opinion than establishing facts, due to his base 
of special knowledge and specialist training in the subject. For clarity, it is then 
customary to ask for an opinion based on hypothetical questions.26  
A test which indirectly would influence the choice of a MEW, similar to many 
common law jurisdictions was formed in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SA) in the 
Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic.27 Here the judge was not deviated 
from his decision-making role, noting that the question of reasonableness and 
negligence is for the court to determine, evaluating the basis of the varying, 
conflicting expert opinions. This determination does not involve credibility so much 
                                                          
26  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 307. 
27  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA1188 (SCA) 
para 1200C. In this case a 19 year old patient having a post trauma nasal bone repair by a 
plastic surgeon, had been administered cocaine via the nose as a local vasoconstrictor, 
which could give a bloodless view for the surgeon, but as a side effect could give heart 
arrest. Whilst the patient developed a fast pulse rate, the anaesthetic level was deepened 
and a beta-adrenalin blocker administered. The patient decompensated and had heart 
arrest. The patient had permanent brain damage and survived in a sad vegetative state. As 
negligence could not be proved the consequent claim was dismissed.  
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but by examining the opinions, the essential reasoning must be analysed for the 
court to reach a conclusion on the issues raised.28    
Evidence from “second hand” sources is admissible only if the use of such 
sources is a normal and acceptable practice. Evidence of accepted practice or 
custom may be given. The court must subsequently determine whether a doctor 
conformed to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent 
risk existing at the time. A MEW must generally be from the same specialty, but 
the “locality” rule is not generally followed. A MEW may express an opinion 
whether care or treatment provided, was consistent with the ordinary care and skill 
of a similar practitioner. A MEW can state that a certain course may have 
produced a result, but never emphatically say did29 (own emphasis).  
The medical report of a MEW should include:30 
• Preliminary data, date and place of examination. 
• The plaintiff’s or defendant’s version of the events. 
• History of plaintiff’s health prior to and at the time of accident and 
examination. 
• Physical and mental state of health and avoid exaggerations. 
• Doctor’s / defendant’s report of the diagnosis and proposed treatment.  
• Details of tests. 
• Opinion whether incapacity is temporary or the degree of permanent 
incapacity. 
• Not comment on the amount of compensation which should be the 
responsibility of the court, except for expected medical expenditures in 
future. 
  
                                                          
28  Letzler “Choosing the Right Expert in a Medical Negligence Case” 
http://www.derebus.org.za/nxt/gateway.dll/4rnla/k(wmc/r9wmc/laxmc (Date of use: 27 March 
2012). 
29  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 219. 
30  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 219.  
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• The medical report must have the patient’s consent for the records.31 
As journal or book texts are actually “hearsay evidence”, the courts have 
considerable discretion in controlling the issue of use. In principle, nothing may be 
given from a textbook other than as an opinion of a witness who gives it.32  
The advocate must also then ensure at cross examination that no hostile abuse or 
efforts to contradict the MEW presentation would be tolerated. It is important that 
the MEW must determine on his own that a physician, had a duty and that it was 
breached, that harm had occurred and that this was indeed caused by the 
physician’s breach of duty. It is most important, to view the larger picture and not 
to get lost in details. The MEW will thereby be reasonable also in evaluating a 
plaintiff’s case against the assumption of a risk, contributory negligence, 
comparative fault, the Good Samaritan clause (USA), “sudden” emergency, the 
opinion of a respectable minority, the opinion and teachings of different schools of 
thought and the necessity of clinical innovation.33 
A MEW if chosen, could excuse himself from a case when it is embarrassing or if 
healthy relationships with colleagues, friendship, incrimination, collegiality and 
impartiality would be threatened and the excuse is raised as a “conflict of 
interest”.34  By implication it must be realised that the adversarial system would in 
itself create problems with conflicting opinions of expert witnesses, for which all 
parties must be prepared to deal with, emphasising that to prevent this conflict the 
MEW also owe duties in giving professional evidence to their respective discipline 
and professions.35   
Medical expert witnessing will be most needed in the following three categories of 
medical negligence claims which could influence the choice of a MEW, namely: 
                                                          
31  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 230. Based also in the RSA under the 
Constitution s14 “Privacy – Everyone has the right to privacy”.Hookman emphasizes the 
inclusion of what he refers to as “magic words”. These are: “all the opinions expressed 
herein are the product of reliable principles and methods developed as a result of 
professional knowledge, experience, education and training in the fields of medicine (surgery 
or trauma) and law; furthermore the said principles and methods were reliably and ethically 
applied”. 
32  Meintjes-Van Der Walt 2000 South African Law Journal 777. 
33  Hudson, Moore (2011) J Emergency Med 598. 
34  Cameron and Gumbel Clinical Negligence – A Practitioner’s Handbook 149.  
35  Meintjes-Van Der Walt 2000 South African Law Journal 778. 
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• Breach of Duty: This revolves mainly around the standard of care. A doctor 
would be considered to be negligent if a patient was treated in such a way 
where a reasonable body of fellow practitioners would not have done (Bolam 
test). If so the doctor would have been considered to have breached his duty. 
The MEW must evaluate the treatment as well as that which should have 
been given. A statement will be made whether the standard of treatment was 
that of a reasonable person, assessed in what the doctor knew or should 
have known at the time of the event. The MEW must be of the same 
specialty as the defendant, except when the defendant practiced outside his 
specialty. 
• Causation: Even if there has been a breach of duty it must still be 
demonstrated that the negligence led to harm. The MEW must demonstrate 
a causative link between the standard of care and the eventual outcome. 
This is done preferably from several opinions to establish on a balance of 
probabilities, whether a causative link exists.36 This entails the study of the 
history and the analyses of a chain of events, bearing the natural progression 
of a disease in mind. An opinion must be given on the effect the negligence 
had made.  If the course would not have been altered, the defence could be 
that a correct diagnosis at the time of the event would not have made a 
difference or created a “loss of chance”.  
• Quantum: Here the MEW assists in the size of the claim and the financial 
settlement. This must be realistically assessed in various details of general 
and special claims. Educated guesses must be tolerated and chances of 
deterioration or improvement must be considered. Occupational therapists, 
psychologists and actuarial calculations might be needed to assess the 
quantum. The final settlement must for example include daily care 
requirements, loss of amenities compensation and future employment 
prospects.37    
Legal practitioners can be in an untenable situation if it is found that their choice of 
a MEW testimony and opinion do not carry much weight resulting in an 
unsuccessful result in a case for either the plaintiff or the defendant. It is 
                                                          
36  Important not possibilities, as it is the probability that must be above 50 per cent chance. 
37  Grobler 2007 The South African Gastroenterology Review 13. 
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imperative that above mentioned facts in the choice of a MEW must be considered 
very seriously.38  
The level of agreement between doctors can be very low due amongst others, to 
conflicting information, different interpretations and substandard personal 
experience. Therefore clinical studies to be quoted must be well designed, 
prospectively randomised and “double blind”. This leads to evidence based 
medicine, based on structured and systematic review, making it acceptable, more 
respectable and it would have better status than textbooks.39  
A threat is that some experts, on account of senior positions, spend more time on 
research and administration than in actual clinical practice, creating a gap 
between the theoretical and the actual situation. Their testimony could generally 
be irrelevant and unreliable.40  
MEWs must not (over) rationalise a case, attempting to justify an action with 
inappropriate logical reasoning. Valuable facts could then be overlooked. A MEW 
must be prepared to advocate for the patient, but must not take the argumentative 
role of the advocate.41 Conflict of interest like testifying against a colleague must 
be avoided. By promoting the truth, the MEW must also be a careful gatekeeper.  
There must be awareness that insurance or medical aid organisations could 
employ “business tools”, raising ethical issues. By paying physicians in unethical 
ways, these organisations could impose conflict of interests, and then “regulate” 
the physician’s clinical judgement, decision making and behaviour. To prevent this 
pitfall, MEW doctors must seize the initiative, convert potential weaknesses into 
strengths, learn from mistakes, seek advantages and not overextend 
themselves.42  
Concepts should be taken note of by MEW, in conjunction with lawyers, for 
instance possible punishment, as this will apply if the action of the defendant was 
unacceptable to society. Undue emphasis on blame in relation to such incidents is 
                                                          
38  Letzler “Choosing the Right Expert in a Medical Negligence Case” 
http://www.derebus.org.za/nxt/gateway.dll/4rnla/k(wmc/r9wmc/laxmc (Date of use: 27 March 
2012). 
39  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 186. 
40  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 187. 
41  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 271. 
42  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 117. 
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unjustified and counterproductive. Culpability would only be aired if substandard 
antecedent conduct had been deliberate. The “reasonable person test” is on 
hand to address the reasonable expectations, but has progressively failed to take 
into account the inherent human limitations of actual “reasonable“ situations and 
people. There has been a shift of what “could reasonably have been expected” to 
“what ought to have been done”.43 The better question would be “could other 
people in this position reasonably have made the same error”. This demonstrates 
the inherent tension and trends in law of delict. A teasing question is whether 
somebody that did his best, but still fell short of a reasonable person’s expected 
performance, must still be held liable, for instance under the imperitia culpae 
adnumerator rule?44 Here then an appropriately appointed MEW must take the 
lead in proper, fair, reasonable and justifiable decision making.45  
4.3  Legal processes and the medical expert witness  
It is in the interest of the MEW to understand relevant issues of the law and 
litigation, especially so that their testimony could influence the fair decisions of 
judges. The following, although not necessarily complete, will help if it is also 
understood by all MEWs.  
4.3.1 The Stare Decisis rule 
From the common law the stare decisis rule had developed. This rule means that 
a proper finding by a judge or judges in another court case would be taken to also 
apply in similar court cases in future. A judge should abide and adhere to a finding 
in already well decided cases. The MEW should understand this concept that a 
court’s finding could be binding as a rule in similar court cases. But, it must be 
emphasised that in medical negligence litigation it is seldom if ever that one case 
is like another, this is a factor a MEW could help to explain.46  
  
                                                          
43  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 244. 
44  Hiemstra and Gonin Legal Dictionary 201. The imperitia culpae adnumerator rule here would 
imply that the want of skill is reckoned as a fault. 
45  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 244. 
46  Thomas, Van Der Merwe and Stoop Historical Foundations of the SA Private Law 111. 
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4.3.2 Importance of an objective evaluation of a case 
It must also be accepted that factors in a system may contribute to an error, and 
must so be presented that a court could make the decision about it. 47 A call for 
mature reflection and a more detailed examination of the facts need to be made by 
the MEW, evaluating all material facts in the right order to correctly advise the 
legal team. No matter how competent a medical or legal person could be, there 
will always be challenges that exceed his or her ability to react adequately and in 
time under specific circumstances. The desire to blame must not and should not 
prevent a proper and objective evaluation of what went wrong.48  
Ideally the medico-legal consultation must be done with the patient or plaintiff 
present as well as a review of all relevant documentation applicable to the case to 
make sure of all the relevant and applicable facts, and only then could an 
informed, unbiased opinion be given by the MEW.49 
4.3.3 The Imperitia Culpae Adnumerator rule 
The MEW must be aware of a serious phenomenon, especially involving surgeons 
that they would continue procedures in the face of persistent poor results.50 
Likewise the problem of technical competence of doctors should be addressed 
and if a surgeon, without warning a patient, except in an emergency, is not 
sufficiently skilled, and not supported by colleagues, the common law rule of 
imperitia culpae adnumerator51 should be the basis of litigation or disciplinary 
action. The MEW could advise the legal team if this rule would be applicable for 
instance in a case where a specialist exceeded his bounds of speciality in the 
absence of an emergency, which caused a patient harm ( for instance a general 
practitioner removing complicated tonsils resulting in the patient’s death by 
persistent bleeding).   
                                                          
47  For instance nursing errors, instrument failures, hospital administration errors. 
48  Strauss Doctor Patient and the Law 249. 
49  Beran R.G. http://www.2012wcml.com (Date of use: 12 August 2012). 
50  Bristol case – cardio-thoracic surgery services suspended. It was noted that regardless of 
cardio-thoracic operations having dismal survival figures for the Bristol hospital, the staff 
carried on performing the operations, until stopped by a court order. See Lloyd-Martyn 1998 
BMJ 816. 
51  Hiemstra and Gonin Trilingual Legal Dictionary 201. Imperitia culpae adnumerator is 
translated as “a want of skill is reckoned as a fault . 
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4.3.4 The adverse event 
To describe an adverse event as an accident, which by a medico-legal definition 
should be an incident largely if not completely unintentional, unforeseeable and 
harmful, is taken by lawyers and lay people as a matter of choice. However, any 
element of foreseeability makes the situation non-accidental.52  
A genuine error must be accepted as unintended and unavoidable, synonymous 
with the true meaning of “accident”. Meaning the event was unintended and either 
was reasonably unforeseeable or was indeed foreseeable, but realistically could 
not have been prevented. It is often seen, that an adverse event is the end result 
of a series of developments which are dependent upon one another.53  
It should be taken into account in terms of the overall picture and the reaction to 
each stage which is affected by what had preceded the adverse event and 
boundaries must be defined. What might have been considered preventable at the 
beginning of a sequence of events, can become inevitable by human limitations 
confronted with informational and emotional overload which develops at a greater 
speed as a crisis unfolds. To prevent this dilemma and pitfall, more training in the 
sophisticated analytic reasoning is needed and adherence to standard proven 
drills and procedures taken.54 The full sequence of events must be evaluated, as 
well as the nature of antecedent factors, evaluation of the cognitive processes, 
examination of the contributory role of other players, as well of the system factors 
(machines, equipment, hospital setting etc.).55 
It must be realised that as soon as a finding is made of a non-accidental injury, 
accident or adverse event, that it in itself implies an element of culpability. There 
may be grey zones and a question of interpretations, but it depends on proper 
insights of psychology and understanding the limitations of human behaviour. By 
implication, errors are never deliberate and if it is a violation, it should be defined 
in terms of rules, norms and principles. It must be shown that there was a 
“deliberate” deviation and that this involved “choice”. Violations are avoidable, 
                                                          
52  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Ethics 27. 
53  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Ethics 27. 
54  Kahneman Thinking, Fast and Slow 71. 
55  Merry and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 32. A lawyer and MEW should then force 
themselves to “look through the haze and beyond the smoking gun”!  
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pending on difficult circumstances and the system. If a MEW does not have the 
above working knowledge, the “expert” witness actually becomes nothing more 
than a lay person regarding a specific case of an adverse event.56   
4.3.5 The concept of vicarious liability 
It must also be accepted by a MEW that there is a concept like “respondent 
superior” where an employer could be involved by vicarious liability. Negligence 
should further be defined here to extend to other role players, as a contributory 
failure by other role players like a hospital authority, to act with reasonable and 
prudent care.57 Doctors in private practice are independent contractors, but the 
impaired standard of care could be due to other role players like the hospital or 
nursing levels deemed below an acceptable standard. Standard of care could then 
be defined as the degree of care that a prudent person should exercise under the 
same or similar circumstances. The reasonable person is defined as a prudent 
person whose behaviour would be considered appropriate under the 
circumstances. In the case of Riff v Morgan Pharmacy a finding was made that 
every member of a health team: “has a duty to be, to a limited extent, his brother’s 
keeper”.58  
4.3.6 The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor59 
Negligence in medical malpractice, at first implies that there was no intent to harm 
or injure, but actually means “not doing what a reasonable man would do in similar 
circumstances”.60 The facts of a case would indicate whether a reasonable man 
had performed an act of negligence. An expert witness, who must come from the 
same profession, is required to testify in a court, to set a standard for a defendant, 
which should have been met. The question here would be whether the conduct 
was acceptable to the majority or to an acceptable minority of professional 
opinion. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor (RIL) must also be set by a MEW, 
                                                          
56  Meagher, Marr and Meagher Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 27.  
57  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 301. It is emphasised that a hospital need not 
necessarily be held responsible for the negligence of staff. St Augustine Hospital (Pty) Ltd v 
Le Breton 1975 (2) SA 530 (D). 
58  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 91. Riff v Morgan Pharmacy 508 
A.2d 1247 (Pa1986). 
59  Hiemstra and Gonin Legal Dictionary 280. Res ipsa loquitor : “the case speaks for itself” or 
“it stands to reason – also known as res ipsa docet meaning the case teaches by itself.  
60  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 92. 
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provided that this could be motivated above all reasonable doubt, by the 
defendant not being able to give a logical explanation and that all contributory 
facts are proven.61 
The questions that need to be answered here is whether in the normal course of 
events, the accident would not have occurred if reasonable care had been used, 
or that the plaintiff did not contribute to the occurrence of the accident.62  Thus the 
maxim or doctrine of RIL should only be considered if (a) that the occurrence must 
be of such a nature that it would not normally happen, unless there had been 
negligence and (b) this occurrence of the “instrumentality” should be within the 
exclusive control of the accused negligent person.63  This maxim as stated in the 
case of Macleod v Rens 1997(3) SA (ECD) is no “magic formula” but has a place 
in the scheme of and the search of causation.64 There must be an absence of 
other facts and evidence so that it would be self-evident that the defendant would 
be at fault.65 The inference of finding a defendant at fault must however be 
consistent with all other proven facts, and also that the proven facts should be 
such that this inference drawn is the most probable one.66   
To establish negligence in civil litigation of medical malpractice, the elements of a 
civil malpractice suit should consists of: 
• A relationship (which had existed) between the physician and patient. 
• An established duty by physician to the patient. 
• Duty had to be upheld at a professional standard of care. 
• The physician had breached this duty to the patient. 
• This breach had resulted in harm. 
                                                          
61  Zeffert and Paizes The SA Law of Evidence 221. 
62  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 92. The res ipsa loquitor principle 
is not primarily accepted as such anymore in South African Law, but must be argued in full 
as a secondary issue. However, in the working stages of evaluating a case it still helps to 
classify facts that could be used in argumentation. 
63  Van Den Heever and Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitor and Medical Negligence 9. 
64  MacLeod v Rens 1997 (3) SA (ECD) para1046D.  
65  MacLeod v Rens 1997 (3) SA (ECD) para 1052E-F. 
66  MacLeod v Rens 1997 (3) SA (ECD) para 1049B-C. 
90 
 
• The physician’s breach was the proximate cause of a patient’s injury. This is 
then more refined into this element by asking the question whether the injury 
would have occurred “but for” the breach of the physician.67 
4.3.7 The concept of the “burden of proof” 
The MEW, in preparing his testimony and in consultation with the lawyers must 
understand and know how to address the burden of proof. The plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof and the elements to argue against must be thought through, 
“applying the mind”. In civil cases it rests on the preponderance of evidence, by 
implication a weight in favour of 51 per cent. Thus the MEW for or against must 
appear and impress the court to be knowledgeable, objective, and credible.68  
The criteria for standard of care should also be assessed by defining it as “that 
degree of care, which a reasonably prudent person should exercise in the same or 
similar circumstances”. It implies “that reasonable and ordinary care, skill and 
diligence as physicians and surgeons in good standing in the same locality, in the 
same general line of practice, would have exercised the same prudent care in 
similar cases”. Thus the MEW must:  
• Establish standards of care applicable to the case. 
• Evaluate whether the factual testimony provided indicates any deviation from 
acceptable standards. 
• When care has been deemed “substandard”, the MEW may be asked 
whether the deviation from the standard of care could be the proximate 
cause of harm. 
• Because courts depend on a MEW to make medical standards 
understandable, the testimony should be clear, coherent and consistent with 
the standards at the time of the incident. 
• The MEW must know of and consider alternative standards, which could be 
raised under direct testimony or under cross-examination. 
                                                          
67  Freckelton, Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 101. 
68  Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 23. 
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• The MEW should not define the standard so narrowly that it only emphasizes 
their opinion on the standard of care, to the exclusion of other acceptable 
options.69 
• The MEW must know that a negative outcome does not necessarily indicate 
medical professional negligence. 
• The MEW must be able to concede to other acceptable treatment a prudent 
physician would pursue.70 
4.3.8 Evidence of journals  
To supplement and boost their testimonies, many MEW and legal teams prefer to 
quote professional journal articles. A major pitfall to avoid when medical journals 
are quoted, is that a MEW must be mindful that editors usually only publish “good 
news” articles where results, as part of a research project are inflated so as to look 
good and are exceptional. To set a standard of care against an article published 
by top experts and having itself highly set standards, would therefore not be 
generally fair for a defendant, except when used in defence.71 Thus, before 
published material is put forward, it must adhere to the so-called Daubert rules, 
where the published evidence must be peer reviewed by random controlled 
studies and meta-analysis, the error rate must be known, the article must be 
widely accepted by the medical community and must meet tested guidelines.72  
In fact, the Daubert rule empowers the court or legal team to be a gatekeeper of 
expert testimony. This must also be interpreted like as it was at the time of the 
alleged malpractice. The common guideline in medicine of primum non nocere 
should also be borne in mind here. A comparative faults doctrine should be 
                                                          
69  This occurs very commonly in most doctors’ opinion in especially disciplinary cases and a 
dilemma is when lawyers pressure a MEW to be “narrow” in his opinion. 
70  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 285.  
71  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 298. 
72  Daubert rule from Daubert v Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579, 1135 (1993) 
Knowledge of the Daubert rule should be obtained and can be used by the MEW and the 
legal team in rebutting the opponent’s testimony. Based upon a case of wrong medication 
that was wrongly prescribed and issued and who would be the negligent person in this chain 
of events. The rule that follows from this case is that the judge becomes a “gatekeeper” of 
expert testimony and the acronym is used of PEAT and especially if literature is to be quoted 
that it should be peer reviewed material with knowledge of error rate, generally accepted by 
the medical community and must be tested. 
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followed and other factors identified which could have contributed more to the 
adverse outcome.73 
Coupled with the above, note should also be taken of the so-called Frye rule 
which states that an expert witness’ testimony must be based upon a reasonable 
degree of acceptance within the specialised field.74  Obviously this necessitates 
that the parties should do a greater effort to agree on the submitted evidence, 
opinion and testimonies and thus the need for alternative dispute resolution has 
developed and will be discussed later. 
4.3.9 Pre-trial discussions 
Pre-trial expert discussions are most important and the ideal is that the experts 
should reach a consensus and note their difference for the court. Although it could 
be argued that the attendance of the lawyers at such a deposition would influence 
the MEW, it still seems very important that the lawyers should attend. Factors 
which should influence this are the importance of the case, the factual complexity, 
the status of the experts, the extent of legal issues relevance and costs. It is 
however recommended that the lawyers attend but only intervene in helping in 
aspects of the law.75  
If a deposition is requested, which is a discovery of documents in the form of oral 
testimony, it must be taken by the attorney appearing in advance of the trial. The 
opposition has the right to dispose of the other party’s MEW. However if this 
occurs there should be insistence on a conference with the client’s attorney. The 
MEW must also be very well prepared. Erroneous claims must be rebutted and for 
the defendant’s case the merits must be demonstrated by a fair MEW.76  
  
                                                          
73  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 299. 
74  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 294. 
75  Campbell, Callum and Peacock Operating Within the Law 249. 
76  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 270 
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4.4  Dilemmas for medical expert witnesses 
4.4.1 The “conspiracy of silence”  
It could be “that all professions are then indeed a conspiracy against the laity”.77 
Lawyers and lay people find it irksome that the doctors, ostensibly at least, do 
have a “conspiracy of silence”. This is often understood as an obligation under the 
ethics of the Hippocratic Oath, where a fellowship status is established amongst 
doctors.78  
Doctors then simply have an aversion to testify or acknowledge mistakes outside 
the “fellowship” knowing that there is a chance that an incident could also happen 
to and with anyone. However, many doctors do feel that medical opinion regarding 
the conduct of a colleague, in whether he was negligent, cannot fit into the 
perceived dogmatism in the law, which the doctors feel would be impossible and 
unfair.79  
The MEW would perhaps be more available to give a medical opinion report 
regarding so-called medical negligence, when his report could be discussed with 
the opposing MEW for the other party when the exchange of the discovery of 
documents take place, with facilitation followed by the focussed expeditious 
testimony and cross examination of the MEW in a court.  This undertaking and re-
assurance by the legal team would then probably break down this “conspiracy of 
silence” phenomenon, and avoiding the pitfall of “hitting the wall of silence”.80  
  
                                                          
77  Concept from George Bernard Shaw’s play “The Doctor’s Dilemma”. Ross George Bernard 
Shaw 111. 
78  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 258. In the Classic Hippocratic Oath “What 
I see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life 
of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep myself holding such things 
shameful to be spoken about”. A modern version states ‘I will remember that I remain a 
member of a society with special obligations to all my fellow human beings, those of 
sound mind and body as well as the infirm.” For senior colleagues “to hold him who has 
taught me this art as equal to my parents and to live my life in partnership of him” or more 
modernly stated “I will respect the hard-won gains of those physicians in whose steps I 
walk…” Also en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hippocratic_Oath (Date of use: 12 July 2012).  
79  Hawkins Mishap or Malpractice 161. 
80  Hawkins Mishap or Malpractice 164.  
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4.4.2 The dilemma of a “duty to give evidence” 
When requested to give evidence, every doctor should recognise his 
responsibilities to assist the court in arriving at a just decision.81 Although doctors 
will testify only to facts within their knowledge, usually medical opinions will be 
offered based upon assumed facts as well. The lawyer must prepare the MEW 
and make him aware when this potential pitfall could be encountered and that 
there are procedural rules, as well as rules of evidence that must be adhered to. 
Conflict of opinion between an assessor and a MEW is a source of great 
embarrassment. Lay people could get the impression that a MEW would be 
prejudiced in favour of their fellow defendant practitioner. It is essential, not only 
that justice should be done as far as possible in every case, but that even the 
appearance of partiality or unfairness should be avoided. Doctors should be 
properly interviewed and must give proper and full honest pre-trial discovery and 
basically stay with this when on trial. The doctor to testify must make sure, that the 
qualifications are established, that note is taken of the medical experience, the 
details of specialisation and the doctor’s attachments to any hospital, clinical 
teaching, writing and research. Conflict of interest must also be ruled upon.82 
The MEW must also be made aware of the subpoena duce tecum procedure.83 
Leading questions are also generally confined to cross examination by opposing 
counsel. The judge may ask leading questions to clear issues for himself. The 
court has the final decision and discretion to accept and reject evidence, to 
determine its reliability, weight and credibility and its relevance.84  
Objections can be raised if basic rules of procedure generally followed are not 
adhered to and that the evidence must be material and relevant to the issues 
involved. Here the MEW must be made aware of the facts that evidence on prior 
facts must be excluded and that hearsay is normally excluded. The MEW cannot 
testify directly as to the truth of the statement of a witness but may support it by 
showing for instance that the patient’s symptoms appeared to confirm the 
                                                          
81  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 215. A “Code of Ethics” should be 
required. 
82  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 309. 
83  Theophilopoulos et al Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure 294. According to the rules 
of the Civil Procedures Evidence Act 25 of 1965. 
84  Theophilopoulos et al Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure 299. 
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statements. The MEW should only answer questions, as volunteering new or 
additional information, which is perhaps immaterial, could give rise to new aspects 
to the embarrassment of all.85  
The question of the reasonable skilful doctor will need to be addressed. There are 
many judicial pronouncements on the standard of care which is expected of the 
doctor.86 The Bolam test could also be applied here in that the defendant doctor 
must sufficiently show that he exercised the ordinary skill of an ordinary man 
exercising that particular profession or art.87 At least, he follows practices that 
would not be disapproved of by the responsible opinion within the profession. This 
doctor has a reasonably sound grasp of medical techniques and is as informed of 
new medical developments as the average competent doctor would be.88  
Obviously the circumstances under which a doctor treats a patient will have to be 
taken into account. It has been eluded that when a doctor has worked under 
severe pressure and made a mistake forced by an emergency, that this incident 
should not be lightly taken as negligence.89  
The MEW could need to testify about so-called “usual practice”. This is also known 
as the “custom test” where a defendant doctor’s conduct is tested against the 
normal usage of his profession. This should be applied in all areas of medical 
negligence litigation. Three facts are needed to establish liability: First the normal 
and usual practice must be established and proven, secondly it must be proved 
that the defendant had not used that practice and thirdly it must be established 
that the course that was adopted is one which no professional man of ordinary skill 
would have taken if he had been acting with ordinary care. The dilemma here is 
that there will always be obvious disagreement as to what the appropriate course 
would have been to follow. Here the “modified” Bolam test could establish the 
perspectives in that a doctor would not be negligent, if he had acted in accordance 
                                                          
85  Meagher, Marr and Meagher Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 315. 
86  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 199. As early as 1838 Tindall CJ ruled 
that every person who enters a learned profession undertakes to exercise a reasonable 
degree of care and skill. This echoed in the R v Bateman in 1925 (1925) 94 LJKB 791 
(CCA), that a court or jury in this case should not exact the highest or very high standard, 
nor be content with a very low standard. 
87  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 2 All ER 118. 
88  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 199.  
89  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 200. In the case Wilsher v Essex Area 
Health Authority (1986) QB 730, 
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with an acceptable practice used by a responsible group of doctors in that 
particular field. This is provided that this medical practice is rightly regarded as 
tenable and acceptable, even if contrary to another view, pending upon the court’s 
decision.90  
The MEW will have to confront the sentiment of “the law will not allow the medical 
profession to play God”. In the Rogers v Whitaker 1992 109 ALR 625 the custom 
test was excluded, by stating that the standard of care is not determined solely by 
reference to the practice followed by a responsible professional body. Expert 
evidence of professional custom will be needed and will be used in the majority of 
suits, but a defendant must not rely on this. A doctor has a duty to keep himself 
informed of major developments, but it cannot be expected that he should have 
read every article or know everything and the MEW must emphasise this point. 
However, a doctor should be aware of a series of articles and/or appropriate 
warnings in the medical press. A MEW must know that innovative techniques must 
also be approached with the necessary caution. Untried procedures would not be 
legally endorsed if patients were exposed to considerable and unreasonable risk 
of damage. Other factors should be taken into account here like the patient’s 
response to conventional treatment, the seriousness of the patient’s condition and 
the patient’s attitude following fully informed consent. The standard of care to be 
applied would be expected to be the same of a doctor competent in the provision 
of such treatment.91 
The MEWs work could be made quite difficult as contesting parties have no 
obligation to present all relevant evidence. They are entitled to present selected 
and potentially favourable evidence to the court. The vision the court and the 
MEW have, is then often limited by the material presented by the adversaries. 
Thus to obtain the “truth”, depends on the issue whether the party has discharged 
the burden of proof. MEWs could deliberately then be specifically chosen to 
present favourable opinions. Thus the views could be made to correspond with the 
wishes of the party who calls them. Problems could arise when MEW extrapolate 
from the general experience to a particular case. Another dilemma is that the 
                                                          
90  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 200. As set out in the Scottish case 
Hunter v Hanley (1955) SC 200. 
91  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 202.  
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emphasis in court is more about the MEW’s qualifications and status, rather than 
the quality of the expert evidence. The MEW with foresight might fear this aspect 
and wish not to become involved, thereby side stepping the “duty to give 
evidence”.92  
Accordingly the role of the MEW must be re-emphasised and is twofold; 
• To furnish basic scientific and technical medical facts or data, 
• To present inferences and conclusions from the facts which the judge, for the 
lack of specialised knowledge, cannot draw.  
The expert is therefore introduced to carry the proof to a conclusion for which the 
party presenting the evidence contends. This evidence should give the scientific 
medical basis and if appropriate, the statistical likelihood, but the presiding officer 
can decide whether this is satisfactory.93   
However the unethical, miasmatic MEW can compensate for the lack of scientific 
authority and facts with aggressive and assertive vehemence, falsely and 
misleadingly superseding the level of satisfaction of presented evidence 
necessary in a legal proceeding.94 These differences in views could be resolved 
by: 
• Accepting the variation of current approaches to causation. 
• Beware of the process of “framing” of influential stakeholders. 
• Defining the role of the “medical expert witness”. 
• Evaluating the quality of evidence, distinguishing between facts and 
opinions. 
• Improving communication between all groups.  
It is a concern amongst lawyers that a culture of “forensic” objectivity must be 
developed for the MEW. Naïve, straightforward, dichotomous answers are 
regularly given by a sole MEW, to resolve complicated issues. Any disciplinary 
                                                          
92  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 52. 
93  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 53. 
94  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 54.  
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hearing will not result in financial compensation, but a finding against a doctor 
could streamline further civil litigation, “boxing in” the MEW.95  
The principles of audi alteram partem, i.e. listening to the other party, must be 
practiced with objectivity by a MEW. Likewise the principle of nemo iudex in sua 
causa, where no-one should be the judge in his own cause must be upheld. 
Furthermore, the MEW must support the doctrine of Common Knowledge, which 
postulates that certain (medical) facts, are so commonly known that pending the 
education and profession of lay people or the court, that cognisance could be 
taken of it without evidence being led. This could be applied after damage 
occurred and where obvious commission or omission negligence occurred. This is 
then to a certain extent the opposite of the res ipsa loquitur principle and where 
“professional malpractice” becomes “ordinary” negligence.96 
A dilemma that could occur is that a MEW (under professional, status and 
psychological pressures) could become utterly convinced of the “correctness” of 
his views. It is most important for the MEW not to give any misleading evidence 
and must not guess or create suspicion. All evidence must be relevant.97 Here 
formal training of an MEW is most important. When a MEW’s evidence, testimony 
or opinion is rejected, it is usually due to the fact that these were not well 
presented and explained.98 Criteria, to prevent the dilemma of a MEW rejection  
that will lead to acceptance of the legal findings of scientific facts are:  
• Theories are to be established, confirmed and must be relevant. 
• The MEW must understand the theory and science around it. 
• Medical scientific principles must be correctly applied to the facts of the case. 
• It must be understandable in and to the court. 
• Correctness of the witness’ presentation is essential.  
• Credibility. Here the Daubert v Morrell Dow Pharmaceutical case must be 
taken note of where scientific data must be used with guidelines of (a) 
                                                          
95  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemma in Health Law 10. 
96  Redelinghuys, Butow, Carstens 2008 South African Dental Journal 151. 
97  Knoetze 2008 De Rebus 29. Relevance : testimony that confirms the existence of a fact or 
the conclusions of the facts. 
98  Mohammed v Shaik 1978 (4) SA 523 (N) para 528 (G). Here it was found that the MEW’s (a 
general practitioner giving evidence over the fertility tests of a man) evidence fell severely 
short of proving on a balance of probabilities that the appellant was sterile. 
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credibility of the theory, with valid results, which were (b) published and (c) 
generally accepted.99 This must be presented in pre-trial meetings. The 
emphasis must however be on answering the legal questions and not the 
factual questions!100  
4.4.3 Understanding the concept of error 
Errors should, in contrast to violations, be viewed to be both understandable and 
inevitable, even for highly trained and regulated professionals. Thus it must be 
distinguished between unintentional errors and deliberate unsafe acts or 
violations. In cases where a standard of practice has knowingly fallen short, the 
act in question would be a violation, even when there was no intent to harm. An 
error is an unintentional failure in the formulation of a plan which is intended to 
achieve a goal, or an unintentional departure of a sequence of activities that was 
intended, except where such departure is due to chance intervention. Errors are 
not necessarily automatic acts, as there is some intended aspect of the procedure 
which goes wrong or a failure of the planned treatment.101   
Errors are therefore skill based and most often a result of a distraction. Knowledge 
based errors, can be due to faulty deliberation, errors of judgement and technical 
errors. Knowledge based errors are actually driven and enforced by the error and 
faulty subjectivity assessments. Skill based errors could be due to unintentional 
actions or omissions, and are probably unavoidable. The remedy to prevent this 
must be in the design of the system. It is a misconception that expertise, 
incentives or threats could prevent errors on the basis of choice alone, to avoid 
unintended actions. Doctors cannot be expected to be superhuman and thereby 
never make an error. Prevention lies inter alia in double checking a protocol and 
not to put expectations unrealistically high. There is also the group of technical 
errors which would depend on patient and doctor variability, the last mentioned in 
terms of skill, knowledge, as well as the levels of fatigue. The phenomenon of “rule 
based” errors, also typically made by experts, often occurs in the presence of 
heavy workloads. A course of action is chosen according to “a rule”, following a 
                                                          
99  Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993). 
100  Knoetze 2008 De Rebus 29. 
101  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 88. 
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sequence that has worked previously. Further investigation into the diagnosis or 
case is halted due to failure to apply “a rule” at the right time. 102   
Errors of judgement, where there must have been thought processes, are clearly a 
subset of deliberative errors. This is compounded by the fact that a perfectly 
rational outcome could follow a poor quality decision. The basis of facts known at 
the time may in analyses, not prove to be the correct one in terms of result. Many 
decisions in medicine also have an element of uncertainty and that the outcome is 
unknown. The phrase “Error of Judgement” has much use normatively so as to 
suggest that an individual takes risks different from what is thought to be 
appropriate.103  
When a crises or emergency happens during medical treatment, doctors should 
force themselves to take essential cognisance in alternatives available, make a 
time frame for decisions and realize their limitations of the cognitive processes and 
thus get help. These steps should also influence a MEW, in defending a case.104   
The dilemma of the egregious error exists, where unacceptably low standards are 
applied. If it is major, it could be argued that it is gross negligence which in severe 
cases could precipitate a criminal case, especially where there is a loss of life. 105 
Poor training, failure of examination systems and non-existent mechanisms for 
screening incompetent doctors contribute to this dilemma.106 
Above can become a true violation where the moral implication of an injury is quite 
different, when some element of choice was involved in the actions which led to 
the adverse event’s causation. This is to be differentiated from an error, because 
the actor believes that the action is an appropriate way of achieving an objective, 
but fails. Here the expression to be used is “acting in good faith”, or “doing the 
best possible thing”. Thus where an element of choice is involved in relation to an 
action, which falls short of some identifiable standard, only then can it be deemed 
                                                          
102  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 89. Example here which often occurs 
in diagnosing influenza instead of malaria or meningitis, because of “frequency gambling”.  
103  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 89. 
104  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 93. 
105  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 93. Egregious, meaning outstandingly 
bad, shocking error. 
106  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 847. 
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to be a violation. This action is the “deliberate – but not necessarily reprehensible”, 
deviation from standard practices.107 
Boundaries could be very vague and cognitive processes are to be used, for 
instance: “was there an element of choice?” The relation to established rules must 
be determined and the violation of these rules would tend to make errors more 
likely and dangerous. The perpetrator of these violations could then be morally 
responsible for the con-sequences. Deliberate violations could be regarded as 
recklessness and would carry a greater measure of opprobrium. This would lead 
to the censure of a medical action, which knowingly was done where an action or 
omission will involve an unacceptable level of risk. It has to be determined by the 
MEW that an action was correct and appropriate. The violation is to be tested for 
appropriateness with a “substitution test”, namely: “whether a different person, in 
the same circumstances and with the same events unfolding in the same way, 
would have likely behaved any differently, assuring that this hypothetical person 
came from the same general field of activity and had similar experience, abilities 
and qualifications”. If this “test” is positive, it could form the basis of “defence of 
necessity”. 108  
Exceptional violations, usually occurs in emergency situations but could under the 
circumstances, be appropriate, like a junior doctor doing an emergency 
tracheotomy in the ward. Routine violations could be neglecting mundane 
procedures, like not checking an anaesthetic machine prior to use, failing to follow-
up blood tests or taking a proper history. Violations could eventually become 
embedded as “bad habits”. Violations created by antecedent actions and errors, 
may involve culpability.109  
                                                          
107  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 100. Standard practices deemed as 
standard are SOP’s – Standard operational procedures, Standard Rules and necessary 
measures to maintain the safe operation of medical practice. 
108  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 101. This substitution test is then 
known as the Johnson test, where Johnson was a legal writer.  
109  Merry and, McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 120. An example could be a doctor 
working while fatigued or under the influence of alcohol. Also failing to take a proper history 
from a patient, where there is no privacy. An additional purpose of these procedures and 
following the above criteria, is to prevent (good) doctors from harming their patients! The 
majority of doctors work longer hours than considered safe and healthy. This must be 
weighed up to the continuity of care. The culture of medicine is to gain competence through 
experience, that hours worked translates into money earned and the average, especially 
junior doctors have extraordinary levels of motivation. 
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When causation of errors is questioned, it is initially the factual causation sine qua 
non, that should be considered by the MEW with the reasoning of the “but for” 
principle or the question “if the consequence would have occurred without the 
conduct – then there’s no blame”. The legal causation is evaluated on a normative 
basis and needs to be answered whether the actor deserves to be held 
accountable. This could lead to compare the violation with five levels of blame, to 
ascertain liability. These are: 
• Pure causal blame: the defendant acted reasonably, no rule was broken, and 
has done nothing wrong in moral terms.  
• Blame by means of unintentional deviation or where normative standards are 
set. Here is a human error and the defendant must be viewed as a “human 
being”. 
• Blame for deviation what could reasonably be accepted. An empiric decision 
about what is reasonable and although no intention was to cause any harm, 
the doctor can be held accountable for performing chosen acts. 
• Recklessness – defendant had knowledge of existence of a risk, but 
proceeded with an action. 
• Blame where it could be demonstrated that there was not an ambiguous 
intention to harm. Antecedent activity could contribute like consumption of 
alcohol, fatigue and omission (whilst still in training, inexperienced or failure 
to do a checklist).110 
4.4.4 The unethical expert  
It is important to avoid the pitfall of being labelled as an untrustworthy and 
unethical MEW whose testimony would not be credible. The unethical expert 
would have testimony variability, an untenable view and will develop certain 
fundamentally dishonest lines of evidence.111 The pro-veritate witness, as an 
independent witness for the court and the so-called miasmatic witness are then 
                                                          
110  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 130. If it could be shown that there 
had been a failure to take all reasonable steps to ensure safety or minimize risk, culpability 
may exist in the last four levels of blame.  
111  Boyce http://www.proz.com/kudoz/italian to english/law (Date of use: 01 April 2012). A 
witness must be impartial and truthful (pro veritate “for the truth”), guiding a court which 
needs authoritative guidance. However this could be abused and by (deliberately) 
missing essential elements, could be misleading.  
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typically examples of the unethical witness.112 This results in profound injustice, 
equally affecting the plaintiff or a defendant. There are then often subtle nuances 
of complex evidence, that pending on the presentation, assertiveness and choice 
of words, could hold the danger to swing a court’s sympathy and findings.113  
Emotional aspects benefitting the plaintiff’s side are often over-exploited. The 
defendant’s MEW has the disadvantage of having to convey facts which are 
difficult to grasp and uninteresting. Gatekeeping of the testimony should be 
appropriate and relevant. Experts, at the time of discovery, should confer and try 
to agree on certain points even only to agree to disagree.114  
“Personal opinion” should rank low in weight of evidence.  Patient factors 
contributing to an adverse outcome must be emphasised. It must be realised that 
medical evidence is an inevitable concomitant of human limitations, especially in 
the face of demanding situations.115  
To compound the dilemma of the unethical witness, there is a lack of legal and lay 
understanding of what the standard of care and the role of an expert witness must 
be. The courts also seldom act against an expert witness whose testimony is 
improper and untruthful. It is emphasised that ethical issues and obligations 
should outweigh legal expectations and duties. The medical boards and 
organisations should monitor this and act against such expert witnesses. Alleged 
abuses by expert witnesses must be studied by the various boards, undertaking 
appropriate action. However, this will not improve the standard of expert 
witnessing and testimony. The medical profession must monitor the medical 
testimony and the manner it is presented. There should be more participation by 
the medical associations and boards, strengthening the presentation of such 
testimony. Legal professional education will then have to play a major role. The 
medical profession should correct misrepresentations and assist in the 
encouragement of thoughtful and informed consideration of medical testimony and 
                                                          
112  Berlin 2003 American Journal of Radiology 25. Pro-veritate witness, in international literature 
referred to but coming from Italian Law, translated into English as a witness called in for an 
independent witness. This witness has no connection otherwise with the case.  
113  Berlin 2003 American Journal of Radiology 25. The skilled and arresting speaker could use 
this technique. 
114  Hoving 2012 Nederlands Juristenblad 873. 
115  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 190. 
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the interpretation of medical literature.116 Due to the court’s adversarial system, it 
is also often difficult to distinguish a simple medical disagreement from a false 
medical representation.117   
To prevent the excessive use of the unethical witnesses, reforms including the role 
of society, should be introduced. No-fault compensation and quick settlement must 
be emphasised. This allows the defendant to avoid a vigorous defence, will protect 
his reputation and prevent feelings of resentment. It will emphasise that harm or 
injury is not necessarily due to incompetence, but rather no more than an 
inevitable concomitant complication of an inherently high risk procedure.118 The 
emphasis should be on the “Burden of Illness” of the patient which must be 
enlightened, in that every ill and unhealthy person will have a larger background 
risk to life and harm, beyond the reasonable, fair and realistic control of a treating 
doctor.119  
The unethical MEW ignores the fact that the management of medical injuries and 
its avoidance creates special cases, deserving special treatment. This will cause 
the practice of so-called “defensive medicine” to increase. Better and improved 
record keeping must also therefore be implemented to prevent the unethical MEW 
gaining a threshold to build a case.120  
An unethical witness, as a colleague, worsens the effects of litigation on the doctor 
and his morale is adversely affected. It affects the doctor’s psychological health 
and ability to work. This could result in denial and blind reasoning, leading a 
vicious circle of confusion of events, self-blame, anger, unworthiness, hesitancy, 
insecurity and a grief reaction. This results in a climate of fear, excessive stress on 
performance, trauma of litigation and can affect the families and colleagues, with 
demoralising effects. The remedy should be to curtail the unethical MEW 
                                                          
116  Kassirer and Cecil 2002 JAMA 1387. 
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aggressively and strive for a timeous out of court settlement, thus avoiding a flood 
of unmerited claims, reputation damage and unnecessary punishment.121  
4.4.5 Manufactured evidence and the concept of “trawling”.  
The MEW should also be aware of the dread of manufactured evidence. As this 
seems to prevail itself the MEW must be most critical and avoid so-called 
“trawling”, “fishing” and “building” of a case. The MEW must be aware of perjury, 
fabrication of and attempts to obscure or prevent knowledge of pertinent facts and 
evidence. Generally, although doctors and lawyers could easily be convinced by 
the patient’s version of events, the MEW must be aware that it is mostly hearsay 
and usually hearsay is not actually admissible evidence.122  
Evidence must be understood as oral evidence, documentary evidence and real 
evidence. It is most important to ascertain and keep to the facts of the issue. Facts 
must form part of the res gestae,123 as well as facts surrounding the event (i.e. 
drunkenness, with assault, that led to a death). Facta probanda, are the facts 
related to each other contributing to the material facts of issue, and must be 
identified and proved to amongst others to establish the cause of the action.124  
This is important to make the determination whether an action is more or less 
probable, thus they have probative value. The golden rule of evidence, with the 
expert witnesses’ opinion, is whether it is admissible and carries weight, by being 
relevant and credible.125 In malicious prosecutions, violations of these principles 
are usually well camouflaged and a MEW must be able to help discover it, to help 
prepare counter arguments!126 
In medical law it is often advised that a defendant doctor should get character 
evidence especially when having to plead for leniency in sentencing. This is most 
difficult and controversial, with limited application in civil cases. However, it could 
have a role in the disciplinary or defamation cases. In cases of real reprehensible 
                                                          
121  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 211. 
122  Meagher,Marr and Meacher Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 315. 
123  Hiemstra and Gonin Legal Dictionary 278. Res Gestae literally means “things done” but here 
in the law of evidence “all facts concomitant with, illustrating and forming part of the matter in 
question”.  
124  Hiemstra and Gonin Legal Dictionary 189. 
125  Zeffert and Paizes The SA Law of Evidence 321. 
126  Murphy Murphy on Evidence 139. 
106 
 
behaviour, the MEW must realise that a judge must decide whether it is a case of 
contra bonos mores, which could lead to a criminal case being founded. By giving 
character evidence a medical witness might be giving (allowable) hearsay 
testimony.127  
4.4.6 The concept of the evaluation of informed consent. 
Characteristics and elements of informed consent decisions include accurate 
assessment of information about the relevant alternate options and their 
consequence in relation to a patient’s priorities. Options need to have been 
outlined. This must include the consequences for the patient if it is decided to have 
no treatment.128 
Where the value of informed consent is appraised, it is accepted that if a patient 
decides that he places his confidence in the surgeon (thus paternalism), to act in 
the patient’s best interests, it must then at least be the patient’s choice. In court 
the subjective approach test,129 would determine what the individual patient 
would have decided, if the necessary information had been given. This is followed 
by an objective test on what the reasonable person would have decided and this 
is where the onus to state this, rests on medical evidence.130  
A pitfall to be avoided is that an informed consent (or informed choice) must never 
be violated. If a patient seems confused and cannot decide, more visits, gaining 
information by reading or a second opinion, is advised. Informed consent must 
contain effects of ideal treatment, the purpose of the treatment, the side-effects of 
the treatment, complications and these are then critical elements of which medical 
law must take note of if it was discussed.131 These norms have been set out in the 
case of Castell v De Greef.132 In this case it was stated that a practitioner could 
incur liability for failure to warn a patient of material risks (in this case the necrosis 
                                                          
127  Murphy Murphy on Evidence 139. 
128  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 117. 
129  The patient’s testimony would emphasise this approach. 
130  Meagher, Marr, Meagher Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 70. The guideline of Chief 
Justice Laskin could be of help as in Riebl v Hughes (1980) 114 (DLR 3rd) 1. This case 
takes into consideration what decision a reasonable person might make in the patient’s 
particular position. 
131  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 106. 
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of tissue with a mammoplasty (sub-cutaneous mastectomy),133 that the defence of 
volenti non fit injuria would then not be allowed,134 that a doctor has a duty to 
disclose material risks “under certain circumstances”.135 
Requirements for informed consent / choice is that it is to be given freely, by a 
patient capable of volition, having full knowledge, appreciating fully the nature and 
(relevant and realistic) risks, also subjectively consenting to the act. This consent 
must be allowable by legal order or not be contra bonos mores.136 The same 
applies not only to surgical procedures but also to the administration of 
medication. 137 
4.4.7 The concept of therapeutic privilege 
The excuse of therapeutic privilege could and although these days the use of it is 
less, it would be used in defence of a doctor. The doctor especially if he feels that 
the whole explanation of a disease could upset an individual so, that that he or she 
might refuse very necessary treatment, might prefer not to mention the risks or 
prognosis of a disease, thus withholding information as “therapeutic privilege”138  
When TP is used, the doctor must state it clearly in the notes, documenting the 
reasons and underlying psychological profile. The MEW in court would need to 
evaluate the risks and dangers of a particular diagnosis and intervention, thus 
evaluating the practitioner’s reasons, clinical notes and the nature of the non-
disclosure.139 The Court would have to decide whether the practitioner’s conduct 
conformed to the standard of the speciality. 
                                                          
133  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) para 408I. 
134  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) para 409A. Volenti non fit inuria is then a defence 
argument implying that “those who had given permission cannot claim for harm”. 
135  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) para 416J. 
136  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 108. The dictum of Innes CJ from the case of 
Waring and Gillow v Sherborne 1904 TS 340-344 must be borne in mind namely: “It must be 
clearly shown that the risk (of injury) was known, that it was realised, and that it was 
voluntary undertaken. Knowledge, appreciation, consent – these are the essential elements; 
but knowledge does not invariably imply appreciation, and both together are not necessarily 
equivalent to consent”. 
137  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 280. 
138  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 984. It is 
difficult to really define therapeutic privilege as it is a wide concept. Therapeutic privilege is 
defined as where a medical professional will keep secret to himself information aspects of a 
disease or treatment that otherwise would cause unnecessary anguish influencing a 
patient‘s correct acceptable consent. 
139  Van Oosten 1993 Medicine and the Law 651. 
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Furthermore as seen above, the TP undermines the patient’s right to self-
determination. TP could be paternalistic and the patient’s right to self-
determination is the principle of the informed consent doctrine. Underlying the 
concept of therapeutic privilege is the classical Hippocratic ethic, according to 
which doctors should do what in their judgement, would lead to the greatest good 
(or least harm) for the patients. Therapy becomes the ultimate goal, but what is 
told to the patient must be carefully planned and communicated with skill. The 
information given must correlate with the patient’s need for information. This 
attitude should not slip into the realms of paternalism.140 Care must be taken not to 
leave a patient with an unrealistic picture for permission for an operative 
procedure, based on deceptive and unbalanced information whilst obtaining 
“informed consent”.141 
The privilege could undermine the patient’s trust in doctors. The real danger and 
potential cause for litigation is that a patient who finds out the truth after having 
been deceived for instance by way of second opinions, materialisation of 
undisclosed risks, discomfort, lack of benefit or awareness of approaching death, 
is the loss of faith against the doctor and the medical profession. The perplexed 
patient is left in a state of anxiety. If possible, a patient must never be deceived by 
non-disclosure. A vicious circle could develop and a communication gap can 
develop. Significant harm can thus ensue, should the patient learn the truth. 
Shielding a terminal patient, even a child, from “bad news” is often futile, as most 
patients intuitively know that they are dying!142 
The TP can be open to abuse. There is very little proof, that a patient after 
receiving bad and upsetting news about their diagnosis and prognosis, actually do 
plunge into severe depression, suffer health problems, refuse sensible and 
reasonable treatment or commit suicide.143  
It is concluded that TP could have been overused as an excuse for not giving 
patients sensitive information. It is likely the TP abuse is inconsistent with the 
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patient’s right to know and to decline “informed” treatment. The doctor therefore 
“forces” the patient into consent. The counter argument is that if patients were to 
be informed of all the extreme complications and risks of an operation, no patient 
would ever undergo any operation.144  
It must be guarded against by the MEW and legal teams, that TP must not be 
allowed for defence where a dishonest doctor concealed the truth under 
circumstances where non-disclosure amounts to abuse. The TP may afford an 
easy defence to present “after the fact”, and thus may shield negligence. The TP 
may be used by doctors who have fear and aversion to disclosing unpleasant 
information, like causing pain, having misplaced sympathy, fearing blame, hiding 
incompetency and deficient training, eliciting unpleasant reactions, having to say “I 
don’t know”, showing emotions, fearing of own illness / death and fearing the 
medical hierarchy. Cost implications of non-disclosure could be that of lost or 
missed chances, having a worse prognosis and suffering indignity. A conclusion 
could be made that therapeutic privilege could rest on false medical assumptions 
and therefore if TP is to be used, it must be done with the utmost thought, 
reasoning and communication skill.145   
Issues are often raised whether a patient would or would not have refused the 
offered treatment if the doctor had informed the patient more fully of the treatment, 
arguing if the patient had refused, there would have been no injury. Here for the 
plaintiff to succeed, the court must be made to decide whether a reasonable 
patient would have accepted the treatment on advice of the doctor. There is the 
subjective view (patient’s view) and objective view (“reasonable” patient’s view) 
factors which must be considered here. Apart from whether the risk had been 
material, the plaintiff has the onus of satisfying the court, on a balance of 
probabilities, that a patient would have refused treatment had the risk of a 
procedure, like “air embolism” (a remote risk not mentioned by a doctor under 
defence of therapeutic privilege), been explained. Subjectively it is determined 
whether the patient would still have undergone the procedure and objectively, 
                                                          
144  The author, when confronted by anxious patients, reminds them that risks must be weighed, 
very much in the same way like buying an airplane ticket. We all know the airplane could 
crash, be hijacked, suffer mechanical failure and that the pilots and ground air traffic 
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under the circumstances, most practical to fly. 
145  Meagher, Marr and Meagher Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 72. 
110 
 
what a reasonable patient would have done if there had been a full disclosure of 
remote risk. Here further examples of remote risks would be the like of perforation 
of the colon by colonoscopy, or permanent paraesthesia of the lower jaw, upon 
extraction of impacted wisdom teeth.146  
If a risk is material, special and unusual but possible, it must be discussed and as 
a guideline all temporary effects with more than a seven per cent chance of 
occurring and all permanent effects more than one per cent chance of occurrence 
must be mentioned as far as reasonably possible.147  
Only in exceptional cases can inadequate disclosure be justifiably accepted, 
pending a real threat to a patient’s mental or physical health, or where the patient 
cannot make a rational decision due to an emotional state. The defendant must 
bear the onus to prove that the TP was based on good clinical judgement, and that 
the patient’s autonomy was not unduly restricted. The main object for TP, is that of 
achieving the best medical treatment, under the prevailing circumstances, for the 
patient.148    
Cognisance should be taken that a doctor could set up defences by:149 
• Waiver – preferably, a document should be provided, signed by the plaintiff, 
which specifically lists the disclosed risks. 
• Consent form – must mention that the plaintiff had been informed of the 
risks. 
• Usual practice – it is claimed that it is practice to warn of certain risks. If 
credible, it should be acceptable.  
• Other sources of information - could have found out by asking doctor, friend 
or relative. Here the concept of imputed knowledge becomes important.  
• Common risks as average knowledge should make one aware of possibility, 
albeit small, of death, bleeding, pain, scars, infection, discomfort, gangrene 
and whether a specific centre would not be capable of dealing with 
complications.  Care must be taken against misconceptions as well as 
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unrealistic and unreasonable expectations, like in cosmetic surgery, that it is 
“scarless”.  
• Emotional factors (therapeutic privilege). 
• Risk of complications. 
• Standard of knowledge – the defendant did not know whether a certain event 
would occur, as it was not reasonably foreseeable.   
• Too remote too mention. If a complication is too remote there is no need to 
normally mention it. The risk has possibly less than one per cent chance, 
fellow doctors would also not warn and the risk effect is not serious enough. 
Here expert MEW testimony is important.  
• The law of percentages – this is a very effective defensive tool. For instance 
the incidence of air embolism150 is less that 1/100 000 cases (unless 
deliberately negligent like central venous line left open to air), perforation of 
the bowel with laparoscopic sterilizations is 1/1000 (unless there was 
previous abdominal surgery or pathology that could have caused adhesions), 
and perforation of the colon is zero in an average of 5 000 – 8 000 cases of 
routine colonoscopies (provided there are no lesions like diverticulitis).151  
• Opinion of experts – considering that there would be a continuous clash 
between the court and the medical profession, to dictate a standard for 
disclosure of risk. 
• Material risks – like voice loss following a thyroidectomy, necrosis of bone, 
facial numbness following surgery, numbness and hypersensitivity of the 
breasts after cosmetic surgery. There is a duty to warn against unnecessary 
elective surgery and the patient’s apprehension must be noted. 
4.4.8 Determining the standard of care: documentary proof  
A dilemma could be that documents, describing appropriate clinical practice in 
defined situations could be (and indeed usually is) viewed as a source of evidence 
on whether there was a departure from acceptable practice. The danger is that 
this could be accepted on face value as the norm in all cases. The guidelines from 
                                                          
150  Air embolism is where air enters the venous system and could as air bubbles prevent the 
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academic institutions will have considerable authority, but these institutions will 
tend to represent only a particular section of medical opinion.152 A danger is 
created and exacerbated in that experts tend to be selected from those working in 
leading academic institutions.153 These MEW’s, if they have strong autocratic and 
narrow minded views, their set expected standard of care presented to a specific 
court will be unreasonably high, differing from that accepted by a substantial if not 
the majority group of experts not associated with these institutions.154 The Bolam 
test (i.e. what would be still acceptable even if it is a minority of reasonable and 
acceptable medical opinion) should therefore be applied in all these potential 
cases. Doctors must always therefore give reasons and document it, when there is 
a deviation of the standard form of treatment. Any deviation must preferably be 
done with the advice of a second opinion. Another danger is that guidelines can 
become so numerous that even the most conscientious doctor would not be able 
to keep abreast of them.155 The academic miasmatic expert could then also set 
standards that not even he himself could obtain!156  
Using documentary proof, the MEW should determine what should have been 
done, rather than what is usually done, where the latter concept would reflect 
which most competent practitioners in the defendant’s positions could have 
reasonably be expected to have done. Due to the changing nature of professional 
knowledge, any reasonable practitioner should not be out of date.157  Judgements 
must be made according to the acceptable knowledge and practices prevailing at 
the time of the adverse accident, like the attitude to internal and intimate 
examinations that have changed.158  It must be accepted that every MEW can and 
will have an outcome bias, thus eventually creating a dilemma in being 
professionally not objective. Eventually the emotional will to win a case could 
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become overriding. The MEW could subliminally be influenced by the fact, that the 
more serious the possible harm that could have been caused, then the higher the 
standard of care would have been expected. MEW should not focus solely on 
individual factors, but also be led by other general and systemic factors, within an 
institution, albeit that it is easier to prove a doctor negligent, than for instance an 
institution like an academic hospital.159 
4.5 The concept of acceptability of expert evidence 
The MEW must know the effect and impact, acceptance and weight of opinion 
evidence. Factors that will lead to a MEW opinion, to be accepted as evidence, is 
the MEW’s composure that will signal special knowledge and technical 
presentation. It is emphasised that an expert’s opinion is actually reasoned 
conclusions based on certain facts which are common cause, established on 
evidence or obtained from another competent witness.160 The admissibility is 
allowed where the court is unable to draw proper inferences, or make its own 
opinion and judgements. The court will realise it needs an expert witness, who 
acquired specialised knowledge by study or practice, to help evaluate the 
evidence. Expert opinion evidence may be contradicted and subject to cross 
examination. The facts are evaluated for admissibility and weight.161 
Independence and objectivity of the MEW will carry a lot of weight (and respect), 
even if the MEW had been retained by the other party. Thus the main function of 
an expert witness is to give an opinion that ultimately could assist the court by 
making a fair finding in matters regarding specialized knowledge. The opinion 
must be credible or must be rejected if the scientific validity is not acceptable or 
logical.162 
4.6 The dilemmas created by Health Professional Committees or Councils 
Once medical malpractice occur health councils or committees must examine, 
classify and clarify a complaint or accusation, using acknowledged definitions and 
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respond to the various parties in writing.  However it is accepted and there is a 
perception, that doctors could have been denied their rights to natural justice.163 
The blocking by the professional councils of the patient’s right to sue, must be 
counterbalanced and accompanied by acceptable alternatives to ensure that 
reasonable complaints against doctors can be heard and dealt with. There are 
many real and perceived instances where mistakes / errors involving little or any 
moral culpability, resulted in findings of “conduct unbecoming” in a hearing of a 
health professions council.164 The opprobrium of such a finding is then unduly 
harsh. Professional over self-regulation and protection however, will lead to patient 
frustration realizing that “closing of professional ranks” could lead to extreme 
cases being overlooked and condoned.165  
It should be accepted that doctors are well placed to judge aberrant and unethical 
behaviour by colleagues.  Preventative measures should be controlled by MEW 
doctors by re-registrations, proof of continued professional education and 
development, as well as programs of clinical governance. The costs will be offset 
by savings on court cases and of iatrogenic harm, in financial and human terms.166  
The dilemma also arises that with different and various diagnostic techniques or 
therapy, that it may be difficult to defend a particular regimen if an untoward 
outcome occurs. Thus alternative dispute resolution procedures must be 
established and followed i.e. mediation or depositions.  Another dilemma is the 
want for punitive damages. Here a third party (like a Medical aid or Medical Care 
Organization) could also sue, if unnecessary or when preventable costs 
occurred.167  
If a finding could be made of “guilty of conscious disregard” of patient safety, the 
punitive rewards in addition to compensatory damage should be considered – an 
MEW can contribute to this process, at the request of the plaintiff’s lawyer.168  
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The dilemma is that when a case is built by a series of questions leading to a 
summation, it could be found (perhaps unreasonably), that the defendant 
“deliberately and intentionally”, consciously contributed to this “adverse outcome”, 
proving that there was a disregard for the plaintiff’s safety. To prevent this most 
doctors would practice forms of defensive medicine. Defensive medicine could 
then be “over practiced” which could be, 
(a) Positive (Assurance Behaviour) – more measures, albeit of little or no real 
value from an objective medical point of view) taken to help with the 
diagnosis, or aiming to reduce litigation risks or, 
(b) Negative (Avoidance behaviour) – avoiding high risk patients.169  
An alternative could be so-called moderated settlement conferences where the 
lawyers are neutral and a panel of experts reports merits on either sides.170  
4.7 Diverse aspects of medical witnessing 
As there are many small pitfalls that could grow into cumbersome problems, the 
MEW should also be aware of many diverse aspects of medical witnessing. The 
most common and often awkward ones would be fees to be asked for and the 
undertaking of practising a “code of ethics”. If not sorted out early, it could ruin a 
medico-legal partnership and cause a justifiable case to be lost. An important 
aspect, as unpleasant as it seems is that fee contracts must be drawn up and a 
memorandum of understanding issued with the legal team. It must be noted to 
NEVER negotiate fees on a contingency basis, as it could “build a case”, thus 
developing an unreasonable and unethical desire to “win”, in order to get 
remunerated.  The MEW must insist on a right to abide by a “code of ethics”, the 
right to receive adequate and fair compensation for services rendered, to consult, 
to all relevant data, to be kept informed of all new developments, to be free from 
all undue influence, to have depositions within a reasonable time and to have 
adequate endorsement.171  
                                                          
169  Howarth 2013 Sept SA Medical Chronicle 3.  
170  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 153. As shown in the Wisconsin State, it 
expedites resolution, settlements and avoids lengthy litigation. This can also be described as 
early neutral evaluation. 
171  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 210.  
116 
 
4.7.1 The dilemma of the “Designation without Permission Syndrome” 
A MEW must be aware of the so-called “Designation without Permission 
Syndrome”, where a lawyer intentionally forces a case on a potential MEW.  
Acceptance of a case must be provisional at first and then later confirmed in 
writing, after the specific lawyer had provided all the relevant facts (own 
emphasis) of the case. Often the request is urgent just to “see” whether a case 
can be made. If the opinion of the MEW would support this prima facie case, 
without further agreement, appointment, contract or letter of undertaking, this case 
is thrust upon the (unwilling) MEW.172  
Closely related to this is the “attorney’s shopping syndrome”, where lawyers 
deliberately build a case with opinions and “fish” for a favourable MEW. Once a 
potential MEW has become involved in such cases, the MEW’s credibility could be 
lost as his opinions would be interpreted by knowledgeable lawyers and other 
MEW as insincere, artificial, deceitful and the witness could be caught out “under 
oath” of not telling the truth. The question that could be asked is whether a MEW’s 
opinion “is also the truth”.173  
It is the judge’s perception of the MEW’s truthfulness that will be critical. The 
phenomenon of the miasmatic expert, who through opportunism and greed 
exploits the judicial system, is typically found out by a judge in the scenario of a 
court case. Doctors should not let an attorney write the report or when conforming 
to local statutes or court rules, put other words into the report that could construe a 
different meaning. Reports must conform to civil procedures.174 Thus the MEW’s 
report must be prepared by the witness and contain a complete statement of all 
opinions to be expressed plus the basis of the reasoning. 175 
4.8 Conclusion to Chapter four   
Knowledge of Medical Law will empower a medical expert witness and enable him 
to be a credible and reliable witness, thus helping a legal team and the courts to 
reach a fair finding. With additional knowledge and skill, a MEW would be trusted 
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to do the correct thing, thus avoiding many mishaps and pitfalls. The basic 
definitions must be known and checked with the legal team, i.e. for instance if one 
is dealing with medical malpractice, medical negligence and when an error of 
judgement is possibly also a cause of medical negligence. The aspects of 
foreseeability versus also the risk must be understood. To evaluate these factors 
fairly, ethics must be a guiding principle like “at first do no harm”, often used in the 
practice of medicine but in a medico-legal opinion it is also very applicable. 
Legal principles must be known like the use of stare decisis and objectivity. Other 
rules and concepts like imperitia culpae adnumeratur and the adverse event must 
be understood and properly evaluated. These concepts could encourage a 
hesitant MEW to avoid the “conspiracy of silence”. Understanding the concept of 
an error and its analyses could contribute to proper legal procedure. Thus there 
must be cognisance taken of criteria which play a role in the appointment of a 
medical witness. Medical witnesses must not rationalize a case or help by 
building, or manufacturing the case. The MEW should know of the considerations 
that a court could use when evaluating the acceptability of the expert evidence. 
The MEW should also play a role in evaluating the informed consent process to 
establish if it had been reasonable. Likewise the pitfall of quoting journals must be 
taken note of and qualified in court by the Daubert rules. Post-graduation training 
in the field of the MEW seems to be quite essential and will have to be enforced in 
future as medical law will inevitably change with changing times. This will 
contribute to selecting an appropriate medical witness ensuring that such a 
witness is just like a lawyer or advocate in their respective professional fields, “a fit 
and proper person” for this role.  
In this chapter many of the most obvious and common dilemmas are discussed 
which act as pitfalls for an unwary medical witness. It is thus most important that 
the MEW should be creatively aware of these potential dilemmas which could 
affect the standard, fairness, reasonableness and justifiability of his opinion and 
testimonies. By not addressing as many medico legal and dilectual elements 
specifically and objectively, the medical expert opinion could become useless and 
be rejected in a court of law. Definitions should be understood so as not to 
complicate reasoning or confound the issues, for instance when is a medical 
complication due to an error of judgement or really due to a wrongful negligent act. 
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The medical witness must know the pivotal role of proof. Likewise the legal team 
and the MEW for a party must be able to evaluate their own and the other party’s 
MEW in terms whether his testimony measures up to acceptable standards. Case 
studies reveal that a judge is seldom, if ever, fooled by these witnesses, but a 
legal team must be actively prepared to raise doubtful issues at cross 
examination. The unethical MEW must thus be eliminated from legal procedures. 
Reforms in the legal process could help to eliminate the threat of unethical 
witnesses in Medical Law.176 Mediation and arbitration meetings could defuse 
patient and family generated dilemmas of unrealistic expectations in term of 
compensation, accountability and punitive actions.177 
Definitions must be well understood and uniformly used by the legal team as 
friction could develop, if the same understanding and definition of a concept is not 
used like using the term “adverse event” loosely as “medical malpractice”. Medico-
legal dilemmas are actually also created by controlling statutory bodies where 
doctors are charged for “conduct unbecoming” and “failing in the care” following 
naïve, unreasonable and unrealistic complaints of patients. Here an ethical 
knowledgeable witness on a committee could defuse many situations and via 
feedback, allay the plaintiff’s concerns.  
A major dilemma is where a case in thrust upon a MEW by an over demanding 
and aggressive legal team. The weak and unprepared MEW could fall for this 
assertiveness and should guard his professional independence fiercely even if it 
could mean losing the client. Specific dilemmas that virtually occur in every 
medical legal court case are that of proper informed consent. Thus all aspects of 
present accepted informed consent must be known and accepted.178  
Although it is virtually impossible to address all the dilemmas that could lead to 
severe pitfalls in the role of the MEW, those mentioned above has been found to 
be virtually consistent in all the case studies and the personal experience of most 
MEWs. Thus it must be taken note of and properly pro-actively addressed when 
every case is evaluated and assessed by the MEW.  
                                                          
176  Berlin 2003 American Journal of Radiology 1521. 
177  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 102. 
178  Van Oosten 1995 Medicine and the Law 167. 
  
119 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESS EXPERIENCE IN OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS 
“Fools learn from experience. I prefer to learn from the experience of others” – 
Count Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany circa 1885 
 
5.1 Introduction 
By evaluating other international MEW experiences and systems could help to 
improve the position in South Africa, bearing in mind that the Constitution 
encourages this action.1 Medical litigation had prominently taken place and had 
been debated in English speaking common law countries for many years, 
therefore a comparison of medical litigation should be made with these countries. 2 
As South African Law is mainly mixed Roman-Dutch Law with extrapolation of 
English law, this would make sense. Because the worldwide tendency for medical 
litigation is rising, English speaking countries make up the vast part of this 
litigation and thus should have the most collective experience of acceptable 
medical litigation that would be applicable for the South African experience.3  
5.2 Facilitation by use of rules and tests in foreign medical law 
To facilitate argumentation in law, the appearance of several objective “tests” were 
noted in the USA. 4 As it is important to reach a fair outcome on the balance of 
probabilities, courts actually invite physicians in the role of “clairvoyants” to foretell 
of conditions, presumably on scientific speculation in the absence of verifiable 
medical predictions, or in hypothetical situations during argumentation, to 
determine an outcome.5  
                                                          
1  Section 39(1)( c ) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
2  Thomas, Van der Merwe en Stoop Historiese Grondslae van die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 8. 
3  Howarth 2012 Medical Chronicle 12. This article acknowledges the steeply rising claims 
being awarded to patients. 
4  Potter et al v Firestone Tire and Rubber Co (1993) California. This case emphasizes the use 
of acceptable scientific knowledge as given by an expert witness. 
5  Mendelson The Interfaces of Medicine and Law 258. 
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In due course it was also accepted in English law, regarding the MEW’s role in the 
law of tort, that the scientific validity of a subject or methodology must be accepted 
by the scientific community.6 By applying this guideline, it must be borne in mind, 
historically and factually, that it is a MEW’s opinion testimony, which must be 
based upon a reasonable degree of acceptance within the specialised field.7 
More recently, internationally, the testimony of the MEW must adhere to the 
guidelines from the case of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc,8 where it 
was suggested that evidence had to be relevant, reliable, would not mislead the 
court and that this evidence should not make a case more complicated.9 Thus 
testimony must be based on sufficient facts or data, must be a reliable product and 
must demonstrate that the witness has applied methods applicable and relevant to 
the facts of the case.10 
In English law two important tests have been devised and have the recognition 
and approval of the high courts. These tests are the so-called Bolam and the 
Bolitho tests.11 
The Bolam principle could apply in medical testimony, which seems to be used 
extensively in English Law, and was upheld for use in court on four occasions in 
the House of Lords (by 2001).12 The Bolam principle states that it allows for the 
difference in opinion between doctors and that it is a sufficient defence to have the 
support of a reputable body of medical opinion (regardless of the size of that 
body). A doctor and especially a MEW should bear in mind that consulting with a 
colleague is a powerful tool, not only in preventing litigation but also to form a 
united front in litigation. At the time of discovery of documents, it could prevent 
unpleasant adversarial procedures or prolonging the case unnecessarily.13  
                                                          
6  Frye v US 293 F 1013(1923). This case emphasised the scientific validity of expert 
evidence. 
7  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 294. 
8  Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993). “Daubert” pronounced 
“Dowbert”, seem to be used extensively in the USA.  
9  Knoetze 2008 De Rebus 29.  
10  Gomez 2005 The Journal of Legal Medicine 391. 
11  Campbell, Callum and Peacock Operating Within the Law 29. 
12  Campbell, Callum and Peacock Operating Within the Law 29.  
13  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 90. 
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Objectively, the Bolam test and the Bolitho test would help to set a standard to 
meet, before appropriation of blame. The Bolitho test demonstrates that if a 
professional opinion is not capable of withholding logical analysis, the body of 
opinion is unreasonable or irresponsible and must be rejected.14  
In the South African case of Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic and 
Another, the Bolitho test (as well as the Daubert principle) was actually followed 
thus setting the precedent of usage in South African Law.15  
5.2.1 Determining the standard of care: the Bolam test 
The test is based on the case of Bolam v Frien.16  
In this case the defendants were vicariously held liable for harming a 
psychiatric patient who had undergone electroconvulsive therapy without a 
muscle relaxant. In the convulsions that followed, the plaintiff fractured his 
hip. In this case it became an issue whether negligence is involved when a 
respectable body of opinion would have supported the mode of action of the 
defendants. This could be qualified by the words “in all circumstances”. A 
doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of appropriately skilled 
                                                          
14  Merry, McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 165. Bolitho v City and Hackney Health 
Authority (1997) 4 All ER 771. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id199798/Idjudmt/ 
jd971113/boli02,htm. (Date of use: 10 September 2012) The test is based upon this case 
where a two year old child died following episodes of respiratory distress after being 
admitted for Croup. Although the child did well on the consultant’s round, he deteriorated 
and the senior registrar was called. She did not come to see the child and sent her junior 
doctor to assess. After initial improvement, the child once more deteriorated and was then 
also again not seen and developed respiratory failure ensuing in brain death and eventually 
died. The question was whether this child should have been intubated and respiratory 
supported. The expert opinions were opposing and the judgement was in favour of the 
defended doctors who were not found negligent. The fact was emphasised, that if an 
opinion differed from another, it had to withstand logical analyses by the court to be 
accepted. However, this finding has attracted a lot of academic criticism. It is realised had 
more assertive medical expert testimony been given, the finding could have been that of 
guilty of negligence and the appeal upheld. 
15  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 
1189G. It is mentioned that in the presence of various and often conflicting expert opinions 
presented, the court must decide using guidelines like credibility, examining, and logical 
analysis. If the expert opinion cannot be logically supported it will fail to be the reference to 
which a defendant’s conduct is assessed (para 1198 I ).  
16  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582. In this case a patient 
underwent electro-convulsive therapy for a psychiatric condition, without a muscle relaxant 
anaesthesia. Muscle contraction due to convulsions were so severe that the patient suffered 
a femur (upper leg) fracture. The majority MEW concurred that this was negligence but an 
authoritative minority group stated it was accepted practice not to give a muscle relaxant and 
thus the hospital and treating doctors were acquitted.  
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medical practitioners, of a contrary body of medical opinion and view. 
Obviously the doctor must work within acceptable borders and not carry on in 
an obstinate fashion, and thus the Bolam test could be “modified” that under 
the circumstances the action was reasonable! The Bolam test must be 
presented where there is a defence of acceptable, but different practice. This 
leads to the dictum quoted as from Lord Denning: “we must say and say 
firmly that in a professional man, an error of judgement is not negligence” 
(own emphasis).17 
The Bolam principle may be formulated as a rule that a doctor is not negligent if he 
acts in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a respectable 
responsible body of medical opinion, even though other doctors adopt a different 
practice. In short, the law imposes the duty of care, but the standard of care is a 
matter of medical judgement.18  
The Bolam test sets the standard of the ordinary, medically qualified, skilled 
professional man. This person need not possess the highest expertise or skill, but 
it will be accepted that sufficient ordinary skill is exercised by an ordinary 
competent man. There may be other perfectly proper standards and if the 
professional person conforms to one of the acceptable standards, there will be no 
negligence. A personal belief whether a particular technique is best, is no defence 
unless it is based on reasonable and logical grounds.19  
Differences of opinion exist and even if one body of opinion is preferred, it is not 
necessarily fair or reasonable for a specific opinion to be a basis for a conclusion 
of medical negligence.20  
In any case the claimant / plaintiff, in establishing that harm or injury has occurred 
due to the negligence of a medical practitioner, carries the burden of proof. To 
counter the Bolam test, the plaintiff must show that the treatment fell below the 
proper standard expected of a practitioner at his level of skill in his field of 
                                                          
17  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 443. Whitehouse v Jordan (1980) 1 All 
ER 650. 
18  Lord Scarman in Sidaway v Governors of Bethlehem Royal Hospital (1985) AC 871. 
19  Cameron and Gumbel Clinical Negligence – A Practitioner’s Handbook 7. 
20  Cameron and Gumbel Clinical Negligence – A Practitioner’s Handbook 8. House of Lords 
(1985) approved the Bolam Test as being a rule that a doctor is not negligent if he acts in 
accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by an acceptable body of medical 
opinion, even though other doctors adopt a different practice.  
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expertise on the specific date the treatment was carried out. It must also be shown 
that the damage or harm was indeed caused by this negligent act (causality). A 
professional man is required by law of negligence (delict or tort law) or by the law 
of contract to display care and skill.21   
The Bolam test was moderated to some extent in the House of Lords in 1997 in 
Bolitho v City and Hackney Authority22 where it held: 
In cases of diagnoses and treatment there are cases where, despite a 
body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant’s conduct, the 
defendant can be held liable for negligence. That is because in some 
cases, it cannot be demonstrated to the judge’s satisfaction that the body 
of opinion relied upon is reasonable or responsible.  
The Australian High Court rejected the Bolam test, unless “modified”, i.e. it must 
be logical, reasonable and responsible, as well as the assessment of a breach of 
duty and focused more on the need for information, rather than the practices and 
attitudes of the majority or minority of practitioners.23 It was held that the law 
imposes a duty on a medical practitioner to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
the provision of both professional advice and treatment.24  
It seems that the application of the Bolam test could be rejected in a particular 
case. Professional advice to a patient depends on the provision of information, 
except in cases of emergency or necessity, ensuring that action is preceded by 
the patient’s choice to undergo it. It is therefore important to realise that the 
decision of whether the required standard of care had been met is a matter for the 
court, based on the opinion of the MEW.25  
                                                          
21  Cameron and Gumbel Clinical Negligence – A Practitioner’s Handbook 11. Comment : in the 
RSA this could extend also to the Consumer Protection Act, although not yet tested in a 
court.  
22  Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority (1993) 13 BMLR 111 (CA) 
23  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 382. In Rogers v Whitaker, 
the rare risk of losing vision in the healthy eye (sympathetic ophthalmia 1:14000 chance) 
where the patient had expressed anxiety about her risks to her vision, many ophthalmolo-
gists stated that they would not have warned a person of such a risk. 
24  Including a covering examination, diagnosis and treatment. 
25  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 383. The Australian law 
committee concluded that if the Bolam rule is strictly applied, it could give rise to results that 
would be unacceptable to the community. 
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The main weakness of the Bolam rule is that it allows a smaller amount of medical 
opinion, to set the requisite standard of medical care, even in instances when a 
substantial majority of medical opinion would disagree. Thus the Bolam rule is not 
a reliable guide to acceptable medical practices, bearing in mind the varying 
aspects of medical practice like the varying size of opinion, different training, 
circumstances and locations.26  
The Bolam principle could apply in other legal systems,27 as it allows for the 
difference in opinion between doctors and that it is a sufficient defence to have the 
support of a reputable body of medical opinion (regardless of the size of that 
body). At the time of discovery of documents, the use of the Bolam principle could 
prevent unpleasant adversarial procedures or prolonging a case unnecessarily.28  
5.2.2 Determining the standard of care: the Bolitho test 
To solve the Bolam test dilemma of varying opinions, the implementation of the 
Bolitho approach is recommended, by considering that in the public interest, 
that the chance that an opinion which is widely held by a significant number of 
respected practitioners could be held irrational is very small. If the expert opinion 
in the defendant’s favour were held to be irrational, the defendant should not be 
allowed to rely on it.29  
This approach contains sufficient safeguards to satisfy the reasonable public, 
patient and medical practitioner. The recommended rule suggests that there must 
be more than one opinion widely held in the field. Provided a court does not find it 
irrational (or unscientific and / or unreasonable), thus most logically and 
scientifically acceptable, a defence can be provided. This is with the 
presumption, by peer opinion, that a provided service was acceptable at the time, 
                                                          
26  In the writer’s view this criticism is over exaggerated as there would not necessarily be 
disagreement, but more acknowledgement that there are other opinions, which pending the 
circumstances could in the hands of a specific doctor be allowable and acceptable.  
27  Campbell, Callum and Peacock Operating Within the Law 29.  
28  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 90. 
29  The Bolitho test was used i.a in the well-known Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic 
Ltd and Another 2001(3) SA para1198 I, where four MEW had to testify about the indication 
and dosage of medication given during an anaesthetic which could have caused heart 
arrest.  
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as competent professional practice. Professional peer opinions need not to be 
universally accepted to be considered acceptable in a particular court case.30  
The MEW must make an effort when using the Bolam or the Boltho tests, to 
establish that there is or was a duty by the treating doctor / defendant to give 
advice of material risks in the process of informed consent.31  If this had been 
done, it would enforce the point that the defendant doctor had been reasonable 
and his treatment regimen most “acceptable”.  
5.3 Solutions to the escalating medical litigation “crises” in other countries 
The escalating costs of litigation have forced several other countries to reform. 
The MEW must be aware of this so that future unrealistic support to outrageous 
claims could be withdrawn using the lessons gleamed from foreign law.32 In 
Ireland, well known for its high rate of medical litigation, and due to rising costs, a 
Clinical Indemnity Scheme was introduced in 2002 where the Irish government 
assumed full responsibility. In 2004 damage compensation “caps” were introduced 
and it now stands at R 6.8million in Ireland, where the State takes responsibility for 
the excess of this. Limitation rulings to initiate claims have also been lessened to 
two years.33 Similarly, the USA has been capping general damage claims in 28 
states since 2006, giving an average saving in total compensation amounts of 20-
30 per cent.34 In Australia it has been recommended, following the collapse of a 
general insurer in 2001, that damages for loss of past and future earnings are 
capped at two to three times average weekly earnings over a year and non-
patrimonial losses at three million Rand. Reforms also set minimum thresholds of 
permanent injury, to make sure claims are proportionate when seeking damages 
for non-patrimonial losses. In New Zealand a “no-fault” system is run by the 
Accident Compensation Corporation, where patients could receive compensation 
without liability being placed on the involved doctor. The emphasis here also shifts 
to proof of causation, rather than proof of fault. The claimant/plaintiff must prove 
that the medical error caused the injury and harm directly, irrespective of who is to 
                                                          
30  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 386. 
31  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 314. 
32  The Constitution of South Africa allows for this under section 39(1)( c ). When interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – may consider foreign Law. 
33  Howarth 2012 Medical Cronicle 12. 
34  Howarth 2012 Medical Cronicle 12. 
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blame.35 However, what works in other countries might not work here in SA, as 
each country has social, legal and governmental factors to consider.36  
In Britain the membership fees to belong to a Medical Defence Society have 
increased so much, that for doctors in the employment of the National Health 
Service (NHS) it is unaffordable and thus Crown indemnity has been extended to 
all professional health care workers since January 1990.37 The entire costs of 
negligence litigation against a NHS doctor are now borne by the NHS. The other 
dilemma that could result, though it has not been properly assessed, is that the 
Health Authorities would now feel obliged to settle cases as this would be 
considered the “cheapest” way. However, this is money for compensation that will 
be at the expense of already limited State treatment facilities. It is recommended, 
even if the NHS doctors are covered, they should retain cover for any private, 
“good Samaritan” work and also now for medico-legal activity.38 
The Australian Federal Government (in 2002) appointed a panel of Eminent 
Persons (the so-called Ipp Committee) to review the country’s laws of negligence. 
This was because the awards for damages had become unaffordable and 
unsustainable. It was concerned that methods have to be examined to reform the 
common law thereby limiting liability and quantum of damages arising from 
personal injury and death and with stricter control, the insurance companies had 
re-introduced acceptable medical indemnity insurance.39 Furthermore, 
recommendations were made and seem to be accepted, including the introduction 
of the modified form (i.e. it must be logically acceptable) of the Bolam test, 
changes relating to the laws of causation, restrictions on recovery, limits on 
                                                          
35  The term “claimant” is used in English Law and the term “plaintiff” is used preferably in all 
other English speaking common law countries.  
36  Howarth 2012 Medical Chronicle 12. However, some examples of reform has inevitably 
been introduced by the RAF amendment act where in 2008, over R 50 million was paid to a 
Swiss tourist who had lost an arm and leg in a motorcycle collision. This was obviously a 
precedent for unrealistic and unsustainable costs. Although it is obvious that transposing 
models to SA might not be practical, some reform for the law of delict and damages for 
medical claims cases must be urgently implemented. 
37  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 32, quoting Ministry of Health circular. 
38  Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics 32. 
39  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 391. 
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damages for personal injuries, compensation and statutory recognition of 
apologies and expressions of regret. 40  
The High Court of Australia found that prima facie harm is regarded as a tort or 
delict, if the harm ensues in the immediate aftermath of the act.41 This can create 
open arguments by health professionals as MEW i.e.: 
• The link between the breach of duty and the damage was temporal and 
coincidental. 
• The damage was inevitable and probably would have occurred regardless of 
breach of duty. 
• The breach of duty was irrelevant to the damage.  
• The event was the immediate result of the plaintiff’s action. 
• The event was not the cause of damage as this event which occurred would 
have happened in the same way even had there not been a breach.  
By answering these questions, more opportunity is brought into litigation for 
fairness to be reasoned by debating the causation. Such reasoning seems absent 
in the SA medical litigation. The Australian court has accepted that had there been 
a foreseeable risk, of loss of an opportunity to undergo surgery at the hands of a 
more experienced surgeon, there is a duty to inform the patient that there were 
more experienced surgeons practicing in a particular field. This must be evaluated 
against a balance of probabilities knowing that intuition and common sense would 
suggest that the greater the skill and more frequent the performance of a specific 
surgical procedure, the less risk of complications will occur.42  
The question to be asked in a court according to Australian practice is what a 
patient would have done, in terms of a procedure or treatment, if given a proper 
warning. The courts do not have to unquestionably accept the ostensible position 
of a patient claiming that they would not have had a (complicated) procedure if 
warned of the risk.43 Here it seems that imputed knowledge plays a major role, 
                                                          
40  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 392. Recommended 
“modified” Bolam test. 
41  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 392.  
42  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 393. 
43  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 393. In the case of 
Rosenberg v Percival (2001) HCA 18 223, the patient as a doctorate in Nursing, her plea 
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while in the RSA medical malpractice litigation this concept seems to be absent or 
not emphasized.  
Following the Australian reforms, a two tier test for causation is put forward 
namely, 
(a). Negligence must be a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm 
(factual causation) and,44 
(b)  It must be appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to 
extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability).  
The Australian emphasis on factual causation is regrettable as it shown that there 
must also be judicial causation to be verified. 45 Here the South African Law of 
Delict with its elements of a delict would be better suited in the final analysis 
of the better legal system for medical professional negligence litigation.46 
Recent rulings in the USA and UK have redefined the court’s role in ensuring the 
quality of expert testimony. In Australia a MEW has to undergo training and 
accreditation.47 In English Law it is held that medical expert evidence is only 
admissible as to matters outside the ordinary human knowledge or experience.48 
Awareness of broader causes for adverse outcomes, like system factors, a 
patient’s health problems and deficiencies of skill and competence, is important, 
especially so as to be able to adhere to the real material and relevant issues of a 
case.49 
Doctors, in most English speaking countries, are generally not legally required to 
provide expert testimony in legal proceedings. It could be argued that the 
adversarial system is found to be against professional collegiality but as a 
profession, doctors should with ethics as a basis (of which sincere honesty and 
                                                                                                                                                                               
was rejected that she, if warned, would have sought treatment elsewhere. (Example of 
imputed knowledge). 
44  Here then acceptable complications of a treatment would thus be automatically excluded as 
grounds for litigation. Obviously the MEW would have to emphasise this.  
45  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 393. 
46  Writer’s conclusion and emphasis in italics. The elements of a delict being an act or conduct, 
which was wrongful and negligent, of which fault is proven, causation proven and that harm 
or damage had occurred and that there must be a nexus between the harm and causation.  
47  Freckelton and Petersen Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 395. 
48  Meintjes-Van Der Walt 2000 The South African Law Journal 773. 
49  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 110. 
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integrity would be most important), have a professional obligation to serve the 
public in settings where expertise is needed by a court. In the USA, supported by 
the American Medical Association, a witness can be qualified by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training and education. In future some form of legal education and 
training will have to take place to set a minimum standard. Guidelines must then 
also be given for acceptable testimony, ensuring that it is conducted fairly, 
reasonably and in good faith.50 This must still be more enforced in the RSA. In the 
United Kingdom, medical witnesses must preferably do a course and be registered 
as a medical witness.51  
In the UK a MEW must take note of the question that seldom seems to be 
answered in the RSA, in that what effect has the natural history of a disease of a 
patient scenario to an unfortunate outcome. This is seen to be a problem when 
patients write most emotionally charged sensational and upsetting statements. 
Lawyers are then not eliminating the subjective interpretation from facts in their 
summaries, before asking MEW’s to give an opinion.  It is emphasised that there 
must be an obligation to objectivity and material facts,52 when doctors respond to 
requests to serve as MEW. Such testimony must embody the relevant facts as 
well as the expert’s knowledge, experience and best judgement of the case.53  
A MEW must be familiarised in the rules of evidence with a mixture of logic, 
epistemology, sociology, psychology and the forensic sciences. Whereas in 
medical malpractice litigation, negligence is the predominant factor, it must be 
borne in mind not to confuse it with complications or medical “mal-occurrence”. 
These would include an unfavourable outcome of medical intervention and is not 
necessarily related to negligence or the unreasonableness of the provided care. 
                                                          
50  American Medical Association. Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 2004 2 
51  General Medical Council. “Acting as an Expert witness” www.gmc-uk.org/static/ 
documents/content//Acting as an expert.pdf (Date of use: 20September 2012). 
52  Silver The Signal and the Noise 57. The author emphasizes that aggressive type A 
personalities as “experts” fail, because they create a blurry fusion between facts and values 
which are lumped clumsily together. A prejudicial view is taken towards evidence “seeing or 
hearing what they (the retaining party) want to see or hear” and missing what is real. 
53  Richards “Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony in Medical Liability Cases” 
http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/map/GuidelinesforExpertWitnessTestimoney . (Date of use: 17July 
2011). This could be most exasperating if lay people could make false statements like “they 
wanted to do a post mortem so that the medical students could do experiments on my 
husband’s corpse”, “the doctor wanted to stop the bleeding by putting in towels in the pelvic 
cavity – have you ever heard about such rubbish!”, “the staff caused the bed sores because 
they did not move him enough” (while not mentioning that the patient weighed 180kg, with 
ischaemic skin ulcers having smoked over 80 cigarettes/day).  
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However it seems to be especially in the USA, that “mal-occurrence” is 
compensated, where there was no real “malpractice”. 54  
The American Medical Association stated in 1992 that a physician has an ethical 
obligation to assist in the administration of justice. This must be done without 
becoming an advocate for the case or by being a partisan in the case.55 It is 
considered unethical in the USA to accept compensation for being a MEW on a 
contingency basis.56   
5.4 The medical expert witness’ role in preventative strategies 
The role MEW’s play in English common law countries in the preventative goals of 
risk management is quite prominent. This concept is already statutory in a few 
States of the USA with educational programs that teach about lawsuit reduction. 
Medical law education for medical students is now compulsory in all US medical 
faculties. This educational course is useful, would reduce physician anxiety and 
provide strategies for prevention and resolution of potential problems. There 
should be ethics committees and risk managers in all major hospitals and 
universities, lying emphasis on risk management education.57 In South Africa, 
although mooted, it is still not well developed. 
To enforce the status of preventative goals, it should be compulsory in any 
tort/delictual reform, that mediation and arbitration must be done before any court 
procedures.58  
To monitor preventative strategies the standard of care must be evaluated. The 
standard of care can often be evaluated by the Bolam or “modified” Bolam tests.59 
                                                          
54  Murphy Murphy on Evidence 21. This should be cautioned against in the RSA as an 
increasing occurrence, the reasoning also being that it is cheaper to settle than to have a 
finding (with costs) against a defendant in a high court. 
55  The desired yardstick for objectivity and fairness is that a testimony must be so prepared 
that it could be used by the plaintiff’s or defendant’s party, without any changes or 
embarrassment! 
56  Richards “Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony in Medical Liability Cases” 
http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/map/GuidelinesforExpertWitnessTestimoney . (Date of use: 17 
July 2012). 
57  Marshall and Kapp Our Hands are Tied: Legal tensions and Medical Ethics 56. 
58  Marshall and Kapp Our Hands are Tied: Legal tensions and Medical Ethics 148. 
59  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 2 All ER 118. 
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Regarding the defence of inexperienced doctors in the prevention strategies, it 
must be noted as emphasized in the Canadian Tort Law, that the definition of 
negligence for inexperienced doctors is not diluted or considered sympathetically 
(except in a true emergency situation)! Thus a novice inexperienced surgeon who 
has not yet performed a particular operation, can and will be held liable, if harm 
due to a negligent act takes place, like the severance of a nerve. One of the 
qualities a junior or inexperienced doctor must have is an appreciation of his 
own limitations. A standard is set, below which no doctor must fall regardless of 
his knowledge and degree of skill. However, public hospitals are so organized that 
young doctors and health care staff inevitably have to “learn on the job”. If this was 
not the case to hold them liable, inexperience would always be rendered as an 
excuse in the defence to an action of professional negligence. If a junior doctor 
sought the advice and help of a senior in the treatment management it would be 
considered satisfactory. An inexperienced junior doctor should only be held liable 
for the acts or omissions, which a careful doctor with his qualifications and 
experience would not have done or omitted. 60  
Junior inexperienced doctors will be judged by the reasonable skill test but the 
danger still exists that these doctors do not realize their own incompetence. 
Reasonable supervision should temper this risk but only constant supervision 
would minimise it. In the context of medical treatment, the law will probably reflect 
a court’s unwillingness to accept that an agreement by the patient (for treatment 
by an inexperienced doctor) is voluntary rather than reached under duress of the 
circumstances. The (inexperienced) professional will be held to the standard of 
care he possesses or professes to have. It is most important for the MEW, that it is 
the medical profession who must set the legal standard of care, but also to 
determine what a doctor ought to have done.61  
English Law has numerous case examples. This controversy was addressed in 
Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority62 where doctors were 
                                                          
60  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 447. Wisher v Essex AHA (1987) QB 
730, (1986) 3 All ER 801 (CA). 
61  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 448. 
62  Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority (1985) 1 All ER 635 (HL). The vocal 
cord nerves were damaged by means of a biopsy done via a so-called mediastinoscopy, 
where by placing an optic steel tube into the central part of the chest, lymph glands are 
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charged with negligence for recommending a diagnostic procedure which caused 
vocal cord paralysis when the diagnosis of tuberculosis was obvious, but as 
defence argued, needed confirmation. The Bolam test was applied and it was 
accepted that an error of judgement was made, as a substantial body of opinion 
would have condoned this diagnostic procedure. However, in the case of Sidaway 
v Board of Governors of Bethlehem Royal Hospital,63 it was stated that the 
definition of care must not be handed over to the medical profession. This 
definition rests as a matter for the law and the courts. It was argued that the 
medical professionalism displays an excess of paternalism and the law must not 
permit “the medical profession to play God”. The caveat here is that the doctor 
should have had “due regard” in the exercise of his judgement, whether another 
professional opinion was obtained. The Bolam test could be rejected in certain 
cases by defining it as that “the duty is fulfilled, if the doctor acts in accordance 
with a practice rightly accepted as proper, by a body of skilled, experienced 
men”.64  
The Hucks v Cole65 trial set a standard where the Bolam test was limited. This 
involved a case of negligence because a doctor did not give his patient penicillin 
for a susceptible germ timeously, which resulted in septicaemia. It was shown that 
the doctor took the risk knowingly and that the fact that others would have done 
the same thing could, however be an excuse. The lacuna which formed between 
the diagnosis, risks and effective treatment was so large, that it was considered 
unreasonable. This case demonstrates that courts should play an assertive role.66  
This leads to the Bolitho v City & Hackney HA 67 where the medical opinion of one 
group of doctors could be rejected on the grounds that the reasons of a specific 
group do not really stand up to analysis. It is emphasized that it borders on the 
unfair for the plaintiff to demonstrate the “unreasonableness” of an “accepted 
practice”. The court must play a meaningful role of setting a legal standard of care. 
Reasonable action must be evaluated in terms of the doctor and the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
removed for analyses. With tuberculosis severe adhesions could ensue and with surgery of 
this kind, the vocal nerves could be damaged and torn. 
63  Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlehem Royal Hospital (1984) 1 All ER 1018 (CA). 
64  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 457. 
65  Hucks v Cole (1993) 4 Med LR 393 (CA). 
66  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 458 . 
67  Bolitho v City & Hackney HA (1993) 13 BMLR 111 (CA). 
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circumstances. This could shift the burden of the proof in asking “what is to be 
done” into “what ought to have been done” in a specific case.68 
In English and US medico-legal practice it is found that medical personnel are 
reluctant to testify or participate in legal proceedings, which testimony could be 
considered a preventative strategy by forcing litigation prone doctors to positively 
adapt their methods in preventing litigation as much as possible.69 There is in any 
doctor, continuous tensions weighing up a duty to testify in a court as an expert 
witness, versus the medical ethics of maintaining silence resulting in the “medico-
legal silent wall” phenomenon. The cost-risk benefit, lost friendships, loss of 
respect from colleagues, loss of referrals and guilt, could be simply too high for 
doctors to testify voluntary. It is inevitable that doctors that are prepared to testify 
are attached to academic institutions and have the time to do medico-legal 
activities. In the case of specialists it is expected that there must be at least five 
years of experience. However, if all doctors have some medico-legal knowledge 
they would understand the litigation process and as long as a medical witness 
follows ethical principles, the legal MEW should not be despised, begrudged or 
feared. Proper education is needed to increase the numbers of a desirable larger 
pool of medical experts. This will address the problem of marked deficiencies in 
the medico-legal knowledge and formal courses in medical testimony could be 
advocated. MEWs must remind colleagues professionally, that a “cover-up” often 
has worse consequences than the initial mistake. If a MEW knows about a cover-
up he could also be litigated against as a vicarious liability process.70 
5.5 Controlling the medical expert witness 
Frustration is experienced especially in the USA and England, in that the “hostile”, 
unethical and miasmatic MEW should be controlled, especially when the witness 
so slants his testimony as to unfairly and unreasonably benefitting his retaining 
party. This is also encountered when a “hired gun” or a miasmatic witness 
deliberately tells a lie or withholds the truth. Incompetence, mental and personality 
defects of the MEW could play a major role. This problem of false testimony being 
proffered remains especially in the English speaking countries that use the 
                                                          
68  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 458. 
69  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 270. 
70  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 8. 
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adversarial system (especially in the USA). Little progress to stop this outrageous 
practice has been made even though the American Medical Association had 
announced that the MEW testimony must also be of such a high standard, that it is 
effectively also the practice of good medicine!71 
The American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons revised the Standards of 
Professionalism applicable to all expert opinions of its members. Instead of using 
the expression “Expert Witness” the emphasis is on “Expert Opinion and 
Testimony”, 72 to ensure less pressure on being the MEW, but more on the quality 
of the evidence.73 In the USA over 30 states have expert witness laws, specifically 
to control the expert witness preventing indifference to the truth, the use of 
unethical tactics and combating the phenomenon of the “hired-gun”. Medical 
associations and various State Medical Boards have created standards for proper 
testimony and would act against a MEW who violates the rules.74 To prevent 
severe distortions of the truth, facts and testimony, all medical associations and 
boards should have a programme to deal with the irresponsible expert witness and 
his testimony.75  
For many years in English Law the witness was protected by the “Witness 
Immunity Rule”. However, following the case of General Medical Council v 
Meadow,76 where on appeal, the English Court of Appeal found that the principle 
                                                          
71  Milunsky 2003 J Child Neurol 413. 
72  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 176. When an MEW testifies around 
the facts of a case it will be considered testimony. Once these facts, with assumption and 
perhaps hypothetical scenario’s are reconstructed to explain an incident, that would be 
considered an opinion.  
73  Young http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/jan11/managing6.asp (Date of use 24: Oct 
2011). 
74  Gallegos http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/m/2011/08/01/psa0801.htm (Date of use 24: 
October 2011). 
75  Feld and Carey 2005 The American Journal of Gastroenterology 991. 
76  General Medical Council v Meadow (2006) EWCA Civ 1390. This case was prominent 
where the UK General Medical Council investigated the conduct of Professor Sir Roy 
Meadow, a professor in paediatrics (Prof Meadow was knighted for his work on the 
“Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy” and against child abuse 1977). The GMC ruled that he 
acted unprofessionally and on appeal the Supreme Court, although upholding an appeal that 
Prof Meadow must not be struck off the role, held that a Medical Expert Witness must stand 
trial for alleged false testimony and also perjury if necessary. In this case the Professor gave 
misleading evidence, based on wrong and faulty interpretation of statistics, against a certain 
Mrs Sally Clark, a lawyer, for being responsible for her children’s cot deaths at different 
times and ages, respectively at 11 and eight weeks post partum. She was handed down a 
jail sentence of which she served three years. It was later shown that both these children 
had an inborn error of metabolism causing their deaths as babies. Although acquitted and 
freed, Mrs Sally Clark became an alcoholic and sadly committed suicide.  
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of witness immunity does not protect the MEW from accountability to the 
regulatory bodies for unacceptable substandard work, resulting in that the expert 
witness immunity is abolished.77 Professor Meadow could have prejudged the 
issue making statistical errors after being famous and knighted for his campaign to 
limit child abuse and coined the infamous blunder “dictum” of: 
one sudden infant death is a tragedy, two is suspicious and three is 
murder, until proved otherwise.78  
Following this case it was realized the there was a lack of security and safeguards 
to prevent miscarriages of Justice in medical litigation. It was emphasized that all 
evidence must have a logical base.79 A MEW could be reported to a regulatory 
body for poor professional performance. More so because if litigants were to be 
unhappy with witness evidence, they cannot litigate and sue the witness, but can 
make a professional disciplinary complaint.80  
In 2012 and following up to present time, the press, family law experts and 
concerned paediatricians have launched a campaign (LB of Islington v Al Alas and 
Wray) against the findings of family courts of England, where children are 
removed from their natural parents for “battered baby syndrome”.81 It was found 
that in many of these cases the children suffered from nutritional (lack of Vitamin 
D) and congenital (nephrotic or malabsorption syndrome) diseases, causing 
rickets and thus are prone to spontaneous rib and long bone fractures.82 A 
                                                          
77  Nash http://www.blm-law.com/2114/11296/objects/news/expert-witness-immunity-abolished 
(Date of use: 9 September 2011). This was precipitated by the case of Jones v Kaney 
(2011) UKSC 13, where the witness for the plaintiff stated that the victim (Jones) suffered 
post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After conflicting reports from the defence a joint 
state-ment was set up and signed by Dr. Kaney. Here Mr Jones was described as deceptive 
and it was then denied that he had PTSD. Dr. Kaney admitted that this statement was not 
read. As Mr. Jones received less compensation than he could, he instituted action against 
the doctor. Dr. Kaney was subjected to proceedings for negligence. 
78  The “Rule” of Meadow” also referred to as “Meadow’s Law”. 
79  Brown 2005 The Lancet 16. Quoting Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls 1995.  
80  Groves 2007 J Law Med 306. 
81  LB of Islington v Al Alas and Wray (2012) EWHC 865 (Fam) para 233. Here after a lengthy 
trial and long findings, a need was expressed that when evaluated accurately using the 
appropriate levels and burdens of proof, death due to rickets should not be confused with 
signs of the baby battering as subdural haemorrhage (brain bleeding beneath brain 
covering) could be a peri-mortal finding due to death of rickets.  
82  Ricketts in children occur with lack of vitamin D, due to lack of sunshine and nutritional 
intake, especially in rainy countries where children are kept mostly indoors like the UK. In 
rare cases it could be inherently congenital. As these could lead to fractures, doctors could 
136 
 
radiologist who claims to be an expert witness, then falsely diagnosed “battered 
baby syndrome” instead of giving the benefit of the doubt, by enquiring about the 
vitamin D levels in the child’s blood, which would have indicated rickets as the 
cause of the bone fractures (following minor trauma). The critique in the press is 
then how such findings of a so-called medical expert witness could be allowed, 
apart from it causing a travesty of justice, also making a mockery of the so-called 
“UK register of Medico-legal Expert Witnesses”.83    
The MEW therefore needs more security and support from the profession and 
there should be some form of vetting of MEW via an “Academy of Experts”. 
Courses for the MEW and a registration programme has been initiated in the UK, 
but due to low numbers an effective MEW Register would not be practically 
achievable in the RSA. Even in the UK, there are no real entry requirements, 
except to pay an annual registration fee and attend a (two day) course, to be a so-
called MEW. In the UK it is recommended that a MEW must take time and make 
an effort to get some medico-legal training and courses in ethics, as lawyers would 
expect better quality and knowledge. To improve the standard of the MEW, the 
courts must set and demand higher standards. Cases have also faltered where 
lawyers relied on expert witnesses drawn from different ends of the range of 
opinions. It is much more appreciated by the courts if a MEW is able to see and 
comment professionally on both sides of an argument.84   
 Although this process to improve the standard of the MEW is being implemented 
in the UK, more definitive work in this area must be done in the RSA. However it 
could be emphasized and consideration must be given that not so much 
accreditation of disciplinary measures are needed, but more measures are to be 
taken to prevent the MEW getting the witnessing and testimony wrong! Focusing 
inappropriately on qualifications, status and presumed credibility takes the 
attention away from the quality, logic and reliability of the MEW evidence. The 
questions of the allowable evidence must be engaged before and not during the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
mistakenly suspect the “battered baby syndrome”. The lack of skin bruising could help to 
distinguish from the battered baby syndrome.  
83  Taylor http://www.theguardian.com.news 9 May 2012 (Date of use 31 January 2014) 
84  Brecker 2009 Heart 763. 
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trial!85 Due to the smaller number of MEW readily available in the RSA, these 
measures would be more pragmatic and realistic.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Although detailed comparisons of the laws and rules affecting the MEW in the 
RSA and other common law countries, like England is a vast subject in itself, it 
could be stated that the RSA have strong and weak points. However, by studying 
case reports somehow, mainly because of the stricter adherence to and element 
definitions of the law of Delict in the RSA, it does seem that philosophically and by 
jurisprudential use, good findings are made. By and far, the RSA court findings 
seem to be fair, realistic, reasonable and equitable. However, it is the opinion of 
this writer that as stated in the RSA Constitution, more use could and should be 
made of Foreign Law.86 The various “tests” used like the Daubert, Bolam and 
Bolitho tests should be used more applicably, MEW training must be done to 
ensure the ethical use and enhance the quality of the MEW and deviant, 
dishonest, unprofessional miasmatic MEW must be reported and possibly 
prosecuted by the various professional boards. 
                                                          
85  Brown 2005 The Lancet 17. Quoting: “the worst doctor might be right and the best doctor 
might, for once, be wrong”. Therefore the quality of the evidence presented is much more 
important than the qualifications of the MEW. 
86  S 39(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. 
138 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESSING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 “Even if someone lacks the ability to practice law…he will still be obliged to excel at things under 
his control, such as justice, good faith, generosity, restraint and temperance…recognizing that 
one’s best inheritance – superior to any fortune- is virtue and achievement”.1 
 
6.1  Introduction 
It seems that the first recorded case of professional medical negligence in 
Southern Africa was the case of Lee v Schönnberg which was heard in the Cape 
Province during 1877.2 There is no reference that a MEW had to help guide the 
court, but the judge (de Villiers CJ) did mention that a medical practitioner, as any 
professional man, is called upon to bear a reasonable amount of skill and care to a 
case which he has to attend to. Surely the learned judge must have obtained at 
least some form of advice to have made this comment which is still most relevant 
and applicable more than 130 years later! A general principle thus developed with 
the help of English case law that in a proposed medical negligence case a medical 
expert witness must be used to help assess to determine the “reasonable man or 
expert”.3  
6.2  Legislation  
There is at present no legislation qualifying a doctor to be a medical expert 
witness, apart from being registered as a medical practitioner at the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa. The selection of who could be a medical 
expert mainly rests on the choice or recommendation of the plaintiff’s legal team 
and that of the defendant doctor and his legal team. Those medical practitioners 
who would be prepared to act as expert witness are then approached either by the 
plaintiff, the defendant or their legal teams.4  
                                                          
1  Habinek Cicero – On Living and Dying Well 147. 
2  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 619. The 
case is quoted as to have been heard in 1877. 
3   Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 620. 
4   Letzler M Choosing the Right Expert in a Medical Negligence Case 
http://www.deebus.org.za/nxt/gateway (Date of use: 27/03/2012). 
  
139 
 
It also seems apparent that it is mainly academic personnel who are readily 
available and sought after for their academic “expertness”, which often is biased 
for instance, against the realism of private and/or peripheral non-academic 
practices.5 
More often than not these medical expert witnesses have no or very little 
knowledge of the legal concerns and evaluating process for instance the 
reasonableness, fairness and objectivity principles as well as evaluating the true 
causality of a specific and apparent professional negligence case.6 
There are many facts that must be considered and also assessed in the right 
context, to be able to be considering whether a particular medical practitioner had 
attained the acceptable standard of treatment. Each case, being unique, should 
then be assessed with reference to its particular facts.7  
It should stand to reason that a medical expert witness should have some form of 
training and preferably some legal qualification, must belong to a medico-legal 
professional body and undertake to adhere to the principles of professional ethics, 
fairness and objectivity.8 
This would prevent MEWs from being “boxed-in” by legal teams and unwittingly 
forced to testify along certain argumentations in the adversarial system.9 
6.3  Case studies and the role of the medical expert witness 
Case studies must be used as a departure and reference point for guidelines for 
the quality, qualification and use of the MEW in litigation. The following cases with 
comments highlight the role of the MEW and how they could help the courts to 
reach fair, reasonable, justifiable and justified findings under the auspices of the 
Constitution. The following case studies are presented with the emphasis on the 
role of the MEW.10 
                                                          
5  Redelinghuys, Butow, Carstens 2008 South African Dental Journal 151. 
6  Meintjes-Van der Walt (2003) CARSA 47. 
7  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 623.  
8  Moodley Medical Ethics, Law and Human Rights 4. 
9  Meintjes-Van der Walt (2003) CARSA 49. 
10  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 619. It is 
emphasised here that a doctor’s negligence should be assessed with reference to the 
“reasonable expert”, confirmed (since the earliest times) with case law as compared to also 
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6.3.1 Van Wyk v Lewis11 
Facts of the case: 
The facts appear from the judgement of Innes CJ. The patient’s appendix was 
removed and gallbladder area had to be drained due to inflammation. Operation 
swabs had been placed in the abdominal wound to pack it, ostensibly to stop 
the spread of sepsis and bleeding. As the anaesthetist was anxious to stop the 
operation, these swabs were removed and the wound sutured. The patient, 
being 26 years old, made a satisfactory recovery but over the course of a year 
drained purulent material from the wound appeared. The plaintiff claimed to 
have recovered a swab which had “presumably” eroded through her intestinal 
wall; she consequently launched an action for damages.  
As judgement had been given to the defendant in the court a quo, the plaintiff 
appealed. Although it was thought by medical evidence, as given by medical 
expert witnesses, that it was improbable that the appellant could pass a swab 
with relatively few symptoms, it was not impossible. The point was made that a 
practitioner could not be expected to bring the highest degree of skill to a 
patient, but is only required to apply reasonable skill, regardless of the locality. 
It was held that it is the duty of the theatre sister to count, check and report on 
the swab status, the reasonable surgeon could not be expected to concentrate 
on the count of swabs in a critical operation. Even when a swab had been 
admittedly left behind, this could not be seen as negligence under the prevailing 
circumstances.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                               
English case law. Carstens states that there is even exclusive reliance on comparable 
English case law by the courts of the RSA even in present times! This is then significant. 
11  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438. Although an old case, this case demonstrated the weighing 
of the reasonable man test, the maxim, causality and the weighing up of the factual versus 
the judicial cause. This South African case is widely in Canadian, English and Australian 
literature. This case, regardless of its age, is still a landmark case to be studied, its 
relevance to the MEW from a historical point of view, being the touchstone realization and 
definition of the reasonable man, that allegations must be proven, that the diligence and skill 
applied must be reasonable and the concept that “no human being is infallible”. This case is 
quite well referred to and quoted from after having been referred to in English, Canadian and 
Australian legal literature and court cases. Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and 
Medicine 80. Meagher, Marr and Meager Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 194.   
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The role of the MEW: 
The court had to consider whether the appellant’s evidence was credible and 
could be accepted, as this course of events of passing an old retained swab 
with minimum symptoms could be doubtful. The role of medical expertise here 
is that it was found that although highly improbable it was not impossible. The 
court accepted the plaintiff’s version of passing the swab.  With the help of the 
MEW’s and their opinion, the level of skill and diligence of the surgeon had to 
be determined. It was stated that the testimony of members of the profession is 
of the greatest value, but although highly regarded, the court is not necessarily 
bound to it. Following expert opinion, the judge found that a surgeon could not 
be accountable for the swab and although much sympathy was expressed, the 
judge found the surgeon not guilty of negligence.  
Comments:       
As “no human being is infallible”, the standard is that of accepted practices, 
provided that these are not unreasonable and/or dangerous. The standard of 
the test of medical negligence is the same in civil as in (medical negligence) 
criminal cases namely, on the balance of probabilities, but is more difficult 
proven in criminal cases.12    
However, in retrospect this finding on the balance of probabilities was with 
respect, probably wrong, as the swab, could not be produced in court as 
evidence. If there was a swab it should have eroded and tunnelled through a 
bowel wall that would have caused so much pain, discomfort, fever and 
obstructive signs that this patient would most likely have presented within three 
months with dire complications, as seen in most present day cases.13 With a 
more experienced MEW, this case would have had a different outcome, in that 
a finding would have been made regarding the staff and hospital also not guilty 
of negligence.    
                                                          
12  Van Oosten 1986 Medicine and the Law 22. See also R v Van der Merwe 1953 (2) PH H124 
(W). Here it was found that a reasonable doctor should/must know the medication, its side 
effects and dosage when administering it. Here the test of negligence was also determined 
to be the same for civil and criminal cases. 
13  Grassi, Cipello, Torciva et al JMed Case Reports www.medscape.com/viewarticle/51247-3 
(Date of use: 30 October 2013) 
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In the recent case (unpublished) of Goliath v MEC for Health in the Provence of 
the Eastern Cape,14 it was found, due to difficulty of a procedure that neither the 
doctor nor the hospital staff could be held negligent for having left one swab in 
the abdomen of a patient. A simplified view was used to judge negligence 
referring to a “three element test” namely, the reasonable foreseeability of 
harm; the taking of reasonable precautions against the occurrence of 
foreseeable harm; and then the failure to have taken these reasonable 
precautions.15  
6.3.2 Castell v De Greef 16  
Facts of the case: 
This case concerned a plastic surgeon being sued for damages on account of 
an unsuccessful subcutaneous mastectomy.17 The patient had a strong family 
history of cancer of the breast as well as several previous breast operations. 
The patient’s operation complicated with necrosis of breast tissue and sepsis. It 
was stated that the defendant surgeon breached his duty to warn the patient of 
these complications (insufficient informed consent).18 The defence was also 
based around the principle of volenti non fit iniuria.19   
The defence held that the reason for insufficient informed consent was 
therapeutic privilege, (a MEW was justifying the withholding of information 
which could cause unnecessary anguish for the patient). This argument was 
rejected in that the “reasonable doctor” would have warned the patient and that 
the defendant was therefore unduly “paternalistic”. The defendant was 
consequently found negligent, not so much for the deficient informed consent, 
                                                          
14  Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC.  
15  Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC para [49]. 
16  Castell v De Greef (1994) 4 SA 408 (C). 
17  Subcutaneous mastectomy is where all the breast glandular and connective tissue is 
removed as much as possible but the skin and nipple area is left intact for reconstruction of 
the breast for instance with a prosthetic implant. The danger, especially in women who 
smoke is necrosis of the central skin area due to insufficient blood supply.  
18  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) para408I and also para409D. 
19  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) para409D. Volenti non fit iniuria – Whoever 
consents cannot receive an injury. 
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but more in the duty of care, for not acting appropriately to the control of the 
subsequent infection.20  
Role of the MEW: 
It was emphasised in this case that realistic risks of the operation which a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of in the proper informed 
consent process, would likely have attached significance to it, and/or the doctor, 
should have been aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would 
be likely to have attached significance to it.21 The delineation of such risks 
would simply not have been possible realistically without proper MEWs. In this 
case the MEW had played a role emphasising that the patient indeed did know 
more that the reasonable patient would have known about the risks of such 
operations. It was stressed that that no surgeon can guard against every 
incident or, as it should be common knowledge, that all surgical operations will 
have a risk and mishaps despite proper exercising of skill by a surgeon. 
Therefore as far as the occurrence of the direct surgical complications were 
concerned, on the evidence that was especially led at the court a quo the 
medical witness had played a significant role in excluding the many 
complications as fault and blame of the surgeon.  
Comments:  
In this case the view was expressed that expert evidence is relevant in 
determining the risks, results and the materiality of the risks of an operation for 
the court. However, it was found, that the plaintiff’s case was weak, as she was 
indeed pre-operatively aware of the risks.22 
For the doctor and the MEW, it is important to be advised of the duty to make 
reasonable disclosure of real material risks of treatment, unless there are sound 
medical reasons for not doing so (i.e. causing unnecessary anguish), exercising 
the right to therapeutic privilege.23 Misrepresentation can occur when an error 
due to a risk is pertinent to the proper care of the patient, and not made known 
                                                          
20  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) para 413 G-F. 
21  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) para 421G. 
22  Van Oosten 1995 Medicine and the Law 167. Castell v De Greef 1994(4) SA 408 (C) para 
424E. 
23   Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 984.  
144 
 
to the patient. Doctors are considered to have a duty to report the full relevant 
and real material medical facts, as non-disclosure prevents a patient from 
consenting, or consenting under the wrong impression. A plaintiff cannot 
succeed in action for negligence i.e. breach of the duty to inform, unless it is 
shown that the breach caused injury and financial loss.24  
A medico-legal dilemma can arise out of the concept of therapeutic privilege, 
where critical evaluation of the principle must be done.25  
The legal teams must be able to realise these concepts as, if unprepared, the 
case could be lost. Unfortunately the guidelines are not clear, could be abstract 
and therefore reasonableness must be the standard guideline.26 Therapeutic 
privilege (TP) as a legal phenomenon is fairly new, and case law 
pronouncements are therefore scarce.27 
Any discussion on TP usually lacks depth, differentiation and detail. The usual 
interpretation of therapeutic privilege is that it must be narrow and limited as not 
to impair the duty of disclosure. As many medical negligence claims are based 
on allegations that informed consent was not procured properly, TP has 
become an important defence. However, whether informing patients is more 
hasardous to their health than not, it is experienced when mentioning material 
complications that the patient could inappropriately overreact to a risk, by 
refusing an operation or demanding a second opinion.28  
If the second opinion “downplays” the risk, the patient would be more 
comfortable and acquiesce that the second opinion should take over the 
treatment. However TP must still be subject to a proper examination, diagnosis 
                                                          
24   Meagher, Marr and Meagher Doctors and Hospitals: Legal Duties 72. 
25  Coetzee Medical Therapeutic Privilege 36.  
26  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 198. In 
Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C), para 421G, the court seemed dubious about this 
privilege. 
27  However, especially in German Litterature (Giesen 1990:163-164 – Artzhaftungsrecht: Die 
Zivilrechtliches Haftung aus Medischer Behandlung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in 
Osterreich und der Schweiz (3rd Ed)), of all exceptions to informed consent, the TP has 
received the most attention. 
28  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 989. 
Therapeutic privilege in closely intertwined with informed consent and even The Promotion 
of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, s30(1) and s61(1). The art to balance this 
conundrum would be to assess the capacity of a normal patient of sound mind to understand 
and accept the medical risk but if the patient would not psychologically cope there will be a 
risk for emotional shock damages if this was not communicated well.   
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and an acceptable treatment plan. If a patient considers it material to have a 
diagnosis before submitting to a procedure, there will be a duty to disclose, 
where non-disclosure vitiates prior consent and TP could then not be used as a 
defence.29   
6.3.3 Richter and Another v Estate Hammann 30 
Following from the reasoning above, a dilemma of therapeutic privilege in the 
informed consent process could easily ensue, creating a problem also for the 
MEW giving an opinion. Here the question could be asked whether a failure to 
have warned or informed the patient could constitute negligence.31 The case study 
Richter and Another v Estate Hammann must be taken note of, as the role of the 
MEW comes to the fore in this case. 
Facts of the case: 
This case raises many points regarding informed consent and the undertaking 
of treatment but the supposed negligence, which does appear credible at first 
glance, is rejected on the advice and testimony of good and well qualified 
MEWs. Judge Watermeyer emphasised at the outset of his findings that a 
doctor “is not under a duty to have warned a patient of a remote possibility of 
complications”. It was also acknowledged by the judge that notwithstanding 
above, a doctor could on the one hand be held liable if there was a failure to 
discuss risks and on the other side could scare a patient off.32  
Litigation was instituted, four years later, after the treating doctor had died. The 
case for negligence was made in (a) being negligent in advising a phenol block 
(for persistent and acute exacerbation of coccyx pain, where phenol that binds 
with the nerves is inserted via a lumbar puncture into the nerve cover, a 
procedure done with great care and concern by neurosurgeons), (b) negligent 
in the manner in which it was administered, (c) failure to have warned the 
                                                          
29  Vitiate: derived from Latin meaning “to impair”, implying the destruction or impairment of 
legal validity.  
30  Richter and Another v Estate Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C). 
31  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 267. 
32  Richter and Another v Estate Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) para 227A. 
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plaintiff of the inherent dangers of the procedure and (d) failure to have 
enquired into the past medical condition and medical history.33  
Role of the MEW: 
Here, although the MEWs did say that this patient should have been treated 
conservatively for a longer period, all conceded that this complication of nerve 
fall out was “very uncommon”, for a procedure that was considered acceptable, 
reasonable and safe.34  
As the defendant was deceased, the plaintiff’s evidence was carefully 
scrutinised. However the Court found that not one of the three MEWs could 
specifically say whether the procedure and the way it was done was 
negligent.35  
The grounds for a case of negligence failed. Because the patient did suffer 
damage with loss of bladder and bowel control as well as sexual sensation, it 
was found that there was an element of a failure to warn. However, it was in the 
patient’s interest to have had the procedure and according to the MEWs, the 
discussion of the risks should have been minimised as the complaints were 
severe, or it was felt that there was no need to mention the risks and another 
opinion was that the chances of complications were so remote that it was not 
necessary to warn. Regardless of the opinions, it was found that the patient had 
an adverse event which caused significant harm and an award was made for 
specific as well as general damages.  
 Comments: 
It should be borne in mind that at that time frame, certain aspects of therapeutic 
privilege (TP) such as a strong element of “medical paternalism” were 
prominent. This case, considering the circumstances, could be an example how 
three MEWs could agree and concede on various points, making a fair 
judgement possible, but also being fair towards the plaintiff (who did receive 
some compensation). At present (40 years later), it would have been more 
                                                          
33  Richter and Another v Estate Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) para 227F.  
34  Richter and Another v Estate Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) para 229G. 
35   Richter and Another v Estate Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) para 230B. 
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appropriate under informed consent to have discussed these rare but significant 
complications, but pleading TP here, would perhaps have been unacceptable in 
present times!  
It follows that there is now presently, a “therapeutic” duty to warn, which would 
also rule out TP. The MEW therefore should know that basically TP could 
presently only be used where: 
• There is a case of psychiatric illness. 
• Mental incapacity complicates the scene. 
• Where disclosure could be life-threatening, detrimental to physical and 
psychological wellbeing. 
• Where a patient’s rational decision-making skill is influenced and is 
preventing treatment. 
• Where there will be precipitated anxiety and stress, influencing outcome.  
• Where it would be insensitive or inhuman to a moribund patient and 
prejudice third parties.36 
• The risks of full disclosure must not equal or exceed the dangers of the 
proposed intervention.37  
6.3.4 Oldwage v Lourens and Lourens v Oldwage38  
A prerequisite for a MEW testimony to be considered in a court is that it must be 
obvious that the testimony is unbiased, fair and reasonable but should also satisfy 
the presiding officer’s quest for truth in that the reasoning is scientifically sound 
and logical. The MEW must concentrate to establish the basis of logical 
reasoning. The following case study should illuminate this concept. At first the 
finding was in favour of the plaintiff, but on appeal the defendant applicant was 
acquitted, due to the fact that the original testimony by MEWs had been flawed 
and illogical.  
  
                                                          
36  Van den Heever 2005 SAMJ 420. Here the psychological profile of the patient would play a 
major role. The patient’s susceptibility to anxiety should be assessed and recorded, 
preferably by a psychologist. 
37   Van den Heever 2005 SAMJ 420. 
38  Oldwage v Lourens (2004) 1 All SA 532 (C) and Lourens v Oldwage 2006 (2) SA 161 (SCA). 
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Facts of the case: 
This case study could actually directly and indirectly contain virtually all the 
elements of the typical pitfalls and dilemmas of being a MEW. In this case the 
plaintiff probably had a double pathology in the aspect of vascular occlusion of 
his pelvic and femoral arteries, as well as a spinal disc protrusion causing pain. 
It is clear that a treating vascular surgeon did not do a proper examination and 
assessment, had very sparse notes and did not take the patient through an 
accepted informed consent process.39  
An operation on the vascular system was done followed by a later spinal 
operation and then another vascular operation, where a rare vascular 
complication known as the “steal” syndrome occurred. This is where a healthy 
arterial system, which is supposed to feed an undersupplied system (in this 
case a so-called femoro-femoral (leg to leg) arterial bypass), was done from the 
“good” right leg to the impaired left leg in order to supply it with blood, but then 
in fact the “good” leg, “steals” even more blood from the ill side. The patient 
could hardly walk and had severe pain on walking scarcely 30 meters after the 
operations, where before he could do cycling, walking and mountaineering. 
The surgeon was found negligent and liable for this course of events. 
Substandard management and flaws in the “contract” were found, as well as 
that deficient informed consent was supplied. The defendant appealed and the 
Appeal Court reversed the High Court’s finding, emphasising that the benefit of 
the doubt had to be given to the doctor regardless of all the factors, in that the 
expert witnesses and their opinions were to have been better evaluated on the 
founding of logical reasoning, as well as the relation of the various evidence 
of the MEWs to each other, viewed in the light of the probabilities.40  
Role of the MEW: 
This case also demonstrates that by sound reasoning, what seems to be an 
obvious finding, when applying a reasonable and fair (legal) mind to the matter, 
                                                          
39  Lourens v Oldwage 2006 (2) SA 161 (SCA) para 173C-D.  
40  Lourens v Oldwage 2006 (2) SA 161 (SCA) para 175C-E. 
  
149 
 
is that a quite unexpected outcome could occur.41 Yekiso J in the court a quo, 
noted that misrepresentation of medical facts and course of action by the 
defendant could have misled the patient. It was emphasised as Yekiso J 
wanted to determine if the defendant’s preoperative conduct, the performing of 
the operation and the post-operative care was culpable and if the defendant 
would be liable. The evidence from the MEWs was conflicting. The judge then 
followed the ruling that the varying opinions of MEWs would be advanced when 
founded on logical reasoning. The MEWs would then be evaluated if by logical 
reasoning “a defensible conclusion” could be made. It then seemed that Yekiso 
J came to the (wrong) conclusion, based on the views of the MEWs, that 
misdiagnoses were made, that the proper diagnosis and evaluations therefore 
were wrong, even when conceding that to practice over-regulated medicine is 
difficult. He faulted the record keeping of the defendant. Yekiso J found based 
on eschewed and wrongfully concluded MEW opinions, that no proper 
consultations and informed consent processes had taken place. The defendant 
was then found, apart from assault that he was in breach of his contractual 
obligations. The defendant lodged an appeal, which succeeded, as the Appeal 
Court found that the MEWs had not allowed for any benefit of doubt and had 
not applied their minds properly to the case.42     
Comments:  
Expert witnesses and their evidence must be properly evaluated, especially 
when quoting articles to support their testimony and pitfalls must be avoided by 
reasoning scientifically sound and logical. Whilst understanding that “anything” 
is possible in medicine, it must be evaluated to help the court by stating 
whether it is probable.  
The dilemma of the medical expert witness and the logical cause of real 
negligence must be addressed by a MEW. The test for negligence cannot be 
disentangled from the particular facts or circumstances. Thus the degree of skill 
used or required, will be dependent on the circumstances of each particular 
case. Allegations of medical negligence cannot be assessed in isolation and 
                                                          
41  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 470. 
42  Lourens v Oldwage 2006 (2) SA 161 (SCA) para 175E. 
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should only be evaluated with objective, proven facts in each case. This is then 
the construed principle of “concrete negligence”, translated into practical 
terms as the rule of circumstances, facilities, financial resources and nature of 
the intervention, i.e. whether emergency or difficult conditions prevailed where 
and when the medical act / intervention was performed. Patient factors also 
come into consideration like a particular predisposition, idiosyncrasies and 
susceptibility for hidden complications.43  
Considering the Lourens v Oldwage case, the “degrees of negligence” can elicit 
debate. It is stated, albeit as a reminder, that whether negligence is gross or slight 
makes no difference to liability, but is could affect the quantum of awarded 
damages.44 However, lawyers try to enforce MEW participation by exaggeration of 
a case as that of “gross” negligence, hoping that a case could then be built up, 
overwhelming the other party’s defence. The term “gross” should then rather only 
be applied to where it would really be abhorrent to any other professional person 
or contra bonos mores, forcing perhaps a criminal case against the defendant 
medical personnel.45    
The concept of contributory negligence must also always be evaluated by a MEW 
as it could be used in defence. The patient also has duties to himself and his 
doctor. A patient could also be expected to meet the standard of a reasonable 
patient.46 If the patient causes a breach which is the factual and proximate cause 
of his injuries, he could be contributory negligent and the compensation reduced 
accordingly, or if the negligence is exclusively due to his own action, the charges 
must be dismissed. The relatively rare application of this concept in medical law is 
due to factors comprising of a patient’s illness, submissive attitude, incapability of 
acting in own best interest and the seemingly unequal position. In addition, the 
standard of care which patients should meet and be responsible for, is then 
perhaps kept at an unreasonably low level.47  
It is not easy to show that a patient was contributory negligent. In medical parlance 
there is also reference to patient non-compliance. This refers to when a patient 
                                                          
43  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 639. 
44   Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 639. 
45   Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 639. 
46  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 640. 
47   Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law:Texts with Materials 492. 
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may not follow the instructions given by his or her doctor.48 The availability of 
contributory negligence defence could be limited because of the disparity in 
medical knowledge and of the patient’s right to rely on the doctor’s knowledge and 
skill in the treatment. An example was seen in the case Schliesman v Fisher49 of 
an overweight diabetic who did not keep to his diet or blood sugar control, 
eventually losing his leg due to sepsis. Overwhelming opinion, as well as MEW 
contradictions, supported that the patient was responsible for his own fate, due to 
excessive contributory negligence by being over 50 kilograms overweight.  
The case of Dube v Administrator, Transvaal50 reminds that a patient is generally 
not guilty of contributory negligence, if the conduct of the defendant which induced 
or misled the patient to believe, to assume that his action or inaction would not be 
dangerous.51    
Closely linked to the above concept, especially when a patient is treated by a 
State Hospital, a defence could be based on the “voluntary assumption of risk”, by 
the plaintiff. Generally, this rule applies in the law of torts where in effect it means 
that the plaintiff has agreed to waive the duty owed by the defendant to observe 
the required standard of care. There is amongst doctors a strong sympathy that 
such a rule should apply in legal reasoning. It need not be an express agreement 
although the courts are reluctant to accept that this is implied. Lack of equality in 
power in the doctor-patient relationship, would lead a court to accept that no 
patient if he had known better, would ever voluntary waive his rights due from a 
doctor except in the most exceptional or emergency circumstances. The question 
of imputed knowledge can perhaps also be implied here.52  
                                                          
48  For example like taking prescribed medication. 
49  Schliesman v Fisher (1979) 158 Cal Rptr 527 (Cal CA). 
50   Dube v Administrator, Transvaal 1963 (4) SA 260 (W) para 270C-F. 
51  Carstens and, Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 639. 
Question of role of “Imputed Knowledge”. In the Dube case the patient contracted an 
ischaemic Volksman’s contracture. The defence held that the plaintiff should have reported 
to hospital earlier but out of ignorance did not. It was found that the hospital staff had been 
negligent for not warning the plaintiff to report earlier to hospital when severe pain occurred, 
although this probably would not have made a difference.  
52  Carstens and, Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 640. It must 
be borne in mind that the Constitution would also protect patients signing a waiver against 
prosecution for professional negligence.  
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6.3.5 Motswai v Road Accident Fund 53 
Often it seems in South African litigation that MEWs are “boxed” in and then are 
gently coerced by a persistent adversarial legal team in giving a faulted expert 
testimony. This could be a dilemma and the MEW must be conscious of this 
unethical practice and even under pressure, not to relinquish his objectivity and 
trustworthiness. The following can serve as an example.  
Facts of the case:  
In this case lawyers have claimed an excessive amount (R 390 000) on behalf 
of a road accident victim who had injured his right ankle as a pedestrian in an 
accident in 2008. It was noted that the ankle was injured and bruised with 
tenderness, but no ligamentous tears or fractures were found. The patient was 
not admitted and within a couple of months no permanent significant injuries 
could be noted and the ankle recovered completely. No compensation was 
granted by the judge. 
Role of the MEW: 
In spite of this and the medical expert witnesses confirming that there were no 
serious permanent injuries, large voluminous opinions were written including 
the effect on the psyche and social function of the victim. The lawyers then 
presented this case. The roles of the MEWs were therefore unacceptable and 
unethical and morally indefensible. The judge in this case expressed concern 
and dismay that this case had been presented and that it was then deducted 
that there had been collusion between two doctors and the legal team to 
present this claim with the sole intention to earn fees for services in an 
unacceptable and unprofessional way. No compensation was granted (as there 
were no serious injuries causing permanent harm), the costs of the court were 
awarded against the plaintiff’s legal team and the legal team, as well as the 
doctors, had been reprimanded and warned respectively, that they would be 
reported to the legal and medical professional boards.54 
                                                          
53  Motswai v RAF (2010/17220) 2011 SGHC. (At the time of writing unreported). 
54  Motswai v RAF (2010/17220) 2011 SGHC. Satchwell J in para [68], [72], and the order page 
25 para [4]. 
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Comments: 
This case is most upsetting in that obvious irregularities and “false” testimony 
were given with the intention to mislead the court. The MEWs should have 
warned the legal team that here was no case for compensation, which would 
have shown integrity and high ethical and moral principles. This is then actually 
a case which could demonstrate that legal action and professional board action 
against untrustworthy and indeed miasmatic MEWs could be instituted. Perjury 
charges could also be instituted and all MEWs should be warned by their legal 
teams that it is imperative now also in the South African context, that a high 
standard of professionalism must be upheld.   
6.3.6 Buthelezi v Ndaba55 
In medical negligence cases, it is further most important, that when a MEW has to 
give his opinion, that all factors be objectively considered to determine whether in 
a particular case, albeit in the mind of a lay person or lawyer that the doctor has to 
be found negligent, that the cause of the harm, in fact is not due to the doctor’s 
alleged negligent conduct. The MEW must then play a dominant role to let the 
court consider the real causality and fault.56 A recent unreported appeal case of 
Buthelezi v Ndaba can serve as an example.57 
Facts of the case: 
This case was an appeal case under a full bench led by Brand JA, where the 
applicant, a Dr Buthelezi, lodged an appeal against a finding of negligence for 
performing a hysterectomy (removal of the womb) in allegedly such a negligent 
manner that the patient (Ndaba), developed a vesico-vaginal fistula (the bladder 
being then connected via a “tunnel” due to surgical trauma to the vagina above 
the sphincter muscles, which give urinary control, causing the free flow of urine 
through the vagina).58  
  
                                                          
55  Buthelezi v Ndaba (575/2012) [2013] ZASCA 72 (29 May 2013) 
56  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 509.  
57  Buthelezi v Ndaba (575/2012) [2013] ZASCA 72 (29 May 2013). SAFLII “Buthelezi v Ndaba” 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/72html (Date of use: 23 October 2013)  
58  Buthelezi v Ndaba (575/2012) [2013] ZASCA 72 (29 May 2013)para [1]. 
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Role of the MEW: 
Two MEWs gave opposing views whether the appellant would have been 
negligent and in the court a quo, the appellant was to pay the patient damages. 
Note was taken in the appeal case that Dr Buthelezi was a gynaecologist with 
over 20 years of experience and had done over 1 000 hysterectomies. In 
addition it was found that the MEWs had areas which proved to be common 
ground in accepting the size of the fistula and that it probably developed 
progressively over the period following the operation and was probably not 
caused at the time of the operation! The development was however triggered 
by the hysterectomy. Both MEWs agreed that contributing factors were the HIV 
sero-positivity of the patient, that she had diabetes, that she had previous 
surgery in this area and that she had a chronic pelvic infection at that stage. 
Both MEWs agreed that the patient respondent had an increased and higher 
risk for forming the fistula!59  
Due to adhesions which needed to be cut through between the bladder and the 
uterus, some damage, not noticeable at the operation could have occurred, 
according to the respondent’s MEW. This MEW emphasised that had 
reasonable precautions been taken at the time of surgery this would not have 
happened and thus the doctor was indeed negligent.60 Although the appellant’s 
notes were poor referring only to the operation as a “standard total abdominal 
hysterectomy”, it was admitted in the court a quo that he could have been 
negligent. However the MEW for the appellant emphasized that factually, no 
one really knew for sure how the fistula developed! This was therefore pure 
speculation that the gynaecologist caused the fistula! Furthermore the fact that 
a fistula developed, did not in itself prove that there was any negligence 
involved on the part of the gynaecologist. This MEW emphasised, with authority 
that fistula development after hysterectomies can occur, no matter how diligent 
or careful the surgeon would be.61  
                                                          
59  Buthelezi v Ndaba (575/2012) [2013] ZASCA 72 (29 May 2013) para [4]. 
60  Buthelezi v Ndaba (575/2012) [2013] ZASCA 72 (29 May 2013) para [7]. 
61  Buthelezi v Ndaba (575/2012) [2013] ZASCA 72 (29 May 2013) para [13]. 
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The judge then emphasized that the court must determine on the analysis of 
the reasoning which would be most credible, criticising that the court a quo 
neglected this aspect. The judge quoted from Hucks v Cole:62 
a doctor was not to be held negligent simply because something went 
wrong,  
and stated that the test, just like in Castell v De Greef,63 revolved around the 
fact whether the practitioner exercised reasonable skill and care and whether or 
not, it was below the acceptable standard of a reasonably competent 
practitioner. Thus the judge found that if the fistula was due to the 
gynaecologist’s action, an error had occurred, which any reasonably competent 
practitioner could also have made.64  
The Judge found that the MEWs testimony for the appellant was more 
acceptable as it was supported by international journals, emphasizing that 
fistula type of injuries to the bladder and vagina are inherent risks of all 
hysterectomies. The doctor appellant had the appeal upheld with costs and the 
order of the court a quo was rejected.65  
Comments: 
It is the opinion of this writer that this case could be the most exemplary case to 
show the true role of a knowledgeable and ethical MEW, in that the facts were 
portrayed accurately, scientifically correct and logical. The emphasis here is 
that the exact cause of the fistula was not really known but that many other 
factors played a role as well as the fact that it was a difficult operation under the 
circumstances. 
The reasonable man test was used here and found that this delayed 
complication could have happened to any other reasonable surgeon. The 
opposing MEW was unfortunately rather miasmatic, but had to concede to this 
argument of the appellant’s MEW. The legal parties must give their respective 
                                                          
62  Hucks v Cole (1968) ( reported 1993) 4 Med LR 393 (CA). 
63   Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
64   Buthelezi v Ndaba (575/2012) [2013] ZASCA 72 (29 May 2013) para [15]. Here quoting the 
cases of Hucks v Cole [1968] 118 LJ at 496, and also Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501 
para 512A-B.  
65  Buthelezi v Ndaba (575/2012) [2013] ZASCA 72 (29 May 2013) para [17,18]. 
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MEWs room to think laterally outside the “frame” in which legal argumentation 
would take place and thus in the interest of justice and fair findings, causality 
and fault must really be accurately established. If questions of causality are 
truthfully solved by ethical MEWs, the legal liability of a defendant and his 
rebuttal burden will be greatly lightened.66        
6.3.7 S v Mokgethi67 
The dilemma of novus actus interveniens or novus causa interveniens,of which a 
MEW must take note of, is that this concept should not be seen as a break in the 
continuity of events, but rather a break in the original chain of events.68  
Many legal teams and MEW are confused with the definition and application of this 
concept. The following case study would clearly demonstrate the dilemma, which 
outcome, in this writer’s opinion, a knowledgeable MEW could have influenced. 
Facts of the case: 
The victim, a bank employee, was shot during an armed robbery. This victim 
was paralyzed, but rehabilitated so much that he (wheelchair bound) could 
resume his work at the bank. To prevent decubitus ulcers,69 he had to change 
his position regularly, by shifting his weight. It was claimed that due to his 
failure to comply, he developed complicated skin pressure sores. In due course 
these developed into septicaemia, resulting in death. Although the respondents 
were convicted of murder, it was argued that there was not sufficient causal 
connection between the harm done by the bullet wound and the deceased’s 
death.70  
Van Heerden AJ found in favour of the respondents that the pressure sores 
formed due to the patient’s own negligence.71 The bullet wound causing the 
paraplegia was a condition sine qua non, but that the complication causing 
death could not be directly coupled to the original wounding. It was thus 
                                                          
66  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 509. 
67  Snyman Criminal Law Case Book 69. 
68  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 10. 
69  Decubitus referring to “lying down” meaning development of bedsores, pressure sores.  
70   S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A) para 38A. 
71  By not changing his position often enough, hampering the blood supply to the skin, due to 
occlusive pressure on the blood vessels caused by body weight.  
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considered that the patient’s own negligence was the real cause of his death, 
causing a “break” in the causal chain, thus too far removed to be criminally 
liable for the death (it thus being a causa nova interveniens).72  
Role of the MEW: 
The judge based his finding on a single medical “expert” witness testimony, that 
due to proper medical care, the mortal potential of the wounding was 
prevented. It was argued that, provided the patient adhered to medical advice, 
he would have survived. 73 The MEW implied that the decubitus ulcer forming 
and complicating was then due to the patient’s own negligence and lack of care 
as well as failure of preventing contributory negligence. 
Comments:  
Here is an example that had the medical opinion been fair to mention, that even 
for an intelligent and educated person, being a high paraplegic in the thoracic 
area, that it is most difficult for these patients to prevent their own bedsores. 
These patients have an involuntary slumped attitude with body crumpling, 
leading to excess weight on the pressure areas. Even in attempting to be 
reasonable and fair to the respondents, it is deemed that it was most unfair and 
unreasonable that the medical witness could not state that this patient could not 
have been responsible for developing his deadly bedsores. Alternative medical 
testimony was not given to what could have led to a different finding, in that 
these complications could still have been flowing directly from the bullet injury 
and thus a finding of guilty of murder, instead of attempted murder, should have 
been made.  
The respondents were only sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, to run 
concurrently with other sentences culminating in 18 years, where they could 
have, at that time, have been sentenced to death or alternatively to life 
imprisonment.  
  
                                                          
72  S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A) para 45E.  
73  S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A) para 47D.  
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6.3.8 Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal74  
In medical practice it would be natural to accept that there could always be more 
than one correct opinion of the course of action decided upon. It could be argued 
by prominent MEWs that pending the experience, knowledge and skill of a doctor, 
that one opinion could be as good as the other and in determining causation and 
fault MEWs would have to concede and concur on the common grounds, weighing 
up the various advantages and disadvantages of the various options. In the case 
of Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal75 an example of a good balance and 
decision by a judge is found.   
Facts of the case: 
In Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal, an accident occurred where a 
mediastinoscopy was done, which entails that the chest cavity between the 
lungs are opened and a rigid tube passed through the incision with a light 
source to evaluate and biopsy suspicious lesions and in the process, caused 
life threatening haemorrhage from a large vein. The presiding officer was Blum 
AJ. The judge emphasized that the test of foreseeability should be applied in 
that the doctor should have foreseen that excessive force used to gain tissue 
for analysis could have caused damage.76 
Role of the MEW: 
Although the MEW who testified for the plaintiff, said that he would have used 
another (implying more safe) approach, the court found that the plaintiff had not 
discharged the onus of proving that the procedure was incorrect or 
inappropriate.77 This MEW admitted that the approach used is as such also not 
really incorrect.  Furthermore, even though the doctor stated that he could have 
pulled too hard or have used, due to inexperience, excessive force (sic), the 
court warned against the “insidious subconscious influence of ex post facto 
knowledge”.78 The judge emphasised that negligence is not established merely 
by occurrence of what had happened or showing how it could have been 
                                                          
74  Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W). 
75  Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W). 
76  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 706. 
77  Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W) para 395B. 
78  Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W) para 394B. 
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prevented. However, the plaintiff received damages on the court’s finding, on 
the weight of MEW opinion, that the applicable skill and diligence was not 
exercised by the members of that particular branch of the profession.79 Thus 
the major lesson here is that the MEW must think laterally and must dissect the 
legal questions in detail to help support these types of findings to aid the legal 
profession.80  
Comments:  
What is reasonable in a particular situation is essentially a matter of expert 
medical evidence. It is the medical profession which lays down what the 
appropriate standard of care is and the principles of fairness, reasonableness, 
justice and justifiability must be honoured. The MEW must remember that 
courts do not make findings in vacuo, but base their interpretation and findings 
on the facts before the court.81 This case serves the purpose that all sides must 
be heard and that more than one opinion might be acceptable and right. It is 
also enlightening to note that a warning was issued not to use ex post facto 
knowledge in “building” a case.82 The use of hindsight knowledge by many 
unwary MEWs could be a weak point in defending a doctor.  
It must be borne in mind (as set out in the case Pandie v Isaacs),83 when there 
are disputed issues in a court, the credibility, reliability of the witnesses and 
their explanations of the probabilities must be considered. Here the witness’ 
attitude, candour and demeanour will play a part. Bias, in whatever form must 
be absent, there must be no contradictions, and the probability or improbability 
of aspects must be explained logically. Reliability will be dependent on a 
witness’ experience and observations as well as the quality, integrity and 
independence during the testimony.84   
                                                          
79  Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W) para 397B. 
80  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 284. 
81  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 290. 
82   Ex post facto here to mean with “hindsight, retrospectively. 
83  Pandie v Isaacs (A135/2013, 1221/2007) [2013] ZAWCHC (4 September). In this case a 
gynaecologist sterilized a patient after her fourth delivery by Caesarean section without her 
consent, when he putatively thought he had it.  
84  Pandie v Isaacs (A135/2013, 1221/2007) [2013] ZAWCHC para [48]. Here the judge had 
quoted from the case Stellenbosch Farmer’s Winery Group & Another v Martell et Cie & 
Others 2003 (1) SA 11 (SCA) para [5], regarding the correct approach in how to solve the 
various factual disputes and irreconcilable versions in a particular case.  
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A dilemma, which can broaden the field of argumentation for a MEW, is that an 
error of judgement is judged to be an error by those who would have done 
something different. This was addressed in the Pringle case.85 It is thus defined 
as an error of judgment when a doctor has made a decision which any other 
similar reasonable doctor under the same circumstances would have made.86 
This is an acceptable principle which could be used in a defence.87  However, 
due to the various inherent risks of medical practice, it is now accepted that 
legal liability for an error of judgement will also depend upon the 
reasonableness of such an error under the same circumstances.88 It is obvious 
that this opinion must be made by using a very experienced and knowledgeable 
MEW. 
6.3.9 Goliath v MEC for Health in the Provence of Eastern Cape89 
It is important, though much present controversy surrounds the maxim of res ipsa 
loguitor, that the MEW must be made aware of its possible use. The Bolam test, or 
similar argumentation, addresses the expected standards of the medical 
profession in setting the medico-legal acceptable standards of care required from 
a doctor. Exceptions, at least in theory, could be res ipsa loquitor (RIL) cases, like 
amputating the wrong leg.90 The essentials for RIL are quite easy to state, but the 
application could be complicated. The doctrine should only apply when, there is no 
evidence as to how or why the litigious incident occurred, the occurrence being 
such that it could not have occurred without negligence and the defendant is 
proven to have been in control of the situation either personally or vicariously. The 
purpose of the RIL could lighten the plaintiff’s burden of proof, especially if proof is 
not available, with the necessary justification in that there is most probably a high 
                                                          
85  Pringle v Administrator of the Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W) para 395B 
86  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 640. 
87  Hawkins Mishap or Malpractice 107. 
88  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 640. 
89  Goliath v MEC for Health in the Provence of Eastern Cape 89 (1084.2012) [2-13] 
ZAECGHC 72 (14 June 2013) 
90   Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 465. The question is, how must a 
plaintiff prove this is not acceptable. The emphasis should be on that the incident speaks of 
negligence, rather than it “speaks for itself”, i.e. res ipsa neglegentia versus res ipsa 
loquitor. 
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chance of negligence.91 However, it is stated that common law courts are largely 
reluctant to accept that RIL has much, if any, primary place in medical law.92  
In the case of Pringle v Administrator of Transvaal it was stated that the RIL 
maxim could only be used where the negligence involved depends on absolutes.93 
There is always a possibility of a judicial error due to conjecture and speculation, 
which must be avoided and here the MEW can play an important role. The MEW 
must help to establish that the claim of RIL must be consistent with the proven 
facts and that these proven facts could not be explained by any other logical 
cause or action.94   
In South Africa the res ipsa loquitor principle, would not readily be applied to a 
medical legal situation, but the tendency in opinion is that it should be a “rule of 
sympathy”.95 The onus should still lie on the plaintiff to convince a court that there 
was indeed negligence, and that the damage which was suffered, was (causally) 
in the consequence there-of and not in the natural course of the illness or natural 
complications.96 It was also emphasised in the Pringle v Administrator of 
Transvaal case that the plaintiff must still prove that a substandard of diligence 
and skill was applied before relying on RIL.97 Thus the posture of RIL in medical 
negligence is limited, but it should be introduced provided that it could be derived 
and supported by an absolute fact, which is not depended on the surrounding 
circumstances of a particular case.98 The “requirements” for this in negligence 
cases could be: 
• This injury or harm does not occur ordinarily without negligence, 
• If injury occurred, there would be a high probability of negligence, 
• The facts of the issue is based on inference derived from the occurrence 
alone, 
                                                          
91  Van Den Heever and Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitor and Medical Negligence 10. 
92  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 465. 
93  Pringle v Administrator of Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W) para 384G. 
94  Van Den Heever and Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitor and Medical Negligence 13. Here it is 
important not to camouflage conjecture with terms like “in ordinary human experience” or 
“common sense dictates” and “obviously”. It is also the writer’s view that when 
considering the “absolutes” to justify RIL maxim usage, that medicine and the 
practice of medicine is not an exact science! This the MEW must bear in mind. 
95   Especially by inexperienced legal representatives and MEW, 
96   Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 290. 
97  Pringle v Administrator of Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W) para 395B. 
98  Van Den Heever and Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitor and Medical Negligence 33. 
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• The presence of injury due to negligence must depend on an absolute and 
thus not by only considering surrounding circumstances. 
• The RIL maxim should be permissible only in the absence of other 
acknowledged or known causes. It is important that there must be no 
contributory negligence from the plaintiff’s part.99  
• The control of preventing the injury (the instrumentality) must have been 
under the exclusive control of the defendant for whom the responsibility or 
right to control exists.100   
In a recent case, Goliath v MEC for Health in the Provence of Eastern Cape, still 
unreported at the time of writing a discussion of the use of the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim is given and of its use and value in medical litigation.101 
Facts of the case: 
The main issue in this case, presided by Lowe J, was that a swab or operation 
towel had inadvertently been left in the abdominal cavity following a 
hysterectomy at an Eastern Cape hospital.102 The plaintiff claimed that that 
there was a duty of care and that she had suffered and had pain until her 
second operation to remove the retained swab. It was argued that she had at 
least a 20 per cent chance of needing a further operation in the unforeseeable 
future for intestinal obstruction following inevitable adhesions.103 It was 
emphasised that the facts of a case could be so that negligence could be 
inferred compatible with the RIL doctrine.104 It is further emphasized that in 
appropriate situations that it be used as an aid by the plaintiff.  This was then 
                                                          
99  Van Den Heever and Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitor and Medical Negligence 125. 
100   Van Den Heever and Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitor and Medical Negligence 34. 
101  Goliath v MEC for Health in the Provence of Eastern Cape101 (1084.2012) [2-13] 
ZAECGHC 72 (14 June 2013). Southern Africa Legal Information Institute “Goliath v MEC 
for Health of the Provence of Eastern Cape” 
http://www.saflii.org/za/casa/ZAECGHC/2013/72.htm (Date of use:3 November 2013) 
102  Jaffary S, Asim S, Anwar S et al 2010 JLUMHA (09) 2 page 58. In this article it is mentioned 
that the term medico-legally of a retained operating device or towel should be 
“gossympiboma” (Latin for cotton is “gossympinus”) or “textiloma”. It is admitted the majority 
are due to gynaecological or obstetrical operation (because of deep recess areas and 
bleeding). The majority present within three months with bowel obstruction.  
103  Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC para [10]. 
104  Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC para [51]. 
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argued with the van Wyk v Lewis case,105 that although rejected as applicable 
in the medical negligence, that the use of RIL should be reconsidered.  
Following then the case of Pringle v Administrator Transvaal it was argued by 
the judge that the RIL maxim has application value, provided that the alleged 
negligence will be deducted from an absolute fact and that the mishap could not 
have taken place in reasonable terms, without the alleged negligence.106 By 
implication its use would be exceptional. On the other hand it must be borne in 
mind that if all possible and true circumstances are considered the absolute 
could become “relative”, and then the maxim could not really be applicable.107 
Once the cause of the foundation of an incident in known the RIL maxim can be 
discarded and in this case it was found that the mere fact of a swab left behind 
in a patient is the not necessarily conclusive of negligence.108  
Role of the MEW: 
With the role of a strong and knowledgeable MEW for the defence, a surprising 
case ensued, where the treating doctor and facility were not found liable for 
damages for a retained swab. This revolves also where the MEW (Prof. L. 
Snyman)109 for the defendant, specifically stated that this was a very difficult 
case and thus it would have been any reasonable surgeon that could have left 
a swab in the abdomen in such a case like this case. This would also apply 
more to emergency situations and where the risk of long term harm is limited; it 
would be a fair finding. The plaintiff clearly still has the onus of proving 
negligence and thus a MEW could emphasize this to block a RIL maxim use.110 
The plaintiff’s expert was found faulted because he did not deal with relevant 
factors at the operation where the swab was retained.111  
  
                                                          
105  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438. 
106   Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC para [59]. 
107   Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC para [65]. 
108  Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC para [79]. 
109  Prof. L Snyman - Head of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Kalafong  
Hospital, University of Pretoria. Personal interview.(Date: 7th February 2014). 
110  Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC para [87]. 
111  Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape (1084/2012)[2013]ZAECGHC para [113]. 
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Comments:  
The RIL should however be applied to limited but meritorious cases of medical 
negligence cases, which are within the common knowledge which a MEW could 
support, after the medical evidence had been evaluated.112  However, pending 
the circumstances this case which was wisely led by a MEW experience and 
insight, established a case where the perpetual legal problem of a retained 
swab could be addressed by considering the circumstances prevailing in a 
specific case, and that the RIL would not automatically be used in such cases in 
future.  
Note is taken that though perhaps exceptional, that a South African court had in 
2012, given judicial recognition to the application of the res ipsa loquitor maxim.113 
In this specific case Lungile Ntsele v MEC for Health Gauteng Provincial 
Government,114 a baby was born with brain damage, where it could be proven that 
a prolonged neglected birth process had been the one and only absolute, cause 
for this brain damage.115  
6.3.10 Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic and Another.116  
The handling of conflicting and variant expert opinions has been quite strictly 
addressed and objectivity used in the important case of Michael and Another v 
Linksfield Park Clinic and Another.117 Objectively, the English Law tests of the 
Bolam test and the Bolitho test helped to set a standard to meet, before 
appropriation of blame. The Bolitho test demonstrates that if a professional opinion 
is not capable of withholding logical analysis, the body of opinion is unreasonable 
or irresponsible and must be rejected.118 In the case of Michael and Another v 
                                                          
112  Van Den Heever and Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitor and Medical Negligence 183. 
113  Carstens 2013 Orbiter 348. 
114  Lungile Ntsele v MEC for Health, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009/52394 (GSJ) 24 
October 2012. 
115  Carstens 2013 Orbiter 357. The emphasis here being on “absolute”, and not relying on any 
circumstantial evidence.   
116  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA)  
117  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA)  
118  Merry, McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 165. Bolitho v City and Hackney Health 
Authority (1997) 4 All ER 771. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id199798/Idjudmt/ 
jd971113/boli02,htm. The test is based upon this case where a two year old child died 
following episodes of respiratory distress after being admitted for Croup. Although the child 
did well on the consultant’s round, he deteriorated and the senior registrar was called. She 
did not come to see the child and sent her junior doctor to assess. After initial improvement, 
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Linksfield Park Clinic and Another, the Bolitho test was actually followed thus 
setting the precedent of usage in South African Law.119  
Facts of the case: 
This case came to the Supreme Court of Appeal whilst dealing with the alleged 
negligence of an anaesthetist. Here the judge also deliberated on how to 
handle and asses the medical expert evidence, setting limitations for the 
medical expert evidence.120  This is rather a sad case as the patient was a 
talented young scholar, who broke his nose during a sporting event. A 
rhinoplasty (surgically correcting the fracture deformity) was recommended. 
The patient developed heart arrest after cocaine was administered to control 
bleeding from the surgical site, probably in conjunction with the anaesthetic 
gasses and Inderal, a heart rate blocker, which could have been given 
erroneously. Furthermore, when it was decided to give cardio-conversion to 
resuscitate the patient and normalise the heart, the cardio-convergence 
(defibrillator) machines did not work, although the staff of the hospital claimed 
that it was examined and tested earlier the day as per protocol. The patient 
suffered permanent brain damage. 
The court was faced with the dilemma to evaluate the individual views of all the 
expert witnesses, to determine which testimonies and opinions would be 
reasonable. It was acknowledged that as often occurs, various and conflicting 
expert opinions are expressed.121 Analysis of the essential reasoning would be 
                                                                                                                                                                               
the child once more deteriorated and was then also again not seen and developed 
respiratory failure ensuing in brain death and eventually died. The question was whether this 
child should have been intubated and respiratory supported. The expert opinions were 
opposing and the judgement was in favour of the defended doctors who were not found 
negligent. The fact was emphasized, that if an opinion differed from another, it had to 
withstand logical analyses by the court to be accepted. However, this finding has 
attracted a lot of academic criticism. It is realized had more assertive medical expert 
testimony been given, the finding could have been that of guilty of negligence and the 
appeal upheld. 
119  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 
1189G. It is mentioned that in the presence of various and often conflicting expert opinions 
presented, the court must decide using guidelines like credibility, examining, and logical 
analysis. If the expert opinion cannot be logically supported it will fail to be the reference to 
which a defendant’s conduct is assessed (para 1198 I).  
120  Carsten and Permain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 785. 
121  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 1189G. 
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considered more important before the court decides and reaches its own 
conclusion.122  
Role of the MEW:  
It was noted in the during the appeal that in the court a quo, that none of the 
MEW witnesses could express, even collectively, what the acceptable and 
reasonable anaesthetic practice entailed.123   
It was emphasised that a doctor cannot be absolved on the MEW’s opinion, but 
must have his conduct evaluated in accordance with sound practices. The court 
must be satisfied that an opinion had a logical basis, and the MEW, has “to 
apply his mind” in considering comparative risks and benefits in reaching a 
defensible conclusion. The court was forced to evaluate each MEW’s evidence 
and then to determine whether and to what extent these were based on logical 
reasoning. If obvious risks had been overlooked, the opinion would not be 
reasonable even if it was an opinion universally held.124 It was held that a 
decision of the court could be swayed if a body of opinion is not able to 
withstand logical analysis.125 Although the court found that the anaesthetist 
presented false evidence to exonerate him, the appeal did not succeed and that 
it was found that the trial judge was right to dismiss the claim.126 
Comments:  
This case is a landmark case in South African medical law, as this case 
emphasised that although the four medical expert witnesses did not present a 
joint or collective view, the court using the English rules of the Bolam and 
Bolitho tests, stated that even if an opinion is held by the minority, it will still be 
considered. Eventually the view was accepted to consider only such evidence 
                                                          
122  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 1189G. 
123  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 788. 
124  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 1189I. 
This is where reference was made to the Bolitho case i.e. Bolitho v City and Hackney Health 
Authority 616 [1998] AC 232(HL), implying that the expert’s testimony must be scientifically 
correct and logical.  
125  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 1190A. 
The court did mention that MEWs tend to asses a case in terms of scientific certainty and 
not in terms of a balance of probabilities.  
126  Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 1190E. 
Costs were awarded for the plaintiffs, and the anaesthetist was reported to the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa for a disciplinary finding.  
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which was scientifically correct and logical. It was also stressed that there is a 
difference regarding scientific and judicial proof. Although the medical 
profession sets the standard for the reasonable man, the court need not be 
bound to it. If the reasoning is not logical it is not reasonable evidence.127 The 
true test therefore for expert medical opinion should be that the opinion is 
objective and must reflect the standard of accepted medical practices in the 
specific circumstances.  The MEW must realise therefore that a judgment is 
dependent on the credibility and reliability of the MEW, which is paramount.128   
6.3.11 Silver v Premier Gauteng Provincial Government.129  
It seems that a problem often encountered by a MEW is that there is confusion, 
exacerbated by the legal team’s inset, regarding the cause of the harm a patient 
would claim for. This could lead to a severe miscarriage of a judgement if not 
identified and corrected. The MEW must play a leading role in these 
circumstances. A case that could be used as an example here is the case of Silver 
v Premier Gauteng Provincial Government.130 The emphasis on factual causation 
is also highlighted to facilitate the assessment is such cases. 
Facts of the case: 
The plaintiff was admitted to a general hospital with the diagnosis of 
pancreatitis, which in itself could over the course of a few days, become a life 
threatening situation. After being admitted to an intensive care unit he was put 
on a ventilator respiratory support for facilitation of respiration. For this he had 
to be sedated, but he also had diabetes and kidney failure needing dialysis from 
kidney machines as life support. For practical reasons he was so sedated that 
he could not move him and as he was in a low blood pressure (hypotensive) 
state he had under perfusion of his skin. With all these factors he inadvertently 
developed a bedsore of his sacral (lower back and gluteal) areas. The plaintiff 
eventually recovered but could hardly walk and blamed the bedsore that he 
claimed was caused by an omission, which was considered negligent in that he 
                                                          
127  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 790. 
128  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 791. 
129  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (WLD). 
130  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (WLD). 
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was not moved enough to ensure sufficient blood perfusion of the skin.131  The 
defendant countered that this was mainly due to complications flowing forth 
from the pancreatitis, and thus in the course of such a disease there was a risk 
of pressure sores occurring irrespective of any reasonable treatment.132 The 
presiding officer Cloete J said that if the defendant’s legal team was correct, the 
plaintiff cannot succeed in his claim, as the factual test of causation would not 
be satisfied.133   
Role of the MEW: 
It is obvious then that the presiding officer had to rely on the scientific 
explanation regarding the causation, as set out by MEWs. The factual 
causation then had to be emphasised using the “but for” test and any other 
unlawful conduct was eliminated, that the event causing the harm would have 
occurred probably in any case, and thus the sine qua non test needed detailed 
application.134  Because the damage could not be determined to have flowed 
naturally and directly from the defendant’s breach of contract, the factual 
causation cause here had carried the weight and the court was satisfied.135 The 
court held that, despite adequate care, the patient would have had on all 
probabilities, still have developed a bedsore.136  This served as a portal of 
germs, and the patient regardless of ideal treatment regimens would have 
suffered such complications irrespectively of any negligence and the case was 
dismissed.137   
Comments:  
Although much emphasis is placed on judicial cause, this case serves to 
demonstrate that fair and reasonable findings would not have been made, 
without proper testimony and opinion of a knowledgeable MEW. The plaintiff, 
who had the burden of proof, could not succeed in the claim based on delict, 
                                                          
131  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (W) para 569H. 
132  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (W) para 569 I. 
133  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 828. 
134  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (W) para 570E. 
135  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (W) para 570H. 
136  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (W) para 570I. 
137  Silver v Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government 1998 (4) SA 569 (W) para 571D. 
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(although the claim was found in contract) as the factual sine qua non test for 
causation was not satisfied.138  
The plaintiff emphasised that in terms of implied agreement and duty to care 
the nursing staff should have exercised due care, skill and diligence. Although 
remoteness of damage was mooted by the defence, the factual test also still 
had to be satisfied.139 Because the patient would have, due to faecal 
contamination of the area, still had developed this complicated bedsore 
irrespective of any negligence, this case was dismissed. Thus the MEW must 
bear in mind in similar cases that delictual liability for alternate causes of 
complications of a debilitating illness must be based on factual causation, 
before judicial causes can be applied. A MEW must use his medical knowledge 
acutely and with lateral thinking to bear important facts in mind which must be 
discussed, regardless of criticism, as the law cannot be divorced from its factual 
context.140    
6.3.12 S v Kramer and Another141 
When an operating team goes into action with an operation, all members of this 
team work in conjunction with one another, but if a negligent act causes harm, 
injury or death, it is necessary to really determine what amount of negligence 
every individual, i.e. the surgeon, the anaesthetist or the nursing staff, had 
contributed in the sum of the total effect. The case of S v Kramer and Another 
establishes the significance and importance to this principle and also highlights the 
role of the imperitia culpae adnumerator maxim.142  
Facts of the case: 
The accused No 1 was an ear, nose and throat (ENT) specialist who had an 
ostensibly junior inexperienced general practitioner (accused No 2) as a 
designated “anaesthetist”. In an anaesthetic adverse event a ten year old girl 
died, during a tonsillectomy, when the endotracheal tube had apparently not 
                                                          
138  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 828.  
139  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 829. 
140  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 833. The 
italics part is the dissertation writer’s own opinion! 
141  S v Kramer and Another 1987 (1) 887 (W). 
142  S v Kramer and Another 1987 (1) 887 (W). 
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been correctly inserted into the airway. Dark blood, encountered with the 
surgical procedure in progress, signified that the airway and oxygenation was 
compromised and in due course heart arrest ensued. The anaesthetist “froze” 
and the ENT surgeon then re-intubated the patient, but resuscitative measures 
were unsuccessful, also because the theatre was ill equipped and had no heart 
monitor. Because accused No 1 had then left the theatre and accused No 2 
“froze” and did nothing, both were found guilty of culpable homicide in a 
Magistrates Court. This case was then heard as an appeal case in a high court 
with Van der Merwe J being the presiding officer. 
Role of the MEW:  
The MEW had to assist in the various aspects of negligence of both the 
accused as well as in the defence. It was stated that accused No 1 failed to 
ascertain whether accused No 2 had adequate experience and training to 
administer anaesthetics for a tonsillectomy.143  The court a quo found that the 
combined acts or omissions of both doctors caused the death but accused No 2 
failed to properly assess, monitor and to begin resuscitative measures.144  
Although it was granted that accused No 1 should have known that the 
anaesthetist was relatively inexperienced and that the endotracheal tube could 
have been placed wrongly, he was not faulted and it was quoted that:  
A medical practitioner is not expected to bring to bear upon the case entrusted to him 
the highest possible degree of professional skill, but he is bound to employ reasonable 
skill and care; and he is liable for the consequences if he does not.145 
Reasonableness as well as reasonable skill and care were emphasized. Thus it 
was stated that if a mishap should occur during the operation, it would be of 
importance to ascertain who was responsible and to what extent any other 
member of the operating team can be held liable for the actions of that 
person.146  
                                                          
143  S v Kramer and Another 1987 (1) 887 (W) para 889D. 
144  S v Kramer and Another 1987 (1) 887 (W) para 889I. 
145  S v Kramer and Another 1987 (1) 887 (W) para 893F. The quote used here, comes from the 
case of Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519 at 525. 
146  S v Kramer and Another 1987 (1) 887 (W) para 895C. 
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The MEW emphasised that a trained anaesthetist would have, even with limited 
facilities, found that the tube in the airway was incorrectly placed and would 
have taken immediate action. The MEW was instrumental to have drawn the 
line, facilitating the correct judgement regarding the omission and delayed 
action of the untrained inexperienced doctor.147 
The court found that, generally speaking, neither the surgeon nor the 
anaesthetist is liable for the other’s negligence, subject to exceptions like where 
the surgeon or anaesthetist is totally incompetent.148  It was found that as the 
“anaesthetist” was an inexperienced general practitioner, that this fact created a 
sense of shock and thus the appeal failed. The surgeon was dismissed as his 
appeal succeeded.  
Comments:  
It is demonstrated in this case that each and every practitioner is to be judged 
individually and his relevant actions scrutinised. Although this case never 
directly referred to the imperitia culpae adnumerator rule,149 the principle of this 
rule was held against the general practitioner who was untrained and 
inexperienced in ENT anaesthetics. 
A dilemma can be confronted when more than one doctor / professional person 
is involved in complicated cases. This is demonstrated in the sad case of S v 
Nel 1987 TPD (unreported) where a general practitioner failed to timeously 
consult a specialist obstetrician when he had encountered problems during a 
delivery. The patient eventually died. It was mentioned that the anaesthetist, 
whilst administering Pentothal and Halothane,150 could have caused the death 
of this exhausted and shocked patient. This argument was rejected by the court 
with the statement that “anything can happen, but whether it was probable”. It 
was mentioned that a MEW would have helped the court better with real 
objective scientific contributions, by explaining how real the possibility had been 
                                                          
147  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 762 
148  S v Kramer and Another 1987 (1) 887 (W) para 895E. 
149  Hiemstra and Gonin Trilingual Legal Dictionary 201. Latin phrase imperitia culpae 
adnumerator here meaning “for the want of skill as reckoned as a fault”.  
150  Pentothal, a long acting phenobarbitone used as an induction agent for anaesthetics in 
conjunction with Halothane, a main anaesthetic gas, in a shocked exhausted patient could 
give heart arrest. These products are presently not in general use anymore.  
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that administration of the substances could have caused the death. The MEW 
must, as the judge observed, “avoid to simply take a shot in the dark”. Likewise 
in the case of De La Rouviere v SA Medical Council151, where the appellant 
was sentenced to suspension and erasure had lodged an appeal in a high 
court, the appeal was upheld. It was found that the quality of the evidence was 
lacking and that the doctor did not have a proper trial. The shocking finding was 
that on a question of the standard of proof, namely distinct balance of 
probabilities, some members (and MEWs) unwittingly failed to apply their minds 
properly to the evidence.152 
MEWs must strive to be as objectively as possible with logical scientific 
reasoning.153  
The most practical way of addressing such problems is to separate and divide the 
fields and the actions of the individual doctors and specialists and then to go 
through their actions to ascertain each his own, if any, role in a medical negligence 
claim.154 
6.4 The role of the Medical Expert Witness in Special Courts and alternative 
dispute mechanisms 
Reform measures in the medical professional litigation in South Africa should be 
implemented like in New Zealand, Australia and the UK inter alia to limit the legal 
costs and amounts awarded to claimants. Presently both the South African 
medical and medical insurance industries as well as the government realise that 
the claims situation needs to be urgently changed.155   
Special courts to expedite valid medico-legal claims, via mediation and arbitration, 
should be made available. Capping of amounts to be awarded must be 
implemented especially for State patients, as the claims payments are indeed 
spiralling out of proportion. The fees of medical malpractice lawyers should also 
                                                          
151  De La Rouviere v SA Medical Council 1977 (1) SA 85 (N). 
152  De La Rouviere v SA Medical Council 1977 (1) SA 85 (N) para106A. 
153  Strauss Doctor, Patient and the Law 181.  
154  Merry and McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 44. 
155  Malherbe 2013 SAMJ 84. 
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be limited, thus preventing inflated claims.156 This could prevent the channelling 
away of funds that could be better spent on patient care.157  
As the risk of medical negligence litigation could never be totally eliminated, the 
rate of claims will keep on rising, especially as patients become more aware of 
their rights.158  
6.4.1 The role of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms  
To counter the increasing litigation alternative forms have litigation should be 
sought. Although the method known as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in 
medical negligence litigation is gaining international favour,159 it is still poorly 
understood amongst doctors and legal teams in South African medical law. ADR is 
then an alternative of a formal civil procedure litigation trial, attempting to resolve 
legal disputes in this case arising out of the allegations of medical professional 
negligence.160 There are three main structures of ADR consisting mainly of 
negotiation (involving a structured bargaining and debate), mediation (here a 
neutral impartial third party, who could be a professional medical person or a legal 
person would assist the parties to reach a settlement) and arbitration (being more 
formal in that an impartial arbitrator will adjudicate and make a final as well as 
binding, decision after hearing evidence and arguments from all parties).161  
It would be ideal if parties in medical litigation, at the consent stage, would agree 
contractually, that if a dispute would occur that they would subject it to arbitration. 
This would be under auspices and regulations of the Arbitration Act,162 which 
presently is used elsewhere in the RSA.163  
The advantages of ADR is first and foremost that cases could be expedited, 
avoided long delays as cases are put on the roll for high courts and civil 
                                                          
156  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 115. 
157   Malherbe 2013 SAMJ 84. This is especially necessary as the highest claim to be paid at the 
time of writing in SA was over R 24million, and for a State patient, R 15million.   
158   Malherbe 2013 SAMJ 83. 
159  Freckelton and Mendelson Causation in Law and Medicine 115. 
160  Greer 2009 AAOS http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/jul09/managing7.asp (Date of use: 3 
March 2014) 
161  Theophilopus, Rowan, Van Heerden et al Foundational Principles of Civil Procedure 5. 
162  Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. Still mainly used in Labour and industrial disputes. 
163  Theophilopus, Rowan, Van Heerden et al Foundational Principles of Civil Procedure 5. 
174 
 
proceedings. This would be more cost effective for all parties.164 The ADR also 
takes place in private and media might not be allowed. Thus the reputation of a 
defendant doctor is protected and a plaintiff might be spared the stressful 
experience of cross examination. The arbitrator will have sufficient medical and 
legal knowledge to make fair findings. The other main advantage is that the MEWs 
on behalf of the various parties would be able to debate and argue their opinions 
and testimony without fear of aggression and confrontation, assisted by their legal 
teams. All parties can participate and is voluntary and have an actual say in the 
final outcome. However time limitation could be applied for each party to put their 
side as well as cap limitation on compensation.165 The anguish of unpredictable 
findings of a high court which would prolong the endurance of the case will be 
preventable and MEWs should know and be prepared to rather appear before an 
arbitrator. Errors of judgment made by a MEW would be more easily retracted and 
excused without any embarrassment.166  
Frivolous medical malpractice claims and “case building” could be prevented. The 
exact cause of the condition or the series of events that caused an adverse event 
and possible medical negligence are then not obscured, and all parties would be 
able to understand the issues.167  
There are disadvantages and sometimes for the plaintiff it would be “harder to sell” 
the plaintiff’s side. Doctors and MEW might be adverse to agree to mediation and 
arbitration, with concerns to their reputation and desire to defend their care. As 
doctors would have to contractually avail themselves to arbitration if the patient 
has a dispute, the doctors could feel that an open contract in the informed consent 
process would actually encourage frivolous litigation. This would also create the 
impression that the doctor would want to shy away from the High Courts as he has 
many litigation prone habits and prohibiting the patient to go through a ‘normal” 
civil litigation process.168 Here confidentiality clauses should allay these fears. The 
                                                          
164  Greer 2009 AAOS http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/jul09/managing7.asp 1 (Date of use: 
3 March 2014). 
165  Metzloff 1996 Wake Forest Law Review 228. 
166  Greer 2009 AAOS http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/jul09/managing7.asp 2 (Date of use: 
3 March 2014). 
167  Kennedy and Grubb Medical Law: Texts with Material 467. 
168  Stein http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billof health/2013/08/29/the-incentives to arbitrate-
medical-malpractice –disputes (Date of use: 3 March 2014).  
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settlement is then confidential and private and will not or cannot be published 
publicly. It must be realised by all parties the Arbitration is voluntary, in that there 
is agreement by all of this avenue, and binding in that the dispute is conclusively 
resolved with no or very limited rights to appeal.169  However it is inevitable that 
facts of the case and settlement would emerge at some stage making the 
physician and MEW feel vulnerable. The largest disadvantage is that lessons 
learnt from a case would not be easily known as no reporting of the case would be 
allowed. Some form of reporting must be done for monitoring purposes by a 
professional medico-legal, maintaining confidentiality. Some compromise must be 
reached between the public’s “right to information”, the professional bodies 
monitoring the standard of health care and the privacy, reputation and good name 
of the professional person.170  
The future internationally of ADR seems to be vibrant and MEW must be prepared 
for an increase of this method, because Courts themselves will be making 
mediation and arbitration approaches mandatory, lessening their work load and 
alleviating the numerous problems with the current litigation systems.171 The South 
African MEW should then strive to get some form of legal training and should 
attend mediation and arbitration courses which would enable them to give a 
sensible and cost-effective service to the litigating parties. This is where special 
courts, mediation and arbitration could play a major role under the auspices of a 
highly trained and knowledgeable MEW. The ultimate aim is to establish a 
medical-legal system, that by using the MEW correctly, that there should be little 
need to resort to formal litigation.172  
It is important, especially here in South Africa, that a MEW should adhere to a 
“Code of Ethics” which would mainly consist of the MEW to be uninfluenced, 
independent, be factual and have reasonable assumptions and be objective. The 
MEW must remain in his field of expertise. It should further be stated, that if the 
provided data was insufficient to use as a basis for establishing facts, that the 
                                                          
169   Metzloff 1996 Wake Forest Law Review 204. 
170  Greer 2009 AAOS http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/jul09/managing7.asp 3 (Date of use: 
3 March 2014). 
171  Metzloff 1996 Wake Forest Law Review  203. Although this article had been written in 1996, 
it is still most applicable in present times. 
172   Carey Medical Negligence Litigation 143. 
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MEW may change his opinion, even if the other party’s expert report provides 
additional material to be considered.173    
The testifying physician, as some SA case studies show (Lourens v Oldwage 2006 
(2) SA 161 (SCA), Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic Ltd and Another 
2001(3) SA 1188(SCA) and others) particularly in professional liability ADR cases 
should: 
• Assess the merits of the case separately from and before agreeing to testify. 
• Insist in reviewing all the records thoroughly. It could be argued that the 
patient must be examined by the MEW.174 
• Develop a solid medical posture for each case and review the case in a 
balanced critical manner. 
• Articulate carefully the standard of care before expressing it in the 
deposition. 
• Stay within the role and duty as an expert witness and not as an advocate.175  
A MEW should take advantage of the opportunity offered ADR, like being 
forewarned within a given situation, to generate novel and inventive outcomes.176 
This must combine self-knowledge and confidence, the role expected to be 
performed and the understanding of medico-legal strategies and tactics. This then 
implies that the medical expert witness must have some form of legal training and 
qualifications to perform to these criteria. From as early as possible, the 
designated MEW should assist the physician under litigation.177  
6.5  The dilemma of the “Expert Paradox” 
This concept of the “expert paradox” is also emerging as a dilemma MEW’s. As no 
presiding officer could judge the contents or accuracy of expert witnesses one 
against the other, a ruling should be enforced that the opposing witnesses should 
meet and settle their opinions and differences as much as possible, the one 
                                                          
173  Meintjes-Van Der Walt 2003 Child Abuse Research SA 45.  
174   Recommendation at WAML Congress in Maceio, Brazil 2012. 
175  Hookman Medical Malpractice Expert Witnessing 405. Quoting from the article “Practical 
Measures to Reduce Medical Expert Witness Bias” (Journal of Forensic Science 1989 4 (5) 
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arguing that his opinion is the better than the other and the other perhaps 
conceding on certain facts.178 This is then often attempted by getting expert 
witnesses to give a joint notice or statement. However in practice this seldom 
works efficiently, adding to everybody’s dissatisfaction.  This statement would 
enhance and make the MEWs so much more reliable and add weight and 
credibility to a “united” expert opinion.179  
If there are differences, then the reasons and arguments are set out before hand 
and discussed. If not, a disciplinary hearing or a court is placed in an untenable 
position to decide between the disagreeing experts. This is then the main problem 
of the “expert paradox”, in that the “expertness” loses its value.180 
Due to a lack of medical knowledge, the legal profession cannot control the 
experts. The legal team then enforces the MEW to “reason like a lawyer” and the 
MEW, wishes the legal team to “think like a doctor”, the first reasoning on “true 
facts” and the latter on deductions, assumptions and probabilities, thus 
contributing to the dilemma of the “expert paradox”.181  
The aim here should be to always strive to have more than two experts agreeing. 
The joint conclusion of the expert witness could be given as credible proof. If there 
are differences it could be minimalised. The logical setting out of the opinions 
could shorten the trial length and enhance effectiveness and a satisfactory finding. 
It saves time and money. The ideal is that a settlement will be reached before trial.  
The danger is that a MEW could be instructed not to change his opinion, or cling 
to an unreasonable point. The main purpose is to lessen the difference between 
expert witnesses, but they need not settle while they at least can discuss and 
identify differences. Thus they can define reasons why there are disagreement 
and find ways of solving the differences. It could still be an advantage especially if 
the agreed upon issues are listed, the disunity showed on points and 
                                                          
178  This is at presently done and encouraged by the MEW’s joint statement notice that is set up. 
Unfortunately the conditions under which this is often set up is unsatisfactory like positioning, 
unwillingness to compromise, discuss and concede points. 
179   Gomez 2005 The Journal of Legal Medicine 390. 
180  Hoving 2012 Nederlands Juristenblad 873. 
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recommendation given for the judge to contemplate. This also takes the 
subjectivity out of the field of the MEW, levelling the playing field for all.182  
The MEW can also get an opportunity to change his opinion without 
embarrassment. With maximal use of professional freedom, knowledge and 
experienced used, new insights are obtained promoting the interests of justice. If 
there are instructions to prevent the experts meeting, as punitive measures, the 
judge should disallow the transgressor party’s expert evidence. The parties need 
not agree, but at least they can logically put their reasons to a judge why they do 
not accept consensus, for example the expert is testifying outside his field of 
expertise or is known to be inexperienced or incompetent.183  
Although difficult to achieve in all cases of alleged professional negligence, a case 
must be referred to a “forum of expert witnesses” with the purpose of streamlining 
and promoting expert testimony. These experts, from the academia as well as 
private practice, should act as diligens paterfamilias and not so much as 
professional witnesses.184 High quality of expert evidence can however only be 
achieved with appropriate medico-legal and additional legal training.185 
Procedures should be changed to allow both parties to agree on the expert 
witnesses at the outset. The danger of a “battle” of experts could ensue and must 
be prevented, perhaps by a mediator. Obviously legal representatives would want 
to call experts who will be most helpful to their client’s case, but it is unfortunately 
true that some experts show little impartiality or objectiveness. Highly qualified and 
niche experts may not be the best MEWs to give opinions on accepted practice by 
reasonable average practitioners. The insistence to use these types of witnesses 
must be counterbalanced by a warning that their witnessing could be viewed as 
perjury under oath. The General Medical Council v Meadow would be a prime 
locus classicus case.186  
It is argued by the American Medical Association that giving medical expert 
testimony is actually the same as the practice of medicine and subjected to all its 
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185   Redlinghuys, Butow, Carstens 2006 South African Dental Journal 137. 
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ethical and stated rules as well as norms. Thus unprofessional conduct of a MEW 
must be disciplined, just as unprofessional conduct of the average doctor. The 
MEW must be able to be held accountable, by proposed legislation, peer review 
boards, reporting to data banks and having some form of qualification and 
registration. MEWs who are untruthful, miasmatic or even have fabricated opinions 
“for hire” must be deterred.187  This should be taken note of by the South African 
medico-legal community.  
6.6 Conclusion 
Although it could be concluded that the South African judicial system has few or 
any proper, trained, qualified and experienced MEWs, the expertise witness and 
testimony as well as opinions, under guidance of judicial officers, have generally 
been of a high standard. The MEW must be guided by the purpose of helping and 
aiding the court to reach a fair, equitable, reasonable and justifiable finding. Every 
medical professional negligent case is unique, thus the MEW must evaluate and 
testify in such a way that all aspects of an expert testimony, should be borne in 
mind. With legal background the MEW should be able to formulate a proper case, 
via the elements of delictual law and causality. 
A great source of learning aspects of a MEW is gained from many case reports 
and the main points of being an effective MEW is discussed under the appropriate 
headings. The central binding theme still comes down to causality and whether the 
alleged negligent act or omission was indeed the cause of the harm or injury. Also 
the background evaluation of the “reasonable man” subjective definition must be 
applied before any blame could be put on the defending doctor. Thereafter 
therapeutic privilege and informed consent must be weighed into the opinion. 
Every step in giving an opinion or testimony must be logical and scientifically 
supported.  The MEW must be seen to be objective, fair, reasonable, trustworthy 
and credible, possessing the ability to reason logically and scientifically correct. He 
or she must be able to communicate effectively, even under the adversarial legal 
system, to the court. The average South African MEW, even of high academic 
standard, has very limited legal insight and background and makes himself and his 
testimony vulnerable. To counter these problems, proper training, briefing and 
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advice must be given to MEW’s, who preferably should have some legal 
background.  
The MEW must know how to handle conflicting expert opinions and under 
guidance of the legal team, there should be a joint statement issued for the use of 
all parties and the court to facilitate the court case and expedite the legal process. 
More work should be done by all concerned to facilitate this and also to use the 
MEW, even as a mediator and if trained, as an arbitrator in medical litigation. By 
using the MEW, reforms in litigation should be introduced (like capping damage 
claims) and consolidating all defences of the medical profession under guidance of 
MEW’s. “Rules” could be enforced by a body or panel of medical expert witnesses. 
The dilemma of the “expert paradox”, where doctors are forced to reason like 
lawyers and where MEWs with the same qualifications would contradict one the 
other, could be prevented. The aim, especially in the RSA, is that the MEW should 
be subjected to all the ethical rules and norms of practicing good medicine. This in 
South Africa could only be achieved with appropriate medico-legal training.188 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
“I beseech you…., think it possible you may be mistaken” – Oliver Cromwell (1650)1 
 
7.1 Summary 
The malpractice litigation quagmire is not the fault of the “onerous efforts of 
lawyers” but rather due to MEWs, who because of opportunism and greed, exploit 
the judicial system.2  
It must be remembered that society changes with time and so also its values – O 
tempore, o mores.3 The law and its application follows suit with the values of 
people and society determining much of the seriousness of offences, whether an 
offence is contra bono mores, “abhorrent” or “not in favour of public opinion”. In 
the medical litigation field a lot of antagonistic public opinion is directed against the 
medical and especially the surgical disciplines. It is contrite medical opinion that 
medical litigation in the RSA is more about winning than about justice. For this 
reason it is important to reach a resolution by mediation or arbitration.4 It is 
presumed that if so, more medical witnesses will become available. The so-called 
“medical wall of silence” phenomenon, which in most cases result in litigation, 
would be uplifted, eventually lessening legal action and costs.5   
A conclusion is made that a MEW and the legal team must understand this 
increase in medical litigation and the adverse effects it can have on the practice of 
medicine and medical practitioners. The legal team and the medical expert 
witness should strive to play such an ethical role that through medical litigation, 
the effect would be to improve the general standard of medical care. Many tests 
and rules have been defined to help comprehend the value and interpretation of 
the medical expert witness. The common factor in these “tests” is to determine an 
                                                          
1   Quoted by Adv. Emiel van Vuuren, lecture Medical Malpractice Seminar, University of 
Pretoria 29 September 2012, referring to it as the Cromwellian Challenge every MEW and 
Lawyer, in fairness and reasonableness, must ask himself during a trial.   
2   Smith and Madden The Surgical Litigation Crises 14. 
3    Latin phrase bewailing: “o the times, o the morals”. 
4   Herring Medical Law and Ethics 206. 
5   Prof Dawid McQuid Mason as quoted in Bateman 1995 SAMJ 78. 
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outcome on the balance of probabilities, to avoid speculation, that statements 
must be based on a degree of acceptance in a specialised field and especially the 
Daubert rule must be accepted where the journal evidence must be relevant, 
reliable and be of help to a court. The MEW and legal teams should demonstrate 
an understanding of and the correct application of the mentioned legal tests which 
could be of help.6 Causes, as times have changed with the Medico-legal “deluge” 
must be taken note of as many factors here could form the angle of approach in 
the defence or prosecution. Note should also be taken of the so-called “hired-gun” 
witness. In the RSA paradigm shifts have occurred, complicated by consumerism, 
impersonality and financial constraints. The locus classicus case of Van Wyk v 
Lewis, has been studied worldwide emphasising the application of the “reasonable 
man” test.7 
Negligence as a main act of omission must be defined and well understood, 
especially by a MEW. Negligence must be verified and knowledge of concepts 
here would avoid fruitless and unnecessary litigation. To help, the legality 
principles of criminal law could apply like the ius acceptum principle and several 
others. The borders of negligence must be defined as whether abandonment 
could be negligent and the circumstances, like a case of a retained swab during 
an operation. The study of case law would help here. With negligence, causation 
must be proven and tests like for a factual cause need to be done in the conditio 
sine qua non test and judicially in, i.a. the proximate cause test also known as “the 
but for…” test. 
Other dilemmas making a case difficult is an absence of a proper history, that no 
thorough clinical examination was done and the presence of unreasonable and 
unrealistic expectations. Medical practitioners have limited medico-legal 
knowledge and great pressure could be brought on a practitioner to admit and 
resolve an issue, compromising fairness and justice. The lack of imputed 
knowledge amongst lay people is a factor and must be used as a reasonable 
defence. The proof must also be understood as it is the key issue in any litigation. 
Proof is essential for any litigious resolution but is afflicted with conundrums, 
influenced by complex rules and objective as well as subjective tests.  
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In regard of the requirements and expected qualities of a MEW, knowledge about 
medical litigation is most important. The definition of malpractice must be known, 
but also that of professional negligence. This involves understanding “duty of 
care”, an adverse outcome, failure to provide a good standard of care and direct 
causality. The term expert must not be mistakenly interpreted as having above 
average and exceptional knowledge but emphasis must be on competence, 
knowledge and ability to aid a court. 
The concept of errors and the definition of errors of judgement must be 
understood. The “substitution test” must be used namely whether another person 
in the same circumstances would have behaved differently”. This is closely related 
to the “reasonable person test” which now creates the dilemma that its limitations 
are the failure to take actual “reasonable” situations and people into account! The 
legal processes must be understood and warnings are given why textbooks and 
journal articles as evidence could give rise to many pitfalls, due to wrong 
interpretations. Pending a case, the so-called Daubert rules regarding medical 
literature as evidence, would apply emphasizing that there must be peer review, 
random controlled studies, the error rate must be known and the article must be 
widely accepted in the particular scientific community. An expert’s testimony must 
be based upon a reasonable degree of acceptance.  
When comparing the South African aspects with other legal systems, it is obvious 
that as the worldwide incidence is rising as far as medical litigation is concerned, 
virtually every legal system has to adapt and find new applications. The high cost 
of indemnity insurance is fast becoming unaffordable. In South Africa there are no 
distinct guidelines, in the form of books which every doctor can use and study like 
in Canada, Australia and the UK. Obviously a solution is that costs and claims 
must be limited and caps put in place, as in Ireland, the UK and Australasia. Non-
patrimonial damage claims must be more realistic. Legal reforms must be done 
and in Australia after the collapse of an insurer in 2001, recommendations have 
been made. Patients must be better informed of foreseeable risks.  
7.2 Suggestions and recommendations  
The defences for a doctor in litigation must be consolidated in that all data must be 
shared and litigation monitored. Contributory negligence and the voluntary 
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acceptance of procedures must be mentioned if applicable. Emergency cases 
leading to litigation must be seen more fairly to the defendant, as likely errors of 
judgement will be increased under such circumstances. Patients, who have 
suffered harm and injury, should have adequate support. An effective system must 
be in place for the early identification of doctors becoming “grossly” negligent, 
incompetent or impaired. 
There is a strong case of developing the “no-fault” system backed up by mediation 
and arbitration. Here the extended role of the MEW is important. The MEW must 
adhere to ethical principles towards all parties. The MEW must not be a victim to 
the pitfall of case building, based on wrong assumptions like the “post hoc, ergo 
propter hoc” weaknesses. The causation must be understood as the pivotal point, 
bearing in mind the factual causation versus the legal causation expressed at first 
with the proximate “but for” test. 
It must be borne in mind by legal teams that the MEW can pay a high price 
amongst his peers by being exposed to continuous tension, cost-risk benefit, lost 
friendships and loss of respect. The MEW must also guard against false testimony 
with inaccuracies, misleading testimonies or being biased. 
The MEW could play a major role in preventative strategies. Here the MEW could 
through education, promote the Bolam principle, the modified Bolam rule and the 
Bolitho rule. The MEW must understand the principle of res ipsa loquitor where the 
emphasis presently should be on res ipsa neglegentia. It is accepted that these 
arguments cannot be presented primarily but after argumentation could and 
should be presented on a secondary level as support argumentation. The MEW, if 
statistics are to be used, must ensure that it is well studied and clearly argued. It 
must be made applicable to the case in casu realising that it is a particular case. 
The MEW must understand and define negligence. The dilemma of multiple doctor 
involvement and complicated cases must be simplified in discussing every 
doctor’s individual role and every course of the incidents involved. The 
subconscious insidious influence of ex post facto knowledge (hindsight) must be 
guarded against. The MEW must be aware of the expert paradox where one form 
is where vehemently disagreeing expert witnesses are presenting their cases and 
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secondly, where doctors are forced to think like lawyers and lawyers think like 
doctors.  
7.3 Conclusions regarding the points of departure, assumptions and 
hypotheses 
 
The point of departure, assumptions and hypotheses is that the medico-legal need 
for qualified and ethical medico-legal expertise and witnesses is great. The 
dissertation tried demonstrate this point. It is also demonstrated and argued that 
the knowledge and practice of medical ethics is the corner stone for effective 
medical expert witnessing. The legal representatives and the so-called medical 
legal expert must therefore be aware of the dilemma regarding the ethics, 
credibility and relevance of the expert witness and the pitfalls comprising mainly of 
irrelevant or wrongly interpreted facts and the building of cases by “trawling”, 
“fishing” or becoming a case of the “hired gun”. This could lead to an 
unsatisfactory finding and outcome of a case. Contributing factors to this 
phenomenon would be and is a conflict of goals between the legal and medical 
fraternity as well as the adversarial court procedures.8  Expert Witnesses must 
know not to usurp the function of the court or prove the law in argument.9 
 
It is trusted that this dissertation will rekindle and create awareness that a MEW 
must be a suitable, fit and proper person, being knowledgeable about their field of 
specialty but also the law. The MEW should be medico-legally qualified as much 
as possible for the improvement of not only the legal standards but also enhancing 
the practice of good medicine via good medico-legal jurisprudence.  
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